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Sports policy is somewhat of ‘a new kid on the block’ for the EU. It only acquired a competence 
in sport following the adoption of Lisbon Treaty in 2007, in force since 2009. This is not to say 
the EU lacks experience in sporting matters. For many years, the EU institutions have grappled 
with the issue of how to reconcile the specificity of sport with the demands of EU law. This 
debate is ongoing, but not the subject of our enquiry. Our focus is to assist the EU in 
considering the merits of adopting a sport diplomacy strategy, first mooted by a High-Level 
Group on Sport Diplomacy in 2016. Four members of that group form part of the research team 
for this study.1 EU action since that report indicates enthusiasm for sport diplomacy. However, 
to act effectively in this relatively new field of EU activity, the EU institutions and the Member 
States require an evidence-base.  
 
The aim of our project was to undertake primary research and stage a series of Multiplier Sport 
Events (MSE) to provide such evidence on the efficacy of sport as a diplomatic tool. During 
our six MSEs, we invited a wide range of actors to share their thoughts and experiences on the 
practice of sport diplomacy. These events reinforced our view of the value of sport in helping 
the EU achieve its external relations ambitions. In this study, we claim that now is the time for 
the EU to act more strategically in this field and adopt an EU Sport Diplomacy Strategy. 
 
Our project received generous financial support under the EU’s Erasmus+ Programme 
(Collaborative Partnerships). The Erasmus+ Programme is a great friend of sport and will be a 
valuable resource assisting the implementation of an EU sport diplomacy strategy. The project 
commenced in January 2019 and concluded in December 2021 following a 12-month Covid-
19 extension. The project was led by Edge Hill University (UK) and the project partners were 
the TMC Asser Institute (Netherlands), the North Macedonian NGO TAKT (Together 
Advancing Common Trust), the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain), ESSCA School of 
Management (France), the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law (Croatia), and the Université 
Catholique de Louvain (Belgium). We co-operated with our associate partner, the Enlarged 
Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) from the Council of Europe and we received academic 
support from our academic reviewers, Associate Professor Stuart Murray (Bond University, 
 
1 Professors Parrish, Perez-Gonzalez, Sonntag and Zintz. 
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Australia, and the Academy of Sport, Edinburgh University, UK) and Dr Simon Rofe (SOAS 
University of London, UK). We are very grateful for this support and to the Erasmus+ 
Programme for facilitating their involvement in our MSEs. The views expressed in this report 
are those of the research team.  
 
Our MSEs were held in Zagreb (June 2019), Madrid (September 2019), Strasbourg (November 
2019), The Hague (March 2020), Skopje (November 2021) with our final flagship event held 
in Brussels (November 2021). Our interim report was published as a special edition of Sport 
and Citizenship. We are grateful to Sport and Citizenship for its support. 
 
The study is multi-authored. Chapter 1 (EU Sport Diplomacy: Background and Context) is 
authored by Professor Richard Parrish and Professor Thierry Zintz. Chapter 2 (Best Practice 
in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples) is authored by Associate Professor Vanja Smokvina 
and Associate Professor Stuart Murray. Chapter 3 (Towards an EU Organizational Culture of 
Sport Diplomacy) is authored by Associate Professor Carmen Perez-Gonzalez. Chapter 4 
(Transnational Actors in Sport Diplomacy: Perspectives of Cooperation) is authored by 
Professor Albrecht Sonntag. Chapter 5 (EU Sport Diplomacy, Mega-Sporting-Events and 
Human Rights) is authored by Dr Antoine Duval. Chapter 6 (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy 













EU Sport Diplomacy: Background and Context 
 
1. Introduction  
“Sports diplomacy is a new term that describes an old practice: the unique power of sport to 
bring people, nations and communities closer together via a shared love of physical pursuits”.2 
Whereas in the above quotation, Murray refers to sports diplomacy (in the plural), our study 
employs the singular, reflecting the common usage in official EU documents. Regardless of 
the preference, the same phenomenon is being observed and is being subject to greater 
academic scrutiny.3 This literature has not only strengthened our conceptual understanding of 
the issue,4 it has also highlighted the success of sport in diverting conflict, assisting with peace 
negotiations and fostering greater cultural understanding, while at the same time revealing that 
sport can fuel or be a source of conflict.5 Sport diplomacy therefore presents two faces, or “two-
halves”6 and whilst it generally represents a low risk and low cost method for states to achieve 
diplomatic objectives, the EU needs to be aware of the challenges that it faces in piecing 
together and implementing a sport diplomacy strategy. As discussed throughout our study, 
these challenges are not only organisational but also relate to questions of how to adopt a 
values-based approach when faced with the realpolitik of international affairs.  
 
The academic literature has both reflected and encouraged a growing practice across the globe 
in which a number of countries are increasingly employing sport to amplify diplomatic 
messages. Our review of good practices, presented later, highlights examples of where sport 
can seek to reconcile estranged relations between states and peoples, promote the image and 
 
2 Murray, S.  (2020) Sports Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Practice. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
International Studies. Accessed at:  
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190846626-e-542 (16 December 2021). 
3 For a review of the literature see Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (TES-D) (2021), Sport Diplomacy: A 
Literature Review of Scholarly and Policy Sources. Accessed at: https://www.tes-diplomacy.org/resources-io2/  
(17 December 2021). 
4 See for example, Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, and Rofe, J. S. 
(2016) Sport and diplomacy: a global diplomacy framework, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 7, 212-230. 
5 Jackson. S. (2013) The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing world, International Area Studies 
Review, 16(3), 274–284. 




reputation of a state, employ sport for peace and development gains, and encourage new 
economic opportunities. As some of the EU’s main partners and competitors are employing 
sport diplomacy, the question should be asked, why is the EU not doing so? With such a rich 
sporting tradition, is it not time the EU turned its attention to this method of advancing its 
interests in the world? Before answering this question, it is worth reflecting on the location of 
sport diplomacy within the wider diplomatic field. 
 
2. Conceptualising Sport Diplomacy 
In recent years, the EU has indeed signalled its intention to make diplomacy and sport 
diplomacy two strong axes of its policy, both foreign and internal. The graphic below positions 
sport diplomacy within the wider diplomacy field and highlights, amongst other things, the 







7 This graphic was first published in the Erasmus+ funded study, Grassroots Sport Diplomacy: Overview, 
Mapping and Definitions. Accessed:  
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2wqkxi39sjm6my4/AABBGvByJV7K67L5b8bNBX1Qa?dl=0&preview=Grassro




Public diplomacy refers to attempts by states to manage the international environment and 
achieve foreign policy goals by engaging foreign publics.8 It concerns “the mechanisms short 
of war used by an international actor (state, international organization, non-governmental 
organization, multi-national cooperation or other player on the world stage) to manage the 
international environment”.9 Within the realm of public diplomacy, a number of common traits 
can be highlighted: (1) it is a key mechanism through which nations foster mutual trust and 
productive relationships; (2) it has state centric foundations but it has evolved so that a 
multitude of actors and networks are now involved; (3) it aims at promoting the national interest 
and advancing the nation’s foreign policy goals; (4) it rests on the leverage of soft power 
resources.10 Coined by Nye, soft power refers to “the nation’s ability to obtain its desired 
outcome not through coercion or payment, but through attraction, particularly through the 
attraction of its culture, its political values and its domestic and foreign policies”.11  
 
Cultural Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy mainly refers to Government sponsored programs intended to inform or 
influence public opinion in other countries. Commonly employed instruments include 
publications, film, TV and radio. Embassies and diplomats play a major role in this one-way 
form of communication. Whereas public diplomacy consists of a nation’s attempt to “explain 
itself to the world”, cultural diplomacy refers to “the use of creative expression and exchanges 
of ideas, information, and people to increase mutual understanding”.12 It establishes a greater 
two-way form of communication with other countries with a greater range of actors being 
involved, including private institutions and NGOs. The EU is no stranger to cultural diplomacy 
having made progress in this field in recent years.13 Over the years, it has also acquired 
 
8 Dubinsky, Y. (2019) From soft power to sports diplomacy: a theoretical and conceptual discussion, Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15, 156–164, at 156. 
9 Cull, N. J. (2009) Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, Figueroa Press.  
10 Nye, J. (2008) Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 616(1), 94-109.   
11 Nye, J. (1990) Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80, 153–171, and Nye J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success 
in World Politics, PublicAffairs Books. 
12 Schneider, C. (2006), Cultural diplomacy: hard to define, but you’d know it if you saw it, Brown Journal of 
World Affairs, Vol.XIII, Issue 1, 2006, at 191. 
13 For political developments see: European Commission (2016), Joint communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, Join/2016/029, accessed 
at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2016%3A29%3AFIN (17 December 2021). 
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considerable experience in the area of educational diplomacy with its Erasmus+ programme 
being the embodiment of its soft power.14 
 
Sport Diplomacy 
Sport diplomacy falls within the framework described above, but one needs to guard against 
the assumption that the world has only just discovered its potential. As already highlighted, 
sport diplomacy might be a relatively new term, but it has ancient roots, illustrated most 
prominently by the Olympic Truce in Ancient Greece in the eighth century B.C. Since then, 
history has been littered with countless examples of sport being used, either strategically or 
sporadically, as an expression of state diplomacy, thus dispelling the myth that sport and 
politics do not mix. A number of incidences are well known to readers such as the ‘ping-pong 
diplomacy’ between China and the United States, ‘cricket diplomacy’ between India and 
Pakistan, ‘hockey diplomacy’ between Canada and the USSR, and ‘baseball diplomacy’ 
between Cuba and the United States (U.S.). As Rofe observes, “when traditional diplomacy 
(be it international or domestic) does not appear to provide an avenue for change, athletes and 
others have used the tremendous audiences at sporting events as a platform for their 
message”.15  
 
These often-cited examples are perhaps known as the public face of sport diplomacy, but they 
are “sporadic, opportunistic and, arguably, somewhat clumsy” and tend to be associated with 
‘traditional sport diplomacy’.16 Whilst this type of sport diplomacy is still practiced, in the 
modern era states have adopted a more nuanced and strategic approach. In this regard, our 
examples of good practice presented below highlight the strategic approaches adopted by 
Australia and the U.S., in which sport diplomacy is no longer understood as state diplomacy 
 
For academic discussion see Carta, C. and Higgot, R. (eds.) (2020) Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the 
Domestic and the International, Palgrave Macmillan. 
14 See for example Ferreira-Pereira, L and Mourato Pinto (2021), Soft Power in the European Union’s Strategic 
Partnership Diplomacy: The Erasmus Plus Programme, in Ferreira-Pereira, L. and Smith, M. (eds) The European 
Union’s Strategic Partnerships, 69-94, Palgrave Macmillan and Piros, S. and Koops, J. (2020) Towards a 
sustainable approach to EU education diplomacy? The case of capacity-building in the eastern Neighbourhood, 
in Carta, C. and Higgot, R. (eds.) Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and the International, 
113-138, Palgrave Macmillan. 
15 Rofe, J.S. (ed.) (2018), Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, Manchester University Press, at 2-3. 
16 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 61. 
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with a sporting backdrop, but rather an attempt to extend the appeal of a nation’s people and 
culture to third countries through the cultivation of people-to-people links, practiced by a wider 
number of players. As Murray explains, from this perspective, ‘modern’ sport diplomacy can 
be understood as the “conscious, strategic and regular” use of sport, sportspeople, sporting 
events and non-state sporting actors by the state to build long-term mutually beneficial ‘people-
to-people’ partnerships with third countries and societies, particularly where relations have 
become estranged.17 The question for the EU is, which diplomatic turn does it want to take – 
traditional or modern?  
 
3. The Road to EU Sport Diplomacy 
 
The EU is an economic, as opposed to a military, power. Soft power, the “power to persuade 
and attract” is, arguably, an underused tool of the EU’s external relations policies.18 At the 
same time, sport is one of Europe’s most appealing attractions to third-country nationals and 
Europe is the home of some of the world’s most recognisable sporting leagues, competitions, 
clubs and athletes. The problem for the EU is that third country nationals tend to regard the EU 
in economic and political terms, whereas Europe is thought of with reference to geography, 
history, society, culture and sport.19 By adopting a strategic approach to sport diplomacy, the 
EU can realign these perceptions amongst external audiences, thereby harnessing the power of 
sport to make the EU ‘brand’ more attractive.  
 
In doing so, the EU will join a number of states across the globe, including some EU Member 
States, who routinely employ sport to amplify diplomatic messages. The question for the EU, 
and one to be addressed in our study, is how should the EU proceed? As a sui generis form of 
political association, the EU is not simply the reconstruction of the state on a larger scale. Will 
sport diplomacy work as well in a supranational context as it does in a national setting?  What 
follows is a chronology of attempts made by the institutions of the EU to plot a path to the 
development of EU sport diplomacy.  Will EU sport diplomacy become the preserve of the 
diplomat, civil servant, European Commissioner, minister and MEP – a reconstruction of 
 
17 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 94. 
18 Pigman G. A. and Rofe J. S. (2014) Sport and diplomacy: an introduction, Sport in Society: Cultures, 
Commerce, Media, Politics, 17(9), 1095-1097, at 1096. 




traditional sport diplomacy at an EU level, or will its approach to sport diplomacy become 
imbued with a more strategic dimension, with a distinct non-state and grassroots character?  
 
An early example of EU diplomacy structured around sport came in 2006 when the European 
Commission and FIFA signed a Memorandum of Understanding to make football a force for 
development in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries.20 The President of the European 
Commission at the time, José Manuel Barroso said: “Football has a great potential of building 
bridges between people. This is particularly important when we look forward to the first FIFA 
World Cup ever to take place in South Africa in 2010. Through this initiative, football will 
contribute to enhancing global capabilities for development.” This initiative highlighted not 
only the potential for the EU to employ sport to advance foreign policy goals, but it also 
revealed the potential for sports bodies to act in a diplomatic space in order to secure their own 
political objectives in terms of relations with public authorities. In recent years, the 
international sports movement has used this diplomatic strength to attempt to leverage 
concessions from the EU in relation to the protection of the autonomy and specificity of sport 
and as a means of seeking safeguards around the perseveration of the so-called ‘European 
model of sport’. The 2006 initiative, repeated in later years, stands as a reminder that private 
actors as well as public bodies practice sport diplomacy.21  
 
A year later, in the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the European Commission hinted at the 
potential for a more systematic deployment of sport diplomacy. The White Paper included a 
section on ‘Sharing our values with other parts of the world’ (s.2.7) in which the Commission 
stated it would “promote the use of sport as a tool in its development policy” and would 
“include, wherever appropriate, sport-related issues such as… cooperation with partner 
countries”.22 At the time, the section received little comment as the Lisbon Treaty, for which 
the White Paper had been prepared for, had not yet entered into force.  
 
In many ways, the Lisbon Treaty was the main political and legal breakthrough for EU sport 
diplomacy. The Treaty included Article 165 TFEU which, amongst other things stated: “The 
 
20 European Commission (2006), European Commission and FIFA sign a memorandum of understanding for 
football in Africa, in the Caribbean and Pacific Countries, IP/06/968, Brussels, 9 July 2006. Accessed at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-968_en.htm?locale=en (17 December 2021). 
21 See for example, Beacom A (2012) International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New Mediators, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
22 European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final (2007).  
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Union shall foster co-operation with third countries and the competent international 
organisations in the field of sport”. As the EU operates under the principle of conferral, it can 
only act within the powers conferred upon it by the Member States. Article 165 settled any 
political and legal doubts regarding the EU’s ability to use sport as part of its external relations 
policies and it has acted as the basis for the EU’s subsequent activity in this field. 
     
In 2010, a Group of Independent European Sports Experts, appointed by Commissioner 
Vassilliou, advised the Commission on priorities in the field of sport and recommended the use 
of sport in the context of the EU’s external relations policies. One member of the current 
research team (Professor Parrish) was a member of the group. In the 2011 Communication on 
Sport, the Commission took forward this recommendation and committed itself to “identify the 
scope for international cooperation in the field of sport with a focus on European third 
countries, in particular candidate countries and potential candidates, and the Council of 
Europe”.23 Also in 2011, sport was for the first time incorporated into the EU’s Erasmus+ 
programme. This equipped the EU with the capacity to deliver practical sport diplomacy 
initiatives, although at the time, the participation of third countries was restricted within the 
programme and so its value could not be fully realised.24  
 
In 2015, in a move signaling a personal commitment to advance EU sport diplomacy, European 
Commissioner Navracsics established two High Level Groups, one on Sport Diplomacy and 
the second on Grassroots Sport. Both groups reported their findings in 2016.25 The Sport 
Diplomacy group advanced recommendations in the context of (1) EU external relations (2) 
promotion of EU values in the context of major sporting events and advocacy and (3) the 
development of an organizational culture of sport diplomacy. Four members of the current 
research team were members of the High-Level Group (Professors Parrish, Perez-Gonzalez, 
Sonntag and Zintz). 
 
23 European Commission (2011), Developing the European Dimension in Sport, COM(2011) 12 final, Brussels, 
18/1/2011. Accessed at:  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0012:FIN:EN:PDF (17 December 2021). 
24 In addition to a number of practice-based projects, the Erasmus+ programme has funded three studies exploring 
the development of EU sport diplomacy: Grassroots Sport Diplomacy (2018-19), Promoting a Strategic Approach 
to EU Sport Diplomacy (2019-21) and Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (2020-21). 
25 European Commission (2016), High Level Group on Sport Diplomacy, June. Accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/policy/cooperation/documents/290616-hlg-sd-final-report_en.pdf(17 
December 2021) and European Commission (2016), High Level Group on Grassroots Sport, June. Accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/policy/cooperation/documents/290616-hlg-gs-final-report_en.pdf  




Having become established as an area of potential interest for the EU, the first political steps 
towards EU sport diplomacy were taken by the Member States. In May 2016, the Council of 
the European Union adopted Council Conclusions on ‘Enhancing Integrity, Transparency and 
Good Governance in Major Sport Events’.26 Within the Conclusions, the Ministers recognised 
the value of hosting major sporting events for transmitting a positive image and that the 
potential for joint hosting of events within the EU exists.  
 
Then in November 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Conclusions on 
‘Sport Diplomacy’ under the Slovak Presidency.27 The Conclusions made a series of 
recommendations to take forward the EU sport diplomacy agenda including, inter alia: raising 
awareness of sport diplomacy in the EU; encouraging cooperation between the EU, public 
authorities and the sports movement; using sport to promote positive sporting and European 
values; using sport diplomacy to advance economic objectives; maintaining sport diplomacy 
on the EU’s political agenda; exploring the possibility of using Sport Ambassadors; promoting 
evidence base research and activities; using sport within the framework of Accession, 
Association, Cooperation and European Neighbourhood agreements; and funding sport 
diplomacy projects, including engaging third countries in the European Week of Sport. 
 
Further ‘softening up’ of the issue was required and to facilitate this the European Commission 
staged an EU Sport Diplomacy seminar in Brussels in December 2016. The seminar brought 
together diplomats, politicians, civil servants and members of the sports community to discuss 
the recommendations of the High-Level Group.28 A second seminar was staged in Brussels in 
December 2017.29 The seminar adopted a series of conclusions on: opening the European Week 
of Sport to Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans states; encouraging the mobility of 
athletes and coaches; and how to use sport to increase the international position of a country.   
 
 
26 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on enhancing integrity, transparency and good 
governance in major sport events, 9644/16, Brussels, 1/6/2016. Accessed at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9644-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 2021). 
27 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, 14279/16, Brussels, 
23/11/16. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14279-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 
2021). 
28 European Commission (2016), Seminar on Sport Diplomacy. Outcomes, 6/12/16. Accessed here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/sport/sites/sport/files/seminar-sport-diplomacy.pdf (17 December 2021). 
29 European Commission (2017), Seminar on Sport Diplomacy, 6/12/2017. Accessed at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/sport/sites/sport/files/report-sport-diplomacy-seminar-2017.pdf (17 December 2021). 
13 
 
Following the adoption of Article 165 TFEU, the EU embarked on a series of multi-annual 
work plans for sport. In the 2017-2020 EU Work Plan for Sport, sport diplomacy was identified 
as a priority theme.30 Paragraph 8 acknowledged, “the need to cooperate with third countries, 
in particular candidate countries and potential candidates to the EU, to promote European 
values through sport diplomacy, and with the competent international organisations in the field 
of sport, including the Council of Europe, WADA and the World Health Organization”.  
 
In November 2017, EU sport diplomacy took one of its first practical steps with the integration 
of sport into EU-China High Level People to People Dialogue (HPPD) which has been taking 
place since 2012.31 Commissioner Navracsics and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu Yandong met in 
Shanghai.  
 
Responding to the recommendation of the High-Level Group and the Slovak Conclusions that 
an evidence-based approach to sport diplomacy be adopted, in 2018, the Commission published 
a study on ‘Sport Diplomacy, Identifying Good Practices’.32 The study was carried out in the 
framework of the 2017-2020 EU Work Plan for Sport and highlighted examples of best 
practice. It made four recommendations: (1) that capacity building workshops be held (2) sport 
for development should be identified as an explicit priority in relevant EU funding instruments 
(3) larger scale research should be undertaken on the current state of play and (4) actions are 
developed to support dissemination of and knowledge sharing on good practices.  
 
A further step at operationalising EU sport diplomacy was taken with the amendments made 
to the 2018 Erasmus+ funding criteria which facilitated participation from third countries. Until 
that change, projects whose proposal did not demonstrate that the Partner-Country participant 
brought specific added value to the partnership would be rejected on eligibility grounds. 
However, this is no longer the case as now, if the Partner Country’s participation meets the 
 
30 Council of the European Union (2017), Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017 – 31 December 2020), 9639/17, 
Brussels, 24 May 2017. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9639-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(17 December 2021). 
31 See European Commission (2017), EU and China strength cooperation on education, culture, youth, gender 
equality and sport, IP/17/4548, Brussels, 15/11/2017. Accessed at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
4548_en.htm (17 December 2021). 
32 ECORYS (2017) Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission. 
Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (17 December 2021). 
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criteria, they are treated in the same way as the other partners.33 This change was also 
recommended by the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy. The internationalisation of 
Erasmus+ and the growing significance of EU sport diplomacy was further evidenced by 
changes made to the European Week of Sport programme. From 2018, this was extended to 
permit participation from Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership states.34 
 
Further political impetus came in June 2018 with the adoption by the Council of the European 
Union of Council Conclusions on ‘Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport’.35 
In a wide-ranging set of Conclusions, the Council highlighted the role of sport in promoting 
common values among Member States, and also with third countries. At paragraph 28, the 
Council invited the Commission to “include sport as part of external relations, where 
appropriate to promote the common values of the EU, for example through including mobility 
and capacity building or supporting sport integrity, as well as integrating it in the discussions 
and High Level Dialogues with third countries”. At paragraph 38, the Council invited the sports 
movement to “continue developing mutually enriching relations and exchanges between 
grassroots sport organisations from EU countries and third countries, sharing values and 
principles, and illustrating the diplomatic value of such people-to-people relations”.  
 
EU sport diplomacy took another concrete step in February 2018 with the agreement between 
the European Commission and UEFA adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation between the 
European Commission and the Union of the European Football Associations (UEFA).36 This 
Arrangement for Cooperation added to that agreed between the parties in 2014.37 The 
objectives of the 2019 agreement are: (1) to promote values and principles common in Europe 
(2) to strengthen cooperation in matters of long-term interest to football and sport and (3) to 
improve the overall financial health of European football. The staging of EURO 2020 was 
 
33 See: Erasmus+ sport goes international. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20170724-erasmus-plus-
sport-goes-international_en (17 December 2021). 
34 European Commission (2018), Press Release: European Week of Sport, 23-30 September. Accessed at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_AGENDA-18-5910_en.htm (17 December 2021). 
35 Council of the European Union (2018), Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport, 
2018/C196/06. Accessed at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2018:196:FULL&from=FR (17 December 2021). 
36 European Commission (2018), Annex to the Commission Decision adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation 
between the European Commission and the Union of the European Football Associations (UEFA), C(2018) 876 
final, Brussels, 19/2/2018. Accessed at:  
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/EuroExperience/uefaorg/EuropeanUnion/02/53/98/34/25398
34_DOWNLOAD.pdf (17 December 2021). 
37 C(2014), 7378 final. 
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highlighted as a key vehicle for achieving the first objective. In 2018, UEFA also agreed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Council of Europe.38 
 
During the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU (January - June 2018), sport diplomacy was the 
focus of a high-level discussion at the EU Sport Forum in Sofia (March 2018). Sport diplomacy 
was retained in the EU Work Plan for Sport 2021-202439 and between January and June 2021, 
the Portuguese Presidency of the EU prioritised sport diplomacy and held a Council policy 
debate on the subject in May 202140 and staged a two-day sport diplomacy conference in 
Lisbon in June. At the policy debate in Brussels, the vast majority of Member States expressed 
a willingness to progress the development of a sport diplomacy strategy for the EU. 
 
Finally, in 2021, a study on EU sport policy commissioned by the European Parliament 
highlighted the limited role of the Parliament in the development of an EU approach, although 
it did note the Parliament’s role in extending financing instruments to third countries.41 The 
subsequent Parliamentary Report, of the same name, conceded that the Parliament should play 
a more active role in the field of EU sport diplomacy.42 Without expressly making the 
connection, the Parliament’s report highlighted the potential of sport diplomacy in addressing 
a number of challenges including, inter alia, the achievement of the EU’s strategic goals, the 
question of human rights and non-discrimination in sport, and the call for the Commission to 






38 Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA). Accessed at:  
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/General/02/56/17/27/2561727_DOWNLOAD.pdf  
(17 December 2021). 
39 Council of the European Union (2020), Work Plan for Sport (1 January 2021 – 30 June 2024), 2020/C 419/01, 
accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42020Y1204(01)&from=EN 
(17 December 2021).   
40 Council of the European Union (2021), Sport diplomacy: Promoting Europe’s interests and values in the world, 
8128/21. Accessed at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8128-2021-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 
2021). 
41 Mittag, J and Naul, R. (2021) EU sports policy: assessment and possible ways forward, European Parliament, 
Research for CULT Committee – Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels. Accessed at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/236742/PE652-251_Study-EU-Sport-Policy.pdf (16 December 2021). 
42 European Parliament (2021), Report on EU sports policy: assessment and possible ways forward 
(2021/2058(INI)). Accessed at: http://isca-web.org/files/Report_on_EU_Sports_Policy-consolidated_version.pdf 





It is clear from the above review that the EU retains a desire to employ sport within its 
diplomatic repertoire. However, thus far, its approach has been somewhat piecemeal and 
lacking strategic orientation. The arguments for becoming more strategic are strong: the EU 
and its Member States have a strong sporting heritage; the EU has a maturing foreign policy 
and existing expertise and capacity to advance sports related goals; and without a more 
concerted effort, the EU is being left behind by some of its partners and competitors who now 
routinely deploy sport diplomacy. The risks are generally low, but significant. The EU needs 
to act in a way that complements Member States’ sport diplomacy strategies; it needs to reflect 
on the messaging so that publics, both within and outside the EU, see this activity as legitimate; 
it requires investment so that ‘diplomats in tracksuits’ carry appropriate messages and so that 
the issue is mainstreamed and retained on the political agenda; it needs to balance co-operation 
with, and distance from, sports bodies, so that relationships do not become too cosy particularly 
as the Commission is the ‘guardian of the Treaties’; and the impact of sport diplomacy needs 











This chapter provides an overview of good practices in the field of sport diplomacy.43 In the 
chapter, numerous models of sport diplomacy are listed. Special attention is given to the 
Australian model of sport diplomacy because it is regarded as the world standard in the strategic 
use of sport as a ‘means to an end’, be that policy, development or human security outcomes.44 
 
As discussed in chapter one, sport diplomacy can be succinctly defined as the conscious, 
strategic and regular use of sport, sportspeople, sporting events and non-state sports actors by 
ministries of foreign affairs and their diplomatic staff in order to create collaborative, long term 
and mutually beneficial partnership which ideally ‘maximise people-to-people’ links, 
development, cultural, trade, investment, education and tourism opportunities for 
governments.45 Therefore, sport diplomacy is the reification and specialisation of a familiar 
aspect of international relations in permanent, institutional and plural manner.46 
 
The genesis of this chapter came from the first Multiplier Sport Event (MSE) of this project 
held in Zagreb, Croatia, on the 12th June 2019. The topic of this landmark event – which 
included ambassadors, politicians, academics and sports stars - was ‘Best Practice in Sport 
Diplomacy: National Examples’. Certain ‘new’ models of sport diplomacy were discussed 
alongside some examples that could be described as more traditional.47  
 
43 For information on national approaches to sport diplomacy see: Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (TES-D) 
(2021), Case Studies of Non-EU Sport Diplomacy. Accessed at: https://www.tes-diplomacy.org/resources-io2a2/ 
(17 December 2021). See also ECORYS (2017), Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to 
the European Commission. Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (17 December 
2021). 
44 Note, Australia prefers to use the plural of sport to describe its approach (sports diplomacy). 
45 Australian Government, Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy, 2015-2018, at 1. Accessed at: 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aus-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18.pdf (10 Jun 2019). 
46 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 94. 
47 Agenda for the 1st MSE “Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples”, Zagreb (Croatia), 12th June 




In this chapter, it is argued that the cliché that sport and politics don’t mix is just that: a cliché 
(an opinion that is overused and betrays a lack of original thought). Like it or loathe it, sport 
and politics have mixed since time immemorial, whether thinking of the Truce and the Ancient 
Olympiad, the emergence of nationalism and international sport in the late nineteenth century, 
or, more recently the instrumentalization of sport as a diplomatic and strategic means to policy 
ends. These links are illustrated by, for example, the practice of boycotts48 against various 
countries whose policies are denounced, or by well-known cases such as ping-pong diplomacy 
between China and the U.S.), wrestling diplomacy between Russia, Iran and the U.S.,49 cricket 
diplomacy between India and Pakistan, hockey diplomacy between Canada and the former 
Soviet Union, and the intermittent episodes of baseball diplomacy between Cuba and the U.S. 
 
In each of these cases, sport was co-opted to serve national interests or foreign policy outcomes. 
However, both the theory and practice of sport diplomacy is something quite different today. 
This chapter – which focusses on traditional sport diplomacy50 - captures some of the changes 
taking place in how governments, non-state actors and representatives from the sports industry 
are beginning to work together, to bring strangers closer together, and advance positive, 
mutually reciprocal policy outcomes for the world. This chapter begins by examining the 







48 The efficacy of which is strongly contested, see Gomez, C. (2018) Boycotts and Diplomacy: when the talking 
stops, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 169-184, Manchester University Press; 
Eaton, J. (2018) Decentring US sports diplomacy: the 1980 Moscow boycott through contemporary Asian-African 
perspectives, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 203-222, Manchester University 
Press; Tulli, U. (2018) ‘They used Americana, all painted and polished, to make enormous impression they did’: 
selling the Reagan revolution through the 1984 Olympic Games, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games 
within games, 223-242, Manchester University Press 
49 Abooali, S. (2017) Wrestling with Diplomacy: The United States and Iran, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, 
Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds.) Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 137-153, FiT Publishing, at 146. 
50 According to Murray, there are three other types of sport diplomacy: networked sports diplomacy, sport-as-




2. Examples of good practice in sport diplomacy in the world 
 
2.1. Australia  
 
Australia has a remarkable international sporting pedigree and is internationally recognised as 
a consistent, high-performing sporting nation and a world leader in sports policy, on and off 
the pitch, so to speak. For the sports mad Aussies, sport diplomacy provides a practical 
opportunity to inform, engage and influence key demographics, particularly youth, emerging 
leaders and women and girls. Through the Australian diaspora in the region and Indo–Pacific 
communities living in Australia, the influence of sport diplomacy means policy outcomes can 
be conveyed to broader audiences than traditional diplomacy activities allow. Sport, in other 
words, amplifies diplomatic messages. Australia started to include sport in its diplomacy in 
2012 and mentioning sport as a diplomatic and cultural tool first came in the 2012 Australia in 
the Asian Century White Paper.51 
 
Australia’s sport diplomacy strategies are whole-of-government approaches that intend to 
maximise people-to-people links, development, cultural, trade, investment, education and 
tourism opportunities.52  
  
A few years ago, Australia published its Sports Diplomacy Strategy 2015-2018.53 Its 
development was guided by a working group co-chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Health’s Office for Sport.  
 
This initial Strategy had four goals:   
(1) Connecting people and institutions via the following programs:  
a. Sports Exchange Australia:  exchanges of administrators, coaches, officials and 
athletes to provide sports knowledge, leadership and skills exchange between 
Australia and countries in the region.  
 
51 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 99. 
52 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Pages/australian-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18 (10 Jun 2019). 
53 Australian Government, Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy, 2015-2018. Accessed at: 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aus-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18.pdf (10 Jun 2019). 
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b. Australian Sports Fellowship: support sporting organisations and tertiary 
institutions to host fellows and scholars from the region for sport-related 
professional development and educational placements in Australia.  
c. The Sports Leaders Mentoring Program:  mentoring and networking through 
the Australian sports network and private sector partners to develop emerging 
leaders in sports business, administration, and sports technical development. 
 
(2) Enhancing sport for development via: 
a. Pacific Sports Partnerships: partner Australian and regional sports organisations 
in the Pacific to deliver targeted sport for development activities.  
b. Sports Volunteers Australia: provide high-quality sports volunteers to help 
improve the capacity of sports organisations and develop people-to-people links 
in developing countries across the Indo–Pacific region.  
 
(3) Showcasing Australia via: 
a. Match Australia: The Australian Government’s international sports business 
program will enhance economic and bilateral relations through major sporting 
events. This program will be managed and implemented by the Australian Trade 
and Investment Commission (Austrade). 
b. The Major Sporting Events Taskforce: this will coordinate Australian 
Government involvement in identified major international events in Australia, 
capitalise on an international reputation for hosting major sporting events, and 
leverage the economic opportunities associated with such events and the on-
going legacy in areas such as trade, tourism and investment. 
c. International Media Visits: this program will use sport to promote Australia’s 
engagement with the region and generate accurate and well-informed 
international media reporting on Australia.  
d. Sports Envoy: This program will use high-profile sports people to promote 
Australia through trade missions, Ministerial-led business missions, Match 
Australia activities, and targeted sport diplomacy initiatives.  
 
(4) Supporting innovation and integrity via: 
21 
 
a. Sports Innovation Australia: will establish sports education, business and 
science initiatives between the Australian sports industry and countries in the 
Indo–Pacific region. 
b. Sports Memorandums of Understanding: will establish government-to-
government sports agreements to advance Australia’s skills capability in sport-
related fields and promote Australia’s collaborative relationship with the Indo–
Pacific region. 
c. The Sports Integrity Program: provide oversight, monitoring and coordination 
to advance and protect the integrity of sport in Australia. With a particular focus 
on doping, match fixing and corruption, the Australian Government will work 
with like-minded nations to develop best practice in consistent and effective 
approaches to protect the integrity of sport. 
 
The first Strategy and the programs described above were a success, particularly in integrating 
the various systems of sport and diplomacy at the international level. Both the sports industry 
and government were given a strategy, direction, and a common vision. Success came in the 
form of two sports for development programs – one in the Pacific and the other in Asia.  
 
One of the key pillars of the Australia’s public diplomacy strategy is to create a positive image 
in the pacific region, particularly among the population of small island states, and one of the 
most successful public-sport programmes has been Smash Down Barriers - an indicative to 
change perception of disabled people in the pacific region through table tennis. The programme 
is part of DFAT’s Pacific Sport Partnerships (PSP) which worked with over fifty institutions 
to enable 1.5 million people to participate in sporting activities, while helping address 
inequalities experienced by women, girls and people living with disability. The Smash Down 
Barriers programme operates across Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Thailand with the support of 
Australian Aid, Table Tennis Australia, Oceania Badminton and Oceania Paralympic 
Committee and, as well, as from Diplomats-in-chef.54 
 
Sporting linkages in the Asian region were also strengthened by negotiating sport cooperation 
arrangements with India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka. In addition, the Australian 
Government awarded ten sports fellowships aimed at improving the capacity of individuals 
 
54 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 95. 
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and institutions to deliver quality grassroots sport in the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, the review 
also described a volunteer’s initiative connecting skilled Australians with regional sporting 
organisations to support media and communications, disability and health outcomes in Fiji, 
Tonga and Vanuatu.55 
 
A successful PSP program is the Oceania Football Confederation’s Just Play program, which 
also involves Football Federation Australia. The program uses interactive football sessions to 
engage children with social messages integrated into all activities. Children increase their 
school and community engagement and learn healthy lifestyle habits while learning about 
gender equality and disability inclusion. The program received the Union of European Football 
Association Foundation for Children Award in 2016 – recognising improvements it is making 
to the lives of children in the Pacific.56 Bolstered by such data, success and interest, the 
Government decided to renew this ground-breaking program and Strategy.  
 
After a long period of consultation with the Australian sports ‘industry’, the original strategy 
was followed by a second – Sports Diplomacy 2030 – which was launched by the Foreign and 
Sports Ministers at the Women’s Rugby World Sevens tournament in Sydney, in early 2019. 
Again, four pillars were introduced, each of which are described below: 
 
(1) Empower Australian sport to represent Australia globally: 
a. enhance Australian sports leaders’ knowledge, skills and connections to 
represent Australia on the global stage;  
b. leverage Australia’s strong sporting brand to enhance its global reputation and 
to build enduring relationships;  
c. increase Australia’s representation on international sporting bodies and 
associations; and  
d. develop tools, including a digital portal, to share sport diplomacy knowledge, 
expertise and successes across government and with the sport industry. 
 
(2) Build linkages with Australia’s neighbours: 
 
55 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 7.  
56 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 9. 
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a. develop pathways for elite Pacific athletes and teams to participate in Australian 
and international sporting competitions;  
b. facilitate access for emerging Pacific athletes to participate in high performance 
training in Australia;  
c. develop pathways for Australian sporting codes to increase their presence in the 
Pacific; and  
d. identify targeted opportunities to strengthen diplomatic and economic 
relationships through sport across the Indo-Pacific. 
 
(3) Maximise trade, tourism and investment opportunities: 
a. showcase Australia’s leadership and excellence in sport governance, high 
performance, technology and other areas in key global markets;  
b. promote Australia as a host of choice for major international sporting events 
and ensure to leverage the wider economic opportunities;  
c. connect Australian sports through its diplomatic and trade networks to unlock 
the potential of global markets for a wider array of Australian businesses and 
companies; and  
d. identify, educate and empower high-profile athletes and sports representatives 
to promote Australia, including through trade missions and targeted sport 
diplomacy initiatives. 
 
(4) Strengthen communities through sport in the Indo-Pacific and beyond: 
a. create leadership pathways and increase participation of women and girls in 
sport in the Pacific;  
b. harness the power of sport to promote gender equality, disability inclusion, 
social cohesion and healthy lifestyles;  
c. support institutional policies, practices and systems to help build safe, fair and 
accessible sport; and  
d. support global efforts to increase awareness of the contribution of sport to the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).57 
 
 
57 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 9, 15, 17, 19. 
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This kind of sport diplomacy is called by Murray “Networked sports diplomacy” since the 
Australian Strategy encompasses a broad network of state and non-state actors: the Department 
of Health, the Australian Sports Commission (ASC), the Office for Sport, the DFAT, Tourism 
Australia and the Australian Trade Commission together with the administrative bodies of 
Australia’s major sporting codes (cricket, soccer, rugby and Australian rules football).58 
 
2.2. The U.S.A. and SportsUnited 
 
In the U.S., sport diplomacy is regarded as an important tool. Indeed, the Department of State, 
with its Bureau of Education and Culture Affairs (ECA) established by President Eisenhower 
in 1959,59 sees sport as “an integral part of efforts to build ever-strengthening relations 
between the United States and other nations. Sports diplomacy exchanges have involved tens 
of thousands of people from more than 100 countries to do just this”.60  
 
The State Department’s SportsUnited is a good example of such initiatives.  Born after 9/11 as 
a way to reach disenfranchised youth in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Africa and Latin 
America, sport was seen as a way to reach people that were immune to tried and tested soft 
power vessels like the Voice of America radio station and the Fulbright Scholarship 
programme. SportsUnited focuses on four main activities: the “Sports Visitors program” 
(where American Ambassadors nominate sports people from their host countries to travel to 
the U.S. for specialised training and clinics. Through participation in sports-based 
programming, these visitors learn to translate success in athletics into achievements in the 
classroom and life), 61 “Sports Grants” (awarded to U.S. based Civil Society Organisations who 
propose and manage international exchange programs for underserved youth athletes, coaches 
and administrators of youth sports), “Sports Envoys” (where athletes and coaches, such as 
Michelle Kwan (figure skating) and Billie-Jean King (Tennis) are employed as ‘diplomats in 
tracksuits’).62 These successful sportspeople lead youth clinics and team building activities 
 
58 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 119. 
59 Ibid., at 100. 
60 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Initiatives, Sports Diplomacy. Accessed 
at: https://eca.state.gov/sports-diplomacy (15 Aug 2019). 
61 Mitevska, S. (2019), Sport Diplomacy, Paper presented at the 1st MSE“Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: 
National Examples”, Zagreb (Croatia). 
62 Other examples are the world famous NBA legend Shaquille O'Neal who has visited Cuba as part of the Sports 
Envoy program, accessed at: https://eca.state.gov/video/sports-envoy-shaquille-oneal-cuba (17 December 2021), 
or the case when the U.S. Department of State sponsored ultra-marathon legend Dean Karnazes as he follows the 
ancient Silk Road through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to mark the 25th anniversary of these 
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overseas and represent their nation in much the same way a serving diplomat does (in terms of 
cultural diplomacy exchanges). Fourth is the “Global Sports Mentoring Program” (where a 
cohort of approximately 15 foreign sport leaders are identified and hand-selected by U.S. 
Embassies to spend one month in a mentoring placement with a female executive in the U.S.).63 
 
The programmes are organized closely with U.S. Embassies and Consulates, American 
universities (such as George Mason University), and leagues and federations. The SportsUnited 
initiative is an excellent example of a range of political, diplomatic and mutually beneficial 
partnership between diplomats, sportspeople and foreign publics.64 
 
Through SportsUnited, the State Department is able to promote American policy, sport, culture 
and values abroad, enhance international understanding and friendship, and dispel U.S. 
stereotypes and prejudices. As Trina Bolton, the team ‘captain’ of the program, notes of the 
versatility and reach of the program, “sport opens doors in hard-to-reach spaces, all the way 
from really grassroot levels and all the way up to the governmental level at home and abroad. 
Through our exchanges, Americans and international participants from all walks of life 
connect through the shared interest in sports.”65 
 
The issue of employing sportspeople as envoys is common in U.S. sport diplomacy history 
starting in 1955 with Jesse Owens’ mission to India, the Philippines and Malaysia where he 
led running clinics and promoted and represented American values abroad or Althea Gibson, 
the first African-American tennis player to break into the female circuit visiting and playing 
tennis on a special tour in India, Pakistan and Burma as an inspiration in the world, but also in 
the U.S., since as a woman of colour was representing officially the U.S delegation.66 
 
To conclude, we may say that the SportsUnited is a great success. The numbers show that with 
a very few resources absorbed (U.S Sport Diplomacy Division employs only five staffers and 
 
countries’ independence from the Soviet Union from June 29 to July 10, 2016, accessed at: 
https://eca.state.gov/ultramarathon (15 Aug 2019). 
63 Lecrom C. and Ferry, M. (2017) The United States Government’s Role in Sport Diplomacy, in Craig Esherick, 
Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 19-37, FiT Publishing, 
at 22-28. 
64 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 101. 
65 Alvarez, A. (2017) Sports Diplomacy in the Age of Trump, VICE Accessed at: 
https://sports.vice.com/en_au/article/mbj4bv/sports-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-trump, (16 Sep 2019). 
66 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 103-104. 
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spend only 0.0001% of the Department Budget)67 the results are impressive. Between 2010 
and 2013, Sports Visitor programs were held in ninety-two countries with a total of 911 foreign 
participants. In terms of Sports Envoy, 317 athletes and coaches represented U.S in fifty-four 
different countries from 2005 to 2013. During the same period, the rate of participation for 
foreign participants in a Sports Grant program also increased with approximately 1,830 
individuals from over thirty-five different countries visiting the U.S.68 
 
Again, the power of sport to augment the perception of a nation, transcend entrenched foreign 
policy positions, or generate informal diplomatic networks (that, if strategized, can often 




Japan has a long history of using sport to advance diplomatic and foreign policy goals. The J1 
professional football League, for example, was established in 1992 to overcome imperial 
stereotypes, as well as to improve the performance of the national team to reflect “a level 
worthy of its [Japan’s] economic power and overall achievements after 40 years of post-war 
peace and prosperity”.69 In the twenty-first century, the Japanese teamed up with old foes the 
Republic of Korea to co-host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) has employed football to “secure a peaceful environment for Japanese troops in 
Iraq”, to bridge divides between Balkan states, and frequently invites “Israeli and Palestinian 
youth players to participate in training camps in Japan” as a way of getting to know the 
‘other’.70 Such activities are directly aimed at changing the way outsiders think about Japan.71  
 
Beyond these examples, MOFA is following a similar path to the French and the European 
Commission (including the clumsy sounding moniker). In 2014, a ‘Panel of Experts on 
Strengthening Sport Diplomacy’ was convened, followed by the appointment Mr. Jun 
 
67 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 102. 
68 ECA 2013 in Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 101. 
69 Manzenreiter, W. (2008) Football diplomacy, post-colonialism and Japan's quest for normal state status, Sport 
in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 11(4), 414-428, at 417. 
70 Ibid, at 422. 
71 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 68. 
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Shimmi72 as an ‘Ambassador in Charge of Sport Diplomacy’ in 2015, as well as a final report 
submitted to Mr. Minoru Kiuchi, State Minister for Foreign Affairs.73 Of further significance, 
is Japan’s Sport for Tomorrow program, an initiative to promote sport to more than 10 million 
people in over 100 nations until 2020.74 
 
It should be mentioned, however, that Japan seems reactive rather than proactive. The Strategy 
emerged after the Land of the Rising Sun won bids to host two major mega-events: the 2019 
Rugby World Cup and the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games. In addition, the Japanese approach is 
one of caution, low-risk and repetition. These two events have been employed by Japan to 
further banish old, unhelpful and inaccurate stereotypes, and cement its reputation as a truly 
sporting nation. No doubt that, especially taking into consideration that the COVID-19 
pandemic strongly affected the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, both these tournaments have been 
impeccably hosted. The research also threw up two interesting asides: first, that most of the 
organization and legacy work for the Rugby World Cup is being driven by World Rugby,75 
rather than the Japanese government or any explicit strategy tied to this specific event. The 
Sport for Tomorrow program, on the other hand, is being driven exclusively by the Japanese 
government and many national sporting partners. As such, this program gives a clearer window 
into the nature, character and depth of Japan’s ongoing engagement with sport diplomacy.  
 
 
2.4. North Korea and South Korea 
 
Taken apart, the sport diplomacy activities of the Republic of Korea (the South) and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the North) can be described as normative. The North 
uses sport as a policy tool in the international arena to reinforce and reflect Juche, the official 
 
72 Mr Shimmi is a career diplomat. At the time of writing, he has since moved on from the post of Ambassador of 
Sport Diplomacy and now serves as the Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Slovakia. It is unclear who 
occupies the Sport role.  
73 The report describes the policies and measures that should be implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in coordination with the relevant ministries, agencies and organizations for the themes of development, peace 
building and relationship between sports and socially vulnerable persons, under the three pillars of “Diplomacy 
by Sports,” which utilizes the influence and attractiveness of sports for the enhancement of diplomacy; 
“Diplomacy for sports,” by which diplomatic authorities implement various efforts for the development of sports; 
and the establishment of a foundation to promote sport diplomacy. See appendix C, or access 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000639.html (15 Sep 2019).  
74 Sport For Tomorrow. Accessed at:  https://www.sport4tomorrow.jpnsport.go.jp (10 Mar 2020). 
75 See the ‘glossy’ brochure accessed at: https://www.asiarugby.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Impact-
Beyond-RWC-2019-Brochure.pdf (10 Sep 2019).   
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state ideology which roughly translates as ‘self-reliance’, while the South folds sport into its 
broader public diplomacy strategy.  
 
Considered together, however, it is clear that sport creates the faintest, positive channel 
between the two fundamentally estranged nations.  The 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic 
Games provides a good example of random meetings between representatives from adversarial 
states that can lead to significant, temporary (in this case), changes in diplomatic relations. 
 
As with the meeting between Glenn Cowan and Zhuang Zedong at the 1971 Table Tennis 
World Championships in Japan, the thaw began with a seemingly insignificant event: an 
invitation to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics by a South Korean, Mr. 
Choi Moon-soon, the governor of Gangwon province, to a north Korean, Mun Ung, head of 
the North Korean Athletic Committee. A few weeks later, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un 
announced that the Hermit Kingdom would send a large delegation to the PyeongChang 
Games.  
 
The story of North Korea’s appearance at the Games provides yet more evidence of the 
Mandelaesque “power of sport” to overcome political division.76 The North Korean leader sent 
his sister, Kim Yo-jong, to the opening ceremony, where she shook hands and chatted with 
South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Kim Yo-jong’s appearance marked the first time since 
the Korean War ended in 1953 that a member of the ruling Kim dynasty had visited South 
Korea. As the world’s media scrambled to capture the rare moment, athletes from both nations 
marched into the PyeongChang Olympic Stadium under the Korean Unification Flag, a picture 
which was not so common but was also seen at the World Table Tennis Championship in 1991 
in Chiba, Japan and at the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games. North and South Korean 
female ice hockey players also formed a joint team and were cheered on by a squadron of 
enthusiastic, well-drilled North Korean cheerleaders (a public diplomacy coup in its own right).  
 
To sport diplomacy watchers, it soon became obvious that both countries were using sport as 
a vehicle to test whether their respective publics would be accepting of a more formal 
diplomatic opening of frozen relations. It worked, and a few months later President Moon and 
 
76 Mandela, N (2000) Address to the 1st Laureus World Sports Award, Laureus, 21st June 2000.  Accessed at: 
http://www.laureus.com/content/nelson-mandela-speech-changed-world, (16 Sep 2019). 
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Supreme Leader Kim met in the demilitarized zone, the first of three summits aimed at 
denuclearizing the peninsula, building closer relations, and ending over sixty years of war.  
 
Hawks remain critical of North Korea, for they are still a kleptocratic dictatorship, a poor 
international citizen, and have a dreadful human rights record, not to mention that their nuclear 
weapons program is in clear violation of the global moratorium against nuclear weapons and 
its concomitant treaties. A more nuanced, ideal understanding of international affairs suggests 
otherwise: faint sporting channels with an adversarial, isolated state are better than no channels 




China was the first to use international sport for its broader foreign and domestic policy goals, 
and its ping-pong77 diplomacy was used not just for the relationship with the U.S., but also to 
foster its diplomatic, economic and political goals in several African countries. It is important 
to note that with its African tour in Guinea, Mali and Sudan, female ping-pong players from 
China were promoting the slogan “men and women are equal” in countries where women were 
not fully free.78 
 
China implemented an effective Olympic strategy enabling it to evolve from an average 
position on the Olympic medal table to the top of the medal table at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
Following that success, China further strategic aim was to move from “a country of major 
sporting events to a sports world power”. To attain this ambition, China invested heavily in 
order to become a football superpower, although in recent years, this investment has been 
considerably reduced.79  
 
 
77 The reason why table tennis or ping-pong was used was because Rong Guotuan was the first Chinese athlete to 
win any major world championship – men’s single title at the 1959 Table Tennis World Championship and the 
International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) was one of the few international sports organization that consistently 
recognized the People’s Republic of China giving them the title of host of the 1961 Table Tennis World 
Championship. 
78 Shuman, A. (2018) Friendship is solidarity: the Chinese ping-pong team visits Africa in 1962, in Rofe J. S. 
(ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 110-112, Manchester University Press. 
79 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 7. Accessed at: http://isca-
web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-
_Overview_mapping_definitions[1].pdf (10 Mar 2020). 
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In April 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a macroeconomic 
management agency under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, announced a 
new reform programme called The Medium and Long-Term Development Plan of Chinese 
Football (2016-2050). This reform programme was jointly prepared by the NDRC, the Office 
of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State 
Council (China Football Association), the General Administration of Sport, and the Ministry 
of Education and was approved by the State Council.80 By developing grassroots football, the 
plan seeks to grow elite players who will qualify for another FIFA World Cup, play at a hosted 
FIFA World Cup and in the end eventually form a competitive team to win the FIFA World 
Cup by 2050.81 
 
China, with its huge investments in football in line to fulfil “the Great Chines Soccer Dream”82 
also points on the Mega-Events sport diplomacy and achieved that target by hosting the 2008 
Summer Olympic Games. But like Russia, for its 2008 Olympic Games, China also faced huge 
criticism because of violations of human rights and minority rights,83 so the Games brought 
also huge international attention on topics which were not planned to be in focus. Another 
dimension of sport diplomacy was observed through so called “stadium diplomacy”. Stadium 
diplomacy can be understood as the construction of sporting facilities, in particularly in 
developing countries.84 For more than 60 years, China has practiced the so-called “stadium 
diplomacy” by providing support, for more than 85 indoor and outdoor stadiums (from 1,000 
seats to 60,000 seats) across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the South 
Pacific. It was mostly used as means for geopolitical strategy and international strategy (for a 
diplomatic and political fight against Taiwan, for formation of strategic political alliances), 
access to valuable natural resources like oil, economic growth and entry into emerging markets 
mostly for its companies etc.85  
 
 
80 China Football 8. Accessed at: http://china-football-8.com/reform-programme-2016/ (15 Mar 2020). 
81 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 7. Accessed at: http://isca-
web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-
_Overview_mapping_definitions[1].pdf (10 Mar 2020). 
82 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 116. 
83 Rocha, C. and Grix, J. (2017) From “Diplomatic Dwarf” to Gulliver Unbound? Brazil and the Use of Sports 
Mega-Events, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport 
Diplomacy, 87-100, FiT Publishing, at 93. 
84 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 117. 
85 Kellison, T. and Cintron, A. (2017) Building Stadiums, Building Bridges: Geopolitical Strategy in China, in 




2.6. Other interesting models 
 
South Africa after decades of isolation used Mega Sports Events as a political tool and as a 
form of presenting the ‘new face of the state’. It started with the 1995 Rugby World Cup and 
had its grand finale with the 2010 FIFA World Cup presented also as the ‘African World 
Cup’.86 
 
Brazil is an interesting example of how bidding for and hosting Mega Events such as the 2014 
FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro helped that big country (fifth-
largest landmass, fifth-largest population and seventh-largest economy in the world) to foster 
its aims together with diverse political motivations to improve public diplomacy.87 Although 
hosting such mega events helped Brazil to have an international focus, in the end they faced 
huge organisational, environmental and corruption problems.88 
 
However, although hosting Mega Events seems important from the promotion of a state point 
of view, construction of sports infrastructure and the huge support for the home Olympic team 
to achieve as more medals as possible, it is not a guarantee of growing diplomatic power if we 
take for instance Russia or China, see supra. Russia invested huge amounts of money for the 
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, precisely around $50 billion total cost which are far 
much more than $12 billion cost for 2012 London Summer Olympic or $7 billion for 2012 
Vancouver Winter Olympic Games.89 Russian efforts resulted also in its special governance 
strategy to host the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and later in 2016 FIFA World Cup, but with 
its controversial law on intolerance towards the LGBT community and the Annexation of 
Crimea during the preparation or just after the closing ceremony of the 2016 Winter Olympics 
have not resulted in a complete success, just the opposite.90 Speaking about sport diplomacy 
we must note the U.S. Government employed three openly gay athletes Billie Jean King (a 
 
86 Dowse, S. (2018), Mega sports events as political tools: a case study of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA 
Football World Cup, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 70-86, Manchester University 
Press. 
87 Rocha, C. and Grix, J. (2017) From “Diplomatic Dwarf” to Gulliver Unbound? Brazil and the Use of Sports 
Mega-Events, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport 
Diplomacy, 87-100, FiT Publishing. 
88 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 124-125. 
89 Ibid., at 249, 258. 
90 Zhemukhov, S. and Orttung, R. (2017) Putin and the 2014 Sochi Olympics: Russia’s Authoritarian Sports 
Diplomacy, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport 
Diplomacy, 101-120, FiT Publishing. 
32 
 
retired tennis champion), Brian Boitano (a retired world champion figure skater) and Caitlin 
Cahow (a retired ice hockey player) as sports envoys during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic 
Games as a response to the Russian discriminatory policy towards LGBT community.91  
 
Compared to Russia, Canada “scored” on a diplomatic and political level with opening the first 
Pride House pavilions for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games and 2015 Pan/Parapan 
American Games in Toronto and highlighting the protection of human rights of LGBTQ-
identified persons.92 
 
3. Examples of good practice in sport diplomacy in Europe 
 
3.1. France: l'équipe qui gagne93  
 
The gold medal for sport diplomacy – outside of Australia, that is – must surely go to France. 
Their journey began in 2012 while watching London host the Olympic Games, a tournament 
they lost out on holding by a mere four votes at the IOC. A long period of consultations within 
government then crystalized into a sport diplomacy strategy which was launched by Laurent 
Fabius, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Valérie Fourneyron, then Minister of Sports, in 
2014. 
 
Acknowledging that “sport plays a major role in attracting visitors to France and showcasing 
the country’s international outreach”, the Quai D’Orsay94 also established a working group 
consisting of government departments, sporting federations, major sporting businesses and the 
national Olympic committee.95 The sports industry was then mapped and measured, and several 
more innovations followed: the world’s first Ambassador for Sport (Philippe Vinogradoff),96 
an Office for the Economics of Sport, and a new French Olympic Committee, which aims to 
 
91 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 105. 
92 Rich, K. and Misener, L. (2017) From Canada with Love: Human Rights, Soft Power and the Pride House 
Movement, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport 
Diplomacy, 155-170, FiT Publishing. 
93 In English, the Team Who Wins. 
94 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
95 France Diplomatic 2018. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ Quai D’orsay. Accessed at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ 
(17 Sep 2019). 
96 A seasoned diplomat whose career has taken him from Panama to Mexico, through Chile, Brazil, El Salvador 
(where he was ambassador), and the United States, where he served as Consul General in Miami and Deputy 
Consul General in Los Angeles. 
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promote French sport internationally, increase French presence in international bodies, and 
ensure French continues as the official language of the Olympic Games.  
 
French sport diplomacy is founded on three pillars that seek to: develop French influence 
through sport; make sport a priority for all ministries and relevant networks; and integrate sport 
into economic diplomacy.97 So far, much French sport diplomacy activity has centered on 
building enhanced capacity for bidding, winning and hosting major sporting tournaments. 
Stung by the loss of the 2012 Olympics by the English, France simply ‘learned to lobby’, in 
the words of Marc Ventouillac, a journalist for L'Equipe.98 As figure 1 illustrate the investment 
has certainly paid off.  
In short, France has matched success in 
sport – for example, a marvelous French 
football team sailed through the 2018 
Russia World Cup, eventually beating 
Croatia 4-2 in the final. France looks set to 
innovate further, especially in the hosting 
of major events. The 2018 Ryder Cup99 
symbolized the French culture of 
innovation, being different, and the new 
strategic direction. Played at the Golf 
National in Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, a 
course purpose built for the unique 
atmosphere the match generates, over 
300,000 fans turned out to watch the 
underdog Europeans comfortably beat the American team 17½ - 10½….and there was not even 
a Frenchman playing in the European team. It should come as no surprise that France 
understands the power of an esoteric sport diplomacy attitude. The annual Tour de France race 
 
97 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 8. Accessed at: http://isca-
web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-
_Overview_mapping_definitions[1].pdf (10 Mar 2020). 
98 Lebrun, C., (2018) Le « soft-power » du sport: un potentiel encore trop peu exploité ?, Open Diplomacy. 
Accessed at:  http://www.open-diplomacy.eu/blog/le-soft-power-du-sport-un-potentiel-encore-trop-peu-exploite, 
(17 Sep 2019). 
99 The world’s third most-watched sporting event after the football World Cup and the Olympic Games. 
Figure 1. Major sporting  
events in France 2015- 2024 
 
- 2015 World Rowing Championships 
- UEFA EUROPE 2016 Football 
Championship 
- 2017 Ice Hockey World 
Championships 
- 2017 Canoe Slalom WC 
- 2017 Men’s handball 
- 2018 Ryder Cup 
- 2019 FIFA Women’s World 
- 2024 Summer Olympic Games 
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In the UK, sport is also extremely important, but football and rugby, as world-wide selling 
products, have been taken as a tool for promoting British values. The British sport diplomacy 
consists of partnerships between the British Council and major sports associations, like the 
Premier League and Premiership Rugby. 
 
One very good example of promoting UK values and English language in the world is the 
Premier Skills, the British Council's international partnership with the football Premier League 
operating in 19 countries across Asia, Africa and the Americas from Afghanistan to Zambia.101 
Through Premier Skills, young people, including the most vulnerable in society, are given 
opportunities to become better integrated into their local communities, to develop their skills 
for employability and raise their self-esteem. Premier Skills English helps teachers and learners 
of English with free, compelling learning materials, drawing on football-based content from 
the most exciting football league in the world. In this regard, Football English is also an 
interesting platform with teaching materials that teach general English through football and the 
words and phrases a person needs to talk about football on and off the pitch.102 
 
The British Council has also teamed up with Premiership Rugby in a project called Try Rugby 
and with the partnership with Brazilian partners Social Service for Industry (SESI) they try to 
bring an innovative rugby project to Sao Paulo State in Brazil.103 Try Rugby SP is using the 
sport of rugby to engage with children and young people in schools and communities, 
delivering educational, social and health benefits, as well as helping to raise the number of 
young people playing the game in Brazil. Premiership Rugby coaches are embedded within 
 
100 According to the organizers, 3.5 billion people in 190 countries tune in to watch the Tour de France each year 
and it is one of the best-attended annual sporting event on the planet, with 12 million roadside spectators cheering 
on cyclists.  
101 Since Premier Skills began in 2007, 20.027 coaches and referees have been trained in 29 countries, who in turn 
have reached over 1.6 million young people. 6,000 teachers have received training in the use of the Premier Skills 
English materials, with 6.5 million views of the materials online. 
102 Premier Skills English. Accessed at:  https://premierskillsenglish.britishcouncil.org/ (10 Apr 2020). 
103 Since September 2012, over 15.000 participants have been involved in rugby-based activity in Brazil every 
week as the coaches have worked with rugby clubs and other community based social inclusion projects. This 
includes 300 teachers and volunteers who have been trained to coach the sport.   
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secondary schools in five states across Brazil, coaching young people in the schools and their 
local community. As well as getting more young Brazilians to play the sport, the programme 
is designed to help them develop valuable skills in areas such as teamwork, leadership and self-
discipline. It also tackles some of the social issues affecting the young people in their school 
or local community, for example lack of inclusion or juvenile crime.104 
 
As a 2012 London Summer Olympic Games legacy, UK Sport, UNICEF and the British 
Council deliver the International Inspiration Programme. The Premier League, the British 
Council, UNICEF and a range of other public and private funders assured the programme’s 
funding.105 Key actors are policymakers since they are made aware of the importance of 
physical education.106 
 
We must note also one more important project of the British Council and the English Football 
Premier League called Addressing Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) through 
football, which uses football to tackle issues of violence against women and girls in Kenya. 
The project aims to address harmful behaviour and attitudes which perpetuate VAWG through 
football, by working with young people in Mount Elgon and Kisumu (Kenya). This three-year 
project was set up in 2014 and is funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(€1.8m).107 
 
As for the use of Mega Sports Events, in 2002, the UK hosted the Commonwealth Games in 
Manchester and in 2014 in Glasgow which made a significant contribution to the rejuvenation 
of the cities and the regions as they struggled with a range of socio-economic challenges and 
industrial decline. In an attempt to secure the legacy of the 2012 London Summer Olympic 
 
104 Try Rugby. Accessed at: https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/sport/current-programmes/try-rugby (10 Apr 
2020). 
105 From the beginning in 2007 the target was to take International Inspiration to 20 countries and inspire the lives 
of 12 million children. The programme far exceeded that target, with over 25 million children and young people 
enriched through the programme. 55 national policies, strategies and legislative changes were influenced and over 
250,000 practitioners (teachers, coaches and leaders) trained. 
106 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 9. Accessed at: http://isca-
web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-
_Overview_mapping_definitions[1].pdf (10 Mar 2020). 
107 ECORYS (2017), Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission, 
at 17. Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (10 Jun 2019). 
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Games, it was aimed to secure seventy world-class events for the period 2013-2019, but the 
target was secured within a year.108  
 
 
3.3. Spain  
 
The importance of Barcelona’s Summer Olympic Games of 1992 for the improvement of the 
external image of Spain seems unquestionable.109 This Mega Sports Event tends to be 
considered an inflexion point in the evolution of the Spanish sport system.110 In fact, it was by 
the mid 90’s that the establishment of organizational structures and sporting infrastructures in 
Spain was completed.111 However, awareness of the potential role sport can play in the 
international sphere is more recent.  From an institutional point of view, the start of the “Marca 
España” (Brand Spain) project in 2000 marks the beginning of this initiative aimed to 
strengthen the image of the nation abroad. Being a governmental project,112 it was created in 
partnership with some of the most important Spanish companies through the “Foro de Marcas 
Renombradas” (Forum of the Leading Brands), created in 1999. LaLiga, Real Madrid, FC 
Barcelona and Atletico de Madrid are part of this Forum.113 Marca España project has gained 
political and public and private financial support through the years and sport has played an 
important role in its implementation. In 2018, the Office of the High Minister for Marca España 
was substituted by the Spanish Secretariat for Global Spain aimed to defend and project the 
international reputation of Spain. Again, sport plays a key role.  
 
The Spanish Secretariat for Global Spain recently published a Report on sport diplomacy titled 
“Sports Diplomacy as an actor for Global Spain. The need of a model for Spain” (hereinafter: 
 
108 Beacom, A. and Rofe, J. S. (2018) Post-match recovery and analysis: concluding thoughts on sport and 
diplomacy, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 243-262, Manchester University Press. 
at. 254. 
109 Rius Ulldemolins, J.  and Zamorano, M. (2015) Spain’s nation branding project Marca España and its cultural 
policy: the economic and political instrumentalization of a homogeneous and simplified cultural image, 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, 21(1), 20-40, at 23.  
110 Puig, N. et al (2010) Sport Policy in Spain, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 2(3), 381-390, 
at 381. 
111 Ibid.  
112 An Office of the High Commissioner for the Marca España was established in 2012. The High Commissioner 
was directly appointed by the Prime Minister, although it was functionally dependent of the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
113 The Forum is a public-private strategic alliance of the main Spanish companies with leading brands and 
international projection in their respective sectors and the competent government departments. Acessed at: 
https://www.marcasrenombradas.com/ (15 May 2020). 
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Spanish Report).114 It has been elaborated in consultation with other governmental 
departments, in particular, the Higher Council for Sports and sporting organizations. The aim 
of the Spanish Report is to reflect on the role of sport as a diplomatic tool and on the importance 
of building a Spanish policy in this field. In this regard, it can be considered the first pillar of 
a more ambitious plan aiming to build a Spanish strategy on sport diplomacy which should be 
achieved in five phases.  
 








Analysis of the 
political and legal 
framework 
Elaboration and 





of the Spanish 










Along with this central initiative, it has to been considered that some regions (Comunidades 
Autónomas - Self-governing Communities - in Spanish) are also trying to develop their own 
models on sport diplomacy. These attempts are clearly connected with traditional claims of 
more political autonomy coming from some regions. From a legal point of view, the question 
deserves some explanation. According to Spanish Law, the competence on sporting matters is 
shared among local, regional and central authorities. Thus, local authorities are responsible, for 
instance, of planning sport facilities and implementing research programmes. They are 
competent for making sport accessible to all. As to the Self-Governing Communities, it has to 
be considered that according to article 148.1.19 of the Spanish Constitution they can assume 
competences on the promotion of sport and the proper use of leisure. Based on this 
 
114 La Diplomacia Deportiva como actor de la España global diego calatayud soriano la necesidad de un modelo 
para España. The report is available in Spanish at 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/Area%20publicacio
nes/Diplomacia%20Deportiva_L.pdf, (15 May 2020). 
The main elements of the Report are the following: 
(1) It analyses the different ways a State can resort to sport as an instrument of Public Diplomacy in order 
to improve its image and to achieve its foreign policy objectives,  
(2) Carries out a study on the interaction between Diplomacy and sport throughout history, 
(3) Examines the importance of the moral, ethical, political, economic and social influence of sport in 
contemporary societies, 
(4) Includes a study of several national models of Sport Diplomacy, 
(5) Concludes how these other models could inspire a Sport Diplomacy model for Spain. 
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constitutional provision, all the Spanish self-governing Communities have legally assumed 
competences on sport issues. Finally, article 149 establishes that the central government will 
have an exclusive competence over international relations. Being aware of the political power 
of sport and its potential to project the image of the region abroad, some Self-Governing 
Communities have tried to explore the possibility of resort to sport to gain presence in the 
international arena. The Basque Country115 and Catalonia116 are two interesting examples in 





As Croatia is mostly known in the world because of its athletes and sporting results,  developing 
a national sport diplomacy strategy certainly makes sense. As a country of just around 4 million 
inhabitants, Croatian sporting results are a winning card. Winning the tennis Davis Cup twice 
in 2005 and 2018, being third in the FIFA World Cup in France in 1998 and second at the last 
FIFA World Cup in Russia and having Luka Modrić as the France Football, FIFA and UEFA 
best football player in the world for 2018, or in the past having Janica and Ivica Kostelić 
winning gold Olympic medals and Ski World Cup titles although coming from a country 
without a proper skiing centre, meant a lot. To have a proper picture of how sport may serve 
as an outstanding promotion and political – diplomatic tool, first it should be noted that the 
final match of the FIFA World Cup in Russia between France and Croatia had a global audience 
of 1.12 billion,117 meaning that every sixth person in the world heard about Croatia. On the 
other hand, for such a small country, this kind of sporting event was an excellent opportunity 
for the Croatian President and Prime Minister to spend a lot of time doing, not just sport 
entertainment, but also politics, during the football games with Russian, British and French 
heads of state and governments. This is the reason why sport, and sport diplomacy, is getting 
much bigger attention for the governmental point of view. 
 
 
115 García, C. (2012) The Use of Sports as a Tool of Public Diplomacy in Regions or "Stateless Nations": The 
Case of the Basque Country in Contemporary Spain, Journal of Sport Media, 7(2), 115-128.  
116 Information about Catalonia and its sport diplomacy is available at https://diplocat.cat/en/about-us/ (15 May 
2020). 
117 Around half the world’s population tuned in to this year’s soccer World Cup. Accessed at: 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/21/world-cup-2018-half-the-worlds-population-tuned-in-to-this-years-soccer-
tournament.html (29 Sep 2019). 
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In January 2019, the first ever draft of the National Sports Programme (a national sports 
strategy) was released for public consultation. This bold move was backed by the Parliament 
on 12th July 2019 when the National Sports Programme was adopted.118 In this document, 
Sports Diplomacy is regarded as an important initiative to be developed, implemented and 
evaluated over a seven-year period (2019-2026). The Croatian Central State Office for Sport 
at the time, and now the Croatian Ministry of Tourism and Sport and the Croatian Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs are tasked to form a special state nominated body whose 
competence is to work on sport diplomacy issues. Using sport as a tool to enhance international 
engagement, brand and connections is a logical step for Croatia, such is the power, success and 
visibility of its world-famous sports stars and teams. The government felt that it made sense to 
ally national interests and policy outcomes with sport. Just to have a picture of the impact of 
the Russian FIFA World Cup success, we must note that during the 8th summit of Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and China and the 9th Business Forum of CEEC and 
China held on 12 April 2019 in Dubrovnik there were signed two memorandums of 
understanding for building two stadiums, one in Rijeka119 and one in Velika Gorica120 meaning 
the Chinese project on “stadium diplomacy” is still going on (see supra). 
 
Sport diplomacy also makes good, economic sense. For instance, the representatives of the 
Croatian Chamber of Commerce and Croatian Tourist Board regularly follow national teams 
around the globe to build relationships, promote Croatian brands, attract new investments, and 
foster new cooperation with host economic partners. Sporting events, for a small country like 
Croatia, serve as productive, informal settings that can create win-win opportunities for both 
sport and the economy. Here we may add that tourism, as the biggest Croatian industry sector, 




118 National Sports Programme (Nacionalni program sporta), Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No. 
69/2019. Accessed at: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2019_07_69_1394.html (15 Jul 2019). 
119 Record Number of Participants at 16 + 1 Initiative Summit. Accessed at: https://www.total-croatia-
news.com/politics/35265-16-1 (10 Feb 2020). 
120 Kineski investitori iskazali interes za stadion. Accessed at: http://www.gorica.hr/2019/04/kineski-investitori-
iskazali-interes-za-stadion/ (16 Feb 2020). 
121 Croatian tourism promo video named best in the world in Madrid. Accessed at: 




4. Sport diplomacy and the non-state sector 
 
As highlighted in chapter one, it is not only states that are beginning to practice sport 
diplomacy. The MSE in Zagreb presented many examples of non-state sporting actors using 
sport for traditional and innovative diplomatic purposes.  
 
A good example is the European Parliament and International Federation of Professionals 
Footballers (FIFPro Europe) Agreement to mobilise voters for the 2019 European Parliament 
elections.122 FIFPro Europe members participating were Italy, Spain, Croatia, Austria, 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, and Czech Republic. Football players from those 
countries acted as sport ambassadors, using their star power, as well as social media platforms, 
to encourage voters to participate in the 2019 elections. Much of this agreement was driven by 
a handful of footballers such as Croatian Dario Šimić, working in tandem with government, 
the EU and sports federations. 
 
One further example from Croatia is the Youth Sports Games (Sportske igre mladih). 
Organized in three countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia), and often 
involving up to 160,000 future athletes, leaders and diplomats, this program uses sport as a tool 
for reconciliation, as well as promoting “a way of life founded in understanding, friendship, 
solidarity and fair play while educating about all aspects of Sustainability”.123 The Games 
enjoyed strong political support in Croatia and it benefitted financially from numerous sponsors 
and among them even Croatian state owned companies. The Games are now the biggest 
amateur sports event for children and youth in Europe.124 They bring together young athletes 
from primary and secondary schools who compete across ten sporting disciplines. In its twenty-
two years of existence, the Youth Sport Games have included more than 1.5 million 
participants. The importance of such an event in a region still recovering from the devastating 
wars of the 1990s is incredible. Sporting activity and friendship helps build relationships 
between future leaders, sports stars, and diplomats. Many prominent names from the world of 
sports, politics, arts and economics support the Games. Johannes Hahn, the EU Commissioner 
 
122 European Parliament and professional footballers team up. Accessed at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190212IPR26008/european-parliament-and-
professional-footballers-team-up (10 Jun 2019). 
123 Youth Sports Games. Vision&Mission. Available at: https://www.igremladih.org/bs/o-nama/organizacioni-
odbor (10 Jun 2019). 
124 Youth Sports Games. About Youth Sports Games. Available at: https://www.igremladih.org/bs/o-nama/o-
sportskim-igrama-mladih (10 Jun 2019). 
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for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Sir Dave Richards, 
Chairman of the Premier League is an Honorary President of the Youth Sports Games, and 
David Beckham, Luka Modrić, Jose Mourinho, Franz Beckenbauer and many others also offer 




Traditional sport diplomacy, where sporting events are employed by governments to 
complement, boost or augment traditional diplomacy, continues to dominate both the theory 
and practice of this growing field of studies and practice. However, as this chapter has revealed, 
it is not just states playing the sport diplomacy game. The monopoly of the foreign affairs and 
its diplomats is no longer so strong and there are many non-state diplomatic actors and “gates 
to international relations".125 Innovation in the use of sport as a diplomatic tool is, these days, 
driven from the academic, sports and civil society sectors. Savvy government, and supra-
national organisations like the European Commission, are – to use a wrestling term – tapping 
in, forming partnerships, and, where possible, trying to create win-win, mutually reciprocal 
outcomes for all concerned: states, sports, fans, players, and so on. As Jarvie noted “there is 
nothing like sport for breaking down barriers”.126 
 
In terms of international practice, Australia continues to lead the world in both the theory and 
practice of sport diplomacy. As yet, the ‘Lucky Country’ is the only nation to consider a 
networked approached, that is, building fluid, sustainable partnerships with industry partners, 
allied and bound by not only sport but also common, collaborative strategies. France and small 
countries like Croatia also stand out for their innovative spirit, collaborative approaches, and 
well-thought out strategies. 
 
In its short existence, both the theory and practice of sport diplomacy have achieved much. 
From a relatively obscure, marginalized position, the field has grown rapidly over the past 
decade, thanks to some innovative theory and policy. The fact that sport remains one of the 
success stories of the globalized era has also helped, as has the growing will, capacity and 
expertise of ‘new’, non-state actors to do more on and off the pitch.  
 
125 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 139. 













The second Multi Sport Event (MSE2), held in Madrid on 20th September 2019, dealt with the 
challenging issue of how, if the EU was to develop a sport diplomacy strategy, it should 
develop an organizational culture of sport diplomacy so that the issue becomes mainstreamed 
and a routine part of the EU’s work. In line with this idea, the starting point of this analysis is 
the need for the EU to develop a set of principles and rules that will serve as the basis for 
making decisions and implementing measures and initiatives in the field of sport diplomacy. 
A sport diplomacy framework is then conceived as a condition for a successful and efficient 
action in this realm, and the concept of organizational culture will structure the analysis and 
will be used in this chapter as a prerequisite for the design of such strategy. 
  
An EU sport diplomacy framework has to be built within the context of the external relations 
policy and developed through both binding agreements adopted between the EU and third 
countries and soft law instruments which are typical of the political dialogue the EU maintains 
with third countries and organizations. A variety of EU institutions will participate in its 
implementation. The role of the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the European External Action Service (EEAS) will be considered. The aim of 
this chapter is fourfold:127  
 




127 The author would like to thank Dr. J. Simon Rofe, from SOAS London, for his contribution and advice on 
various issues examined in this chapter. 
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2. It will propose a definition of the notion of organizational culture, which should 
structure EU’s action in this field.  
 
3. It will also explore the challenges that the EU faces in order to introduce a successful 
organizational culture in the sport diplomacy domain.   
 
4. Concrete proposals will be formulated to help the EU and its Member States shape their 
own sport diplomacy policy from a practical perspective.  
 
 
2. Towards an EU organizational culture in the sport diplomacy domain: Traits and key 
challenges 
 
2.1. Reviewing past and recent literature: What’s in a name? 
 
First, it is necessary to conceptualize what we understand by ‘organizational culture’. Whilst 
several authors have attempted definitions, at the time of writing there is still no generally 
accepted consensus. As has been said, “a glance at just a few works that use the concept of 
‘organizational culture’ will reveal enormous variation in the definition of this term and even 
more in the use of the term ‘culture’”.128 Despite this lack of definition, there seems to be a 
universal consensus that it plays a crucial role in the proper execution of the strategies, actions 
and measures adopted by an organization as well as on its effects on performance efficiency.129  
 
A very well-known definition is the one proposed by Eldridge and Crombie in 1974. According 
to these authors, it refers “to the unique configuration of norms, values, beliefs and ways of 
behaving that characterize the manner in which groups and individuals combine to get things 
done”.130 In general, definitions proposed by culture theorists range “from notions of accepted 
behavioral rules, norms and rituals (…) to shared values, ideologies and beliefs (…), and, at 
an underlying level, shared patterns of meaning or understanding (…)”.131  
 
128 Alvesson, M. (2012), Understanding Organizational Culture, Sage, at 3.  
129 Bluedorn, A. C. and Lundgren, E. F. (1993) A culture-match perspective for strategic change, Research in 
Organizational Change and Development, 7 (5), 137-179. 
130 Eldridge, J. and Crombie, A. (1974) The Sociology of Organizations, Allen and Unwin, at 89. 
131 Linnenluecke, M. K.  and Griffiths, A. (2010) Corporate sustainability and organizational culture, Journal of 
World Business, 45(4), 357-366, at 358. 
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When we unpack this quotation, a number of issues emerge, each of which impacts on the ways 
the work of an organization is structured. First, there is the suggestion that this is not a fixed 
concept, but one that changes over the time and that is dependent on the type of organization. 
Second, there is the idea that, as said, organizational culture has something to do with the 
behavior of the organization. Third, shared values and beliefs inform a particular organization’s 
culture. Nevertheless, apprehending the essence of the concept is not an easy task. This is 
mainly due to its multidimensional character.  
 
Organizational culture is, therefore, an evasive concept which has gained weight in the corpus 
of knowledge typical of strategic and managerial studies. Rather than establishing a strict 
definition, both academics and practitioners are more prone to decompose the main elements 
of the concept, as values, managerial practices, internal communication, and non-formal 
interactions. These decomposed elements are usually studied in the framework of 
organisational performance and effectiveness, as recent studies have done.132 In this line, 
Hofstede’s seminal work draws our attention to six independent dimensions to describe the 
variety in organizations practices that can be used as a framework to give an account of 
organizational cultures:133  
 
• Process orientation cultures, dominated by technical and bureaucratic routines vs. 
results orientation determined by a common concern of outcomes cultures. 
 
• Employee orientation vs. job orientation cultures. The former tends to assume 
responsibility only for employees’ job performance, while employee-oriented cultures 
accept also broad responsibility for the organization members' wellbeing. 
 
• Parochialism, when the members of the organization derive their identity from the 
organization they work for vs. professionalism, when they identify primarily with their 
professions.134 
 
132 Shahzad, F. et al (2012) Impact of Organizational Culture on Organizational Performance: An Overview, 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(9), 975-985. 
133 Hofstede, G. (2011), Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context, Online readings in 
psychology and culture, 2 (1), 2307-0919. The author warns about that his research is based in organizations from 
different countries. For this reason, additional dimensions may be necessary or some of these six may be less 
useful for, for example, defining an organizational culture within the EU.  
134 As Christensen and Yesilkagit remind us “the influence of international civil servants depends on various 




• Open system vs. closed system cultures, related to the style of internal and external 
communication, and to the ease with which outsiders and newcomers are admitted. 
 
• Loose control vs. tight control cultures, referring to the degree of formality of the 
organization. 
 
• Normative vs. pragmatic cultures, describing the way of dealing with the environment. 
 
Despite the importance of organizational culture to explain the performance of any 
organization, recent developments have stated that it is even more determinant in the case of 
non-market strategies.135 On this matter, both governments and public administrations have 
been the subject of a continuous research on this field during the last decades,136 since the 
values, leadership style and internal relationship framework have been identified as part of the 
main elements to assess public administration performance and effectiveness. The role of 
organisational culture in the public sector was accentuated in the aftermath of the New Public 
Management revolution, when private sector management practices were adopted by public 
sector reformers. Starting from these points, several authors have defined different ways to 
improve public administration and government performance through a change in the 
organizational culture, through changes in leadership positions or specific training for civil 
servants.137  
 
Organizational culture has not only been identified as a key element for public service 
performance, but also as part of the success in the implementation of new public policies. 
Therefore, the successful implementation of new policies needs a careful matching between 
the established policy goals and the organisational beliefs, as well as the establishment of 
 
K. (2019) International public administrations: a critique, Journal of European Public Policy, 26 (6), 946-961, at 
951. 
135 Joseph, O. O. and Kibera, F. (2019) Organizational Culture and Performance: Evidence From Microfinance 
Institutions in Kenya, SAGE Open, 9 (1) at 1.  
136 Molina, A.D. (2009) Values in public administration: the role of organizational culture, International Journal 
of Organization Theory & Behaviour, 12 (2), 266-279. 
137 Schraeder, M., et al. (2005) Organizational culture in public sector organizations. Promoting change through 
training and leading by example, Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 26(6), 492-502. 
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specific management practices, the latter based on performance more than on the process‐
oriented nature of classical bureaucratic management practice.138 
 
In this context, research has tended to focus on local and regional governments. Thus, a key 
problem with much of the literature in relation to the role to be played by a certain 
organizational culture in implementing successful EU policies and strategies is that EU 
institutions have been relatively absent from the analysis. There is still considerable ambiguity 
and uncertainty with regard to this question. The diversity of public administrations within the 
EU, their different organizational and managerial cultures, and the different conceptions of 
‘public sector performance’ make it difficult to conclude that the organization has managed to 
develop its own organizational culture.139 As might have been expected, EU institutions 
functioning and behaviour cannot be considered but the result of the diversity of the dominant 
administrative cultures in the EU countries.  
 
However, this lack of definition does not only affect the EU. The study of the role of 
organisational culture within international organizations is still to be fully developed. Only a 
few studies have been focused on the role of organisational culture as a factor to explain the 
behaviour of international organisations, even if some authors declare, without enough 
evidence, the key role to be played by vocabulary, internal power relations, common values 
and socialization processes of international civil servants in the decision making process of 
such institutions.140 In other words, while the behaviour of international organisations has been 
studied in the context of international relations from different perspectives, i.e. rational choice 
models or game theory, the potential role of internal cultural determinants have not been yet 
fully explored. This opens a new field for further research and practice.  
 
Having this in mind, the implementation of an organizational culture of sport diplomacy within 
the EU requires a reflection about its potential role in the fulfilment of the planned objectives, 
which obviously requires a previous agreement on which those objectives are. Once goals are 
 
138 Brunetto, Y. and Farr‐Wharton, R. (2005) The role of management post‐NPM in the implementation of new 
policies affecting police officers' practices, Policing: An International Journal, 28 (2), 221-241. 
139 See the papers included in Gravier, M. and Triga,V. (eds) (2005), Organisational Culture in the Institutions of 
the EU, EUI Working Paper 2005/4, accessed at  
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/3337/sps2005-04.pdf (23 June 2021). 
140 Sarfaty, G. (2009) Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at the 
World Bank, American Journal of International Law, 103(4), 647-683. 
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defined, it is needed to address the type of culture that the advancement of these goals and 
objectives would require.  
 
Later in this section we will analyse how the EU can develop its own organizational culture in 
the field of sport diplomacy. For doing so, we will first refer to the traits that we consider 
essential for the definition of an organizational culture in this domain. Then, we will examine 
the key challenges the EU and its Member States face in the implementation of those traits in 
the sport diplomacy domain. The notion of organization culture offers greater opportunities to 
promote the advancement of a sport diplomacy EU agenda since it incorporates a number of 
key elements which are relevant to turn the EU into a distinct and perceptible actor in this field. 




2.2. Three traits defining EU Sport Diplomacy organizational culture 
 
A. Coordination  
 
The role of coordination in organization efficient performance has been documented for some 
time now. Its importance seems obvious. Working together in an efficient and organized way 
helps to achieve objectives previously defined. Coordination is needed in order to minimize 
eventual conflicts, smooth rivalries, and avoid delays and other typical organizational 
problems. Coordination requires the integration of activities and tasks, and the centrality of this 
culture concept follows from the profound importance of shared meanings for any coordinated 
action.141  
 









As we will see below, EU coordination within the field of sport diplomacy must be ensured:  
 
a) Ad intra: Within the EU. This should include: 
 
- Coordination among Member States. It is a key element. Sports falls within the 
competence of Member States, having the EU competence as a supportive character. 
As a number of EU Member States have developed their own national sport diplomacy 
strategies,142 coordination becomes important in order to avoid conflict between the 
national and supranational level and ensure complementarity.  
 
- Coordination between Member States and EU institutions. In a similar vein, 
coordination between national sport diplomacy strategies and the EU’s strategy in this 
field has to be safeguarded. The Council becomes a key actor in this regard. As known, 
this institution adopts EU policy frameworks and work plans in the area of sport with 
the priorities for cooperation between Member States and the European Commission.143 
 
- Coordination among EU institutions. As will be detailed below, different EU 
institutions have played a role in the definition of a sport diplomacy strategy. Since 
sport diplomacy is connected with the implementation and consolidation of European 
values, both within and outside the EU, we can consider it has a ‘constitutional’ 
dimension and all European institutions should be involved in its definition and 
implementation.  
 
b) Ad extra: Between the EU and non-EU actors, being these: 
 
- Third countries and other international organizations. As said, Article 165(3) TFEU 
provides a legal basis for EU action in this regard. Also, the third and fourth EU Work 
 
142 See chapter two.  
143 The third EU Work Plan for Sport acknowledged ‘the need to cooperate with third countries, in particular 
candidate countries and potential candidates to the EU, to promote European values through sport diplomacy’, 
and agrees that sport diplomacy should be given priority by Member States and the Commission for the period 
covered by the Work Plan. See the Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the EU Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017-31 December 2020), 
OJ C 189, 15 June 2017. Sport Diplomacy has been also conceived as a key topic in the fourth EU Work Plan for 
Sport (1 January 2021-30 June 2024), OJ C 419, 4 December 2020.  
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Plans for Sport identify sport diplomacy as a tool in the cooperation with third 
countries. Other international organizations have been working in the definition of their 
own strategies and policies in this field. The Council of Europe and UNESCO are 
among them. Coordination between these international organizations and the EU is 
essential in order to identify EU’s strategy added value. This is an issue explored later 
in the study. 
 
- Sporting organizations. With self-regulation being a traditional claim of the sport 
movement, national and supranational institutions have encountered serious difficulties 
when intervening in the sector. Sports authorities have traditionally called both for 
independence and normative and organizational autonomy. They also play a role in the 




Consistency plays a critical role in providing clear direction in the achievement of an 
organization’s plans. It can be defined as “the quality of always behaving in the same way or 
of having the same opinions, standard, etc.”,145 and it is therefore linked to the behavior of the 
organization. From a legal perspective, consistency is understood as a requirement of no 
contradictions.146   
 
At EU level, consistency is currently enshrined in Article 13(1) of the EU Treaty. This article 
establishes that “the Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote 
its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the 
 
144 As Pigman has affirmed, “a basic taxonomy devised to understand how international sport and diplomacy 
interact in the broad sense proves equally useful for understanding relationships between sport and public 
diplomacy. At the broadest level, one can distinguish between international sport used as a tool of diplomacy by 
governments, on the one hand, and international sport-as diplomacy, the diplomacy that takes place between a 
range of different types of actors when international sporting competition is organized and hosted, on the other. 
The former category tends to be better known to scholars of diplomacy than the latter, but international sport is 
playing a significant part in public diplomacy in both categories”: Pigman, G. A. (2014) International Sport and 
Diplomacy's Public Dimension: Governments, Sporting Federations and the Global Audience, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 25(1), 94-114, at 97. 
145 Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, retrieved from 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/consistency?q=consistency (accessed 23 June 
2021). 
146 Langer, J. and Saute, W. (2017) The Consistency Requirement in EU Law, Columbia Journal of European 
Law, 20(3), 39-74, at 43. 
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Member States, and ensure the consistency,147 effectiveness and continuity of its policies and 
actions”.148 It is not a new principle. On the contrary, “the first mention of consistency at Treaty 
level was made more than 25 years ago, as an instrument seeking to regulate the conduct of 
the various actors involved in the European Community’s (EC) external relations”.149 This 
mention is now contained in article 21(3) of the EU Treaty, establishing that the EU “shall 
ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its 
other policies”.150 Nevertheless, we can find also “provisions at Treaty level providing for 
consistency to be achieved both more generally as between all EU policies (both internal and 
external) as well as more specifically in the field of external relations”.151 
 
As sport diplomacy is an area of EU policy operating both at internal and external levels, 
consistency guarantees a coherent policy approach and is therefore connected to the idea of 





Coordination and consistency should result in the determination of both the general and 
specific aims that EU sport diplomacy policy is supposed to achieve, the reasons for which an 
EU sport diplomacy policy is designed and implemented. Being a political exercise, the 
participation of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council seems 
desirable.  
 
In a broad sense, the EU has the opportunity to enhance a new role for sport diplomacy, 
conceiving it as a tool for the dissemination of its values worldwide, the democratization of 
international relations and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, as well as a central axis in 
 
147 Emphasis added. 
148 OJ C 326, 26 October 2012.  
149 Franklin, C.N.K. (2011) The Burgeoning Principle of Consistency in EU Law, Yearbook of European Law, 30 
(1), 42–85, at 42.  
150 An additional mention is made in article 26.2: ‘The Council and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’. 
151 Franklin, C.N.K. (2011) The Burgeoning Principle of Consistency in EU Law, Yearbook of European Law, 30 
(1), 42–85, at 83.  
152 ‘Coherence requires political leadership and a strong responsibility on the part of the Institutions to ensure a 
consistent approach within a complex system’: European Commission (2001), European Governance: A White 
Paper, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_01_10 (23 June 2021).  
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global governance. A goal-oriented and strategic action should underpin the EU efforts in this 
field. This long-lasting purpose dimension should be consistent with a periodic determination 
of the specific goals of this EU policy area. 
 
 
2.3. Addressing key challenges: The configuration of an EU organizational culture in the 
field of sport diplomacy 
 
The EU and its Member States face specific challenges regarding coordination, consistency 
and purpose. The aim of this section is to highlight those challenges while making 
recommendations for effectively addressing them.  
 
A. Coordination challenges 
 
As known, a specific EU competence on sport only was set up in Lisbon Treaty in 2009. At 
that moment Articles 6 and 165 TFEU shaped the limits of the competence conferred upon the 
EU by the Member States in the sport domain. Thus, Article (6.e) of the TFEU confers on the 
EU the competence to carry out actions to support or supplement the actions of the Member 
States in the field of sport, while Article 165(1) sets out the details of a sport policy, stating 
that the Union “shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function”. Thus, sport is a relatively new competence of the EU which 
concerns both EU’s internal and external functioning. 
  
Nevertheless, EU action in the field of sport predates the Lisbon Treaty. Two interconnected 
aspects should be taken into consideration in this regard. First, the European Court of Justice 
located sport within the scope of EU law whenever the sporting activity in question constitutes 
an economic activity, in particular, within Treaty provisions related to the free movement of 
workers and the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.153 But sport is 
much more than an economic activity. The ECJ’s case law has also taken into account the 
socio-cultural values of sport, in particular, non-discrimination.154 Both dimensions of sport 
 
153 See Parrish, R. (2012) Lex sportiva and EU sports law?, European Law Review, 37 (6), 716-733. 




had been developed by the other EU institutions before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
 
Taken into account that autonomy has been a traditional and constant claim of the sporting 
movement in its relationship with the EU,155 the truth is that even in the absence of an express 
sport competence, the European institutions have been addressing sporting questions from 
different perspectives for decades. Thus, the European Commission reflected on the role of 
sport in the context of the European integration process long before laying the underpinning of 
an EU policy for sport in the 2007 White Paper on Sport.156 The Helsinki Report on Sport is 
an example in this regard.157 And we find examples also from the European Parliament158 and 
the Council.159 
 
A consequence of this activity is that different aspects of sport were developed by the EU 
institutions before the Treaty of Lisbon, although certainly not in a coordinated way. As Parrish 
put it, even before the Bosman ruling “the EU operated a highly polarized and fragmented 
sports policy characterized by two conflicting policy approaches to sport. First, the EU took a 
fleeting regulatory interest in sport. The ECJ and the Competition Policy Directorate 
intervened in sport to correct free movement and competition restrictions and distortions 
within the Single Market. These interventions were not however informed by the EU’s other 
main policy strand and as a consequence EU sporting actions were not co-ordinated. The 
second strand of policy involvement in sport involved the EU pursuing a political interest in 
sport. In particular, sport was identified as a tool through which the EU could strengthen its 
image in the minds of Europe’s citizens”.160 
 
155 The independence of sports organizations and their right to organise themselves through appropriate associative 
structures was recognized by the Nice Declaration in 2000. European Council, Nice, 7–10 Dec. 2000, Conclusions 
of the Presidency. Annex IV, Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, 
of which account should be taken in implementing common policies (2000). The Declaration is available at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice2_en.htm (accessed 23 June 2021).  
156 COM(2007) 391 final, available at : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52007DC0391 (accessed 23 June 2021). 
157 Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures 
and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework, COM/99/0644 final, available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:51999DC0644 (accessed 23 June 2021).  
158 See for instance the Resolution on women and sport (2002/2280(INI) adopted on 5 June 2003, available at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-
0269+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 23 June 2021).  
159 See its Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of the Ministers for Youth meeting within the Council 
of 17 December 1999 on the non-formal education dimension of sporting activities in the European Community 
youth programmes, OJ C 8, 12 January 2000.  
160 Parrish, R. (2003) Sports law and policy in the European Union, Manchester University Press, at 5.  
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Regarding sport diplomacy, previous attempts to enhance EU action in this field can also be 
identified before the delivery of the Report of the HLG.161 Thus, the Sport Intergroup of the 
European Parliament met in Brussels on 30 June 2015 for the first time and addressed different 
topics relevant to sport, including sport diplomacy. Also, the European Parliament Resolution 
of 2 February 2012 on the European Dimension of Sport affirmed that sport can play a part in 
various areas of the EU’s external relations, among other ways by means of diplomacy.162  
 
Consequently, the EU built an institutional knowledge and expertise in the area of sport, in 
general, and sport diplomacy in particular. Even if in an uncoordinated and fragmented way, 
European institutions developed the main elements of the European sports policy before the 
conferral of an express competence in this field. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
marked the beginning of a new period, but the foundations of this policy can be identified much 
earlier. Even so, given the nature of the EU competence on sports, the organization has a weak 
legal basis to act, which makes it more complex to claim for its own role in this field. 
 
Incoordination and fragmentation should be addressed when it comes to shape and implement 
an EU sport diplomacy strategy. Acting in a coordinated way, both ad intra and ad extra, will 
result in a more efficient common action. As said, diverse EU institutions have shaped until 
now an emerging sport diplomacy policy and have played an active role in boosting EU action. 
The Report to Commissioner Tibor Navracsics delivered in June 2016 can be identified as the 
starting point of this process. From that moment, the European Council, the Council and the 
European Commission have been working on a sustained basis in this field. 
 
a) Addressing coordination ad intra 
 
Sport diplomacy is part of the sport/external policy of an increasing number of EU Member 
States. At the same time, thanks to the supportive competence in the area of sport, the EU can 
shape its own sport diplomacy policy by coordinating Member States policies and 
supplementing them. The White Paper on Sport acknowledged the importance of cooperation 
among Member States. According to this instrument, this cooperation “takes place in informal 
 
161 Parrish, R. (2003) Sports law and policy in the European Union, Manchester University Press, at 2.  
162 2011/2087(INI), accessed at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-0025 (23 
June 2021).  
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ministerial meetings, as well as at the administrative level by Sport Directors”163. Besides that, 
a Rolling Agenda for sport was adopted by EU Sport Ministers in 2004 to define priority 
themes for discussions on sport among the Member States.164 
 
In this context, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), conceived as an instrument by the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2000, could be a useful tool. As known, it takes place in areas that, as sport, 
fall within the competence of Member States. Conceived as an intergovernmental method of 
policy-making, its shape “varies according to policy area”.165 Therefore, it is a flexible 
method166 that is aimed to spread “best practice, to be a learning process for all players that 
participate in the process”. At the same time, “by seeping into domestic discourses and 
arrangements, it is supposed to alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors (…), thus 
leading to convergence in the long run. It is also meant to improve transparency and deepen 
democratic participation, one of the key objectives of the European Union”.167 The reference 
to convergence is an interesting one, since it connects coordination and consistency challenges. 
Besides that, it offers the possibility of ensuring coordination beyond EU Member States and 
institutions, since “in theory, OMC should involve all relevant stakeholders: the Union, the 
Member States, the local and regional collectivities, as well as the social partners and civil 
society”.168 
 
In particular, the OMC would be principally aimed to: 
 
1. Deciding a set of rules and guidelines for the EU in order to identify and achieve the 
sport diplomacy goals in the medium and long terms. Once decided, these goals would 
be endorsed by the Council.  
 
2. Exchanging best practices in the field of sport diplomacy. 
 
 
163 European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final (2007), at 49. 
164 Ibid.  
165 De la Porte, C. (2003) Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European 
Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, European Law Journal, 8 (1), 38-58, at 39. 
166 According to some authors, OMC differences depending on the policy area makes more accurate to talk about 
'OMCs', rather than a single OMC: Hatzopoulos, V. (2007) Why the open method of coordination is bad for you: 
a letter to the EU, European Law Journal, 13 (3), 309-342, at 312.  
167 De la Porte, C. (2003) Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European 
Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, European Law Journal, 8 (1), 38-58, at 39. 
168 Ibid, at 44.  
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3. Transposing the European guidelines into Member States’ sport diplomacy policies. 
This could encourage alignment between the EU sport diplomacy strategy and the 
domestic ones, thus avoiding contradictions and, consequently, ensuring consistency at 
different levels.  
 
4. Measuring the effect of EU action in this field, by jointly establishing indicators and 
periodically monitor and evaluate it.  
 
 
In short, the creation of a sport diplomacy OMC group could help to smooth eventual 
contradictions between European and national sport diplomacy policies and strategies. 
Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that, while both the European Commission and 
the Council have a strong role to play within the OMC policy-making process, the role of other 
European institutions have to be defined. In particular, the participation of the European 
Parliament would need to be ensured. Both the fact that the European Parliament is “completely 
left out of the procedure”,169 along with the criticism of this method could make it problematic 
to adopt the OMC in this area. The formal involvement of the European Parliament would 
ensure more democratic OMC’s outcomes. A re-defined OMC in the field of sport diplomacy 
could let the collective action of EU institutions in this domain.  
 
On a different note, it has to be taken into account that the institutional responsibility for 
running sports policy at EU level rests with the Directorate General for Education, Youth, Sport 
and Culture.170 However, sport is a multidimensional policy, also in the diplomatic context. 
For this reason, sport has to be mainstreamed into the work of other European Commission 
services and EU institutions. In particular, those dealing with responsibilities in the 
implementation of external relations’ goals and including the Foreign Affairs Council and the 
General Affairs Council.171 Their involvement would also benefit a more coordinated action in 
this regard.172 Nevertheless, it has to be highlighted that, despite the international consensus 
 
169 Hatzopoulos, V. (2007) Why the open method of coordination is bad for you: a letter to the EU, European Law 
Journal, 13 (3), 309-342, at 320. 
170 Including the word ‘sport’ in the name of the Unit has contributed, on the one hand, to draw attention to the 
work of the European Commission in this field and to send a clearer message that sport is a priority at EU level, 
on the other.   
171 The General Affairs Council is responsible for coordinating a number of cross-cutting policy areas and for 
ensuring consistency in the work of the rest of Council configurations.  
172 In 2018, the Council adopted its Conclusions on Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport in 
which it invited the Commission to include sport as part of external relations and to promote the common values 
of the EU. The Conclusions encourages the promotion, where appropriate, of common European values outside 
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about the importance of sport as a soft diplomatic tool, it is not mentioned in the strategic 
agenda 2019-2024 agreed by the European Council in June 2019. This new agenda identifies 
as a priority for this period the promotion of European interests and values on the global 
stage.173 
 
b) Addressing coordination ad extra  
 
Coordination ad extra refers first to the need of working with other competent international 
organizations in the field of sport. The EU is not the first international organization in resorting 
to sport diplomacy in order to meet its goals. At the universal level, both the UN and the 
UNESCO have trusted in sport as a useful tool to foster development, social inclusion, gender 
equality, and peace-building.174 At regional level, also the Council of Europe has played a role 
is this regard.175 EU action needs, on the one hand, to prove an added value in this field, and to 
avoid overlapping with the action of these other international actors, on the other. Therefore, 
coordination between the EU and other international organizations should be ensured. 
  
This is not a new problem. As it has been said, “the coordination of organizations working in 
the same field or towards the same goal is a classic theoretical problem of organizations as 
much as it is a practical requirement”.176 In this sense, international organizations are 
conceived as actors required to offer “integrated solutions as well as the practices that may 
help in managing [global] challenges”, which  “requires overcoming fragmentation and siloed 
thinking (…) through coordination or the alignment of interdependent activities to accomplish 
a collective organizational task (…) in order to create more consistency among decisions 
horizontally as well as vertically”.177 
 
 
the EU and invites the European Commission to take further action in this field. The Conclusions are available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/eycs/2018/05/22-23/(accessed 23 June 2021).  
173 It is available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-strategic-agenda-2019-2024/ 
 (accessed 23 June 2021).  
174 In 2013, the UN General Assembly resolution A/67/L.77 proclaimed 6 April as the International Day of Sport 
for Development and Peace. The resolution is available at:  
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/L.77&Lang=E (accessed 23 June 2021).  
175 As known, the Council of Europe is the only international organization expressly mentioned in article 165.3 
of the TFEU. 
176 Boussard, H. (2008) The coordination of international organizations: the example of the United Nations Inter 
Agency Committee on Bioethics, Revue Française D'Administration Publique, 126, at 37. 
177 Mele, V. and Cappellaro, G. (2018) Cross‐level coordination among international organizations: Dilemmas 
and practices, Public Administration, 96 (4), 736-752, at 736-737.  
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At the same time, successful EU sport diplomacy action requires the participation of sporting 
organizations.178 The EU has a long history of cooperation with them,179 the importance of 
which was most clearly highlighted in the White Paper on Sport and the successive EU Work 
Plans on Sport. Regarding sport diplomacy in particular, it is central the opportunity for the EU 
in this realm to recognise that sporting organizations are increasingly relevant diplomatic 
actors.180  
 
Again, the White Paper on Sport must be taken into account. Due to the “complex and diverse 
sport cultures in Europe”, the European Commission highlighted the need to strengthen its 
structured dialogue on sport by involving in it:181 
 
1. The European Sport Federations.  
 
2. European umbrella organizations for sport, notably the European Olympic Committees, 
the European Paralympic Committee and European non-governmental sport 
organizations. 
 
3. National umbrella organizations for sport and national Olympic and Paralympic 
Committees. 
 
4. Other actors in the field of sport represented at European level, including social 
partners. 
 
5. Other European and international organizations, in particular the Council of Europe's 
structures for sport and UN organizations such as UNESCO and the World Health 
Organization. 
 
178 The abovementioned Council conclusions on Sport Diplomacy adopted in November 2016 recognized that 
Sport Diplomacy can be realized in close cooperation with the sports movement whilst respecting its autonomy. 
179 A recent example in this regard is the cooperation agreement adopted in February 2018 by the Commission 
and UEFA including the goal of promoting values and principles common to both parties: Parrish, R. (2020), 
Developing an EU Sport Diplomacy, Sport and EU Blog, available at 
https://www.sportandeu.com/post/developing-an-eu-sport-diplomacy (accessed 23 June 2021). 
180 As it has been said, ‘sport in diplomacy’ and ‘diplomacy in sport’ processes can be distinguished: Murray, S. 
and Pigman, G.A. (2014), Mapping the Relationship between International Sport and Diplomacy, Sport in Society, 
17 (9), 1098-1118, at 1099.  
181 European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final (2007) at 48. On 21 November 2017 the 
Council of the European Union adopted its Resolution on further developing the EU Structured Dialogue on Sport, 
which underlined the importance to invite the highest representatives of sports movement, European institutions 
and other relevant sport stakeholders to Sport Directors’ meetings. The resolution is available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13432-2017-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 23 June 2021).  
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The EU should take full advantage of the main structures of the structured dialogue on sport182 
to ensure participation and cooperation on sport diplomacy issues with external stakeholders.183  
It is also noteworthy that other international organizations have created more formal 
mechanisms for institutionalized cooperation with external stakeholders.  UN and UNESCO, 
at the universal level, or the Council of Europe, at the regional level, are relevant examples in 
this regard.  
 
The following table summarizes this point: 
 
UN UNESCO Council of Europe 
The United Nations Office on 
Sport for Development and Peace 
(UNOSDP) partially illustrates the 
point above. It was introduced by 
UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in 2001. Its mandate was to 
coordinate the efforts undertaken 
by the UN in promoting sport in a 
systematic and coherent way as a 
means to contribute to the 
achievement of development and 
peace in cooperation with relevant 
stakeholder. Nevertheless, on 4 
May 2017, Secretary-General 
António Guterres announced the 
closure of the UNOSDP along 
with a new partnership with the 
IOC in this field.184 
In 1978, an Intergovernmental 
Committee for Physical Education 
and Sport (CIGEPS) was 
established to promote the role of 
sport. CIGEPS is comprised of 
expert representatives in the field 
of physical education and sport 
from 18 UNESCO Member 
States, each elected for a four-year 
term. The Permanent Consultative 
Council (PCC), comprising key 
sport federations, UN agencies 
and NGOs, provides technical 
support and advice to the 
Committee. 
EPAS is not only a forum where 
Member States of the Council of 
Europe cooperate in sporting 
issues. It also constitutes a useful 
platform for cooperation and 
dialogue between public 
authorities, sports federations and 
NGOs. 
 
A specific and stable framework could be introduced in order to make possible a fluent dialogue 
and closer cooperation between public and private sporting authorities.  
 
182 Being these the EU Sport Forum, the EU high-level structured dialogue on sport in the margin of the meeting 
of the Council of the EU, and the EU operational-level structured dialogue on sport in the margin of the meeting 
of the EU Sports Directors or other informal Presidency events.  
183 In this regard, the Report of HLG on Sport Diplomacy recommended the maintenance of ‘on-going good 
relations with relevant sports bodies, stakeholders and the Council of Europe through the EU structured dialogue 
on sport’. 
184 Some critical analysis of this decision can be found at https://www.sportanddev.org/en/news-and-views/call-
articles/closure-unosdp (accessed 23 June 2021).  
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B. Consistency challenges: Mapping EU Sport Diplomacy within the External 
Relations Framework 
 
In contrast with the political recognition of the prominent role sport can play in the EU’s 
external relations agenda, sporting issues are underused in the vast typology of normative 
external relations instruments, both binding and non-binding, and programmes. Likewise, the 
EU’s political dialogue with third countries and regions would benefit from a more congruous 
and structured role of sport. Also, although some of the actions carried out by the EEAS are 
directly linked to sport, these actions have not yet been systematically conceived. 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the role sport actually plays in the EU’s external 
relations framework, while trying to identify consistency shortcomings and to explore the 
possibilities of reaching a more coherent approach of EU action in this field. A vast typology 
of international instruments is used to carry out the EU external action objectives.185 Among 
them, we can distinguish between ‘autonomous’ and ‘conventional’ instruments. Both can be 
legally binding (agreements) or soft law instruments (for instance, Joint Letters, Joint 
Statements and Memorandums of Understanding).  
 
 
a) Sport issues within international agreements  
 
Sport is an area of cooperation considered in a variety of binding international agreements 
concluded between the EU and third countries or international organizations.186 
 
First, we have to consider international agreements on the economic and trade domains. For 
example, Economic Partnership and Free Trade Agreements seek to liberalize the trade in 
goods and services. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are aimed at providing a general 
 
185 See Wessel, R. A. (2018) ‘Soft’ International Agreements in EU External Relations, Paper presented at the 
ECPR SGEU Conference, accessed at  
https://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID=38907&EventID=124 (23 June 2021). 
186 As known, sport has played an important role in this framework due to the ECJ case law concerning cases of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality against players from third countries that have concluded an international 
agreement with the EU and its Member States containing a non-discrimination clause.  
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framework for bilateral economic relations. These agreements may contain specific references 
relating to trade in sporting goods and/or services originating from the parties.187  
 
Despite the fact that they basically regulate economic questions, it is interesting to highlight 
that some of these agreements are supplemented by a Protocol on Cultural Cooperation.188 For 
example, the Free Trade Agreements with CARIFORUM (the 15 Caribbean Community States 
and the Dominican Republic),189 and with the Republic of Korea190 include this kind of 
instrument. The Protocols set up the framework within which the parties shall cooperate in the 
facilitation of the exchanges of cultural activities, good and services, and expressly refers to 
the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions adopted in Paris in 2005.191 Protocols on Cultural Cooperation can also be 
applicable to the promotion of traditional sports and games, considered by UNESCO part of 
the intangible cultural heritage.192 Also, this practice could be extended to cooperation in the 
field of sport by signing specific Protocols on sporting cooperation with third countries which 
are Parties to such agreements.  
 
Second, we will refer to Association and Stabilization Agreements. This kind of international 
agreements constitutes the framework of relations between the EU and the potential candidate 
Western Balkan countries. These agreements establish a free trade area between the EU and 
the country concerned, while identifying common political and economic objectives and 
encouraging regional co-operation. They serve as the basis for the implementation of the 
accession process and involve Western Balkan countries in a dynamic partnership aimed at 
stabilizing the region and creating a free-trade area. Even if the third EU Plan for Sport (2017-
2020) acknowledged the need to cooperate with third countries, in particular candidate 
 
187 See the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the EU 
and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017. 
188 For a critical analysis of this practice see: Loisen, J. and de Ville, F. (2011) The EU-Korea Protocol on Cultural 
Cooperation: Toward Cultural Diversity or Cultural Deficit?, International Journal of Communication, 5, 254-
271. 
189 OJ L 289, 30 October 2008. 
190 OJ L 127, 14 May 2011. 
191 The text of the Convention is available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 June 2021). The EU 
accessed the Convention on 18 December 2006.  
192 Recent UNESCO initiatives in this regard can be found at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/physical-education-and-sport/traditional-sports-and-games/ (accessed 23 June 2021). 
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countries and potential candidates to the EU, to promote European values through sport, the 
role it can play in this framework remains unexplored and should be boosted.193  
 
Third, Association Agreements are aimed at fostering close relationships between the EU and 
third countries on a variety of topics. A specific article regarding cooperation in the field of 
sport and physical activity has been included in recent Association Agreements concluded by 
the EU: 
 
- The Association Agreement between the EU and its Member States, one the one hand, 
and Ukraine, on the other,194 refers to cooperation in sporting issues in Article 441.195  
 
- The Association Agreement between the EU European Atomic Energy Community and 
their Member States, and Georgia,196 refers to cooperation in sporting issues in article 
368.197 
 
These provisions should place a strong emphasis on the role sport can play to support 
democracy and economic development in third countries, paying particular attention to its 
potential benefits in the context of social inclusion and non-discrimination. Given the potential 
of sport in smoothing political dialogue, such a provision could also be included in Partnership 




193 The White Paper on Sport only encourages the European Commission to pay particular attention to the sport 
sector when implementing the Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships with third 
countries, and when elaborating harmonized schemes for the admission of various categories of third country 
nationals for economic purposes on the basis of the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration. 
194 OJ L 161, 29 May 2014. 
195 According to paragraph 1 of the art. “the Parties shall cooperate in the field of sport and physical activity in 
order to help develop a healthy lifestyle among all age groups, to promote the social functions and educational 
values of sport and to fight against threats to sport such as doping, match-fixing, racism and violence”. Paragraph 
2 details the areas where such cooperation will be implemented: it “shall, in particular, include the exchange of 
information and good practices in the following areas: (a) promotion of physical activity and sport through the 
educational system, in cooperation with public institutions and non-governmental organisations; (b) sports 
participation and physical activity as a means to contribute to a healthy lifestyle and general well-being; (c) 
development of national competence and qualifications systems in the sport sector; (d) integration of 
disadvantaged groups through sport; (e) the fight against doping; (f) the fight against match-fixing; (g) security 
during major international sporting events”.  
196 OJ L 261, 30 August 2014.  
197 According to it, “the Parties shall promote cooperation in the field of sport and physical activity through the 
exchange of information and good practices in order to promote a healthy lifestyle and the social and educational 
values of sport, mobility in sport and in order to fight global threats to sport such as doping, racism and violence”. 
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b) Sport within soft law instruments adopted in the framework of political dialogue 
 
The expression ‘political dialogue’ is used in a broad sense. In the case of the EU, it has its 
origin in the European Political Cooperation which was introduced in 1970 as “a separate and 
additional framework of cooperation between the nine Member States of the Communities 
under which the nine agree to consult on, and so far as possible, to coordinate and act in 
common on foreign policy matters”.198 At present, the EU maintains an important number of 
political dialogues with third countries or groups of countries. They take place by means of 
contacts, information exchanges and consultations. In particular, regular meetings at different 
levels.  
 
Taking place at different levels, political dialogue allows the EU to maintain stable and 
periodical contact with third countries and regions on a variety of issues. Human rights, 
security, peacebuilding or democracy are among them. This process is complementary to other 
processes implemented by the EU at the international level.199 Resulting in non-binding, soft 
law final declarations or statements, political dialogue puts less pressure on the parties to 
achieve concrete results.   
 
Only recently, sport has starting to play a role in this framework. In November 2017, EU sport 
diplomacy took the practical step of integrating sport into EU-China High Level People to 
People Dialogue (HPPD) which has been taking place since 2012. Similarly, and allowing for 
knowledge exchange, the first EU-Japan Policy Dialogue on Education, Culture and Sport was 
held in Budapest in July 2018. The Joint Statement that followed the meeting affirms that 
“sport offers an interesting opportunity for peer-learning, particularly with regard to measures 
to preserve the integrity of sport and to promote mutual understanding”.200 Sport diplomacy is 
also mentioned in the Joint Statement made public after the Second EU-Japan Dialogue on 
Education, Culture and Sport, held online in May 2021.201 
 
198 Fitzgerald, G. (1976) European Political Cooperation, in AH Robertson (ed), European Yearbook/Annuaire 
Européen, XXII. 18–39, Springer Netherlands, at 18. 
199 Sometimes, political dialogue is conceived as part of a formal agreement concluded by the EU and a third 
country. See, for instance, the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, concluded on 12 December 2016, 
OJ L 337, 13 December 2016.  
200 See at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/japan/48106/joint-eu-japan-statement-following-first-eu-japan-
policy-dialogue-education-culture-and-sport_en (accessed 23 June 2021). 
201 ‘Sports diplomacy and the opportunities that it provides for international cooperation were also highlighted, 




Sport should become widespread in the framework of the political dialogues the EU maintains 
with third countries and regions by including it as a specific issue in: 
 
1. The regular summits between the Heads of State of the third countries and the highest 
authorities of the EU.  
2. The meetings of Ministers responsible for matters of mutual interests. 
3. The periodic meetings of senior officials from the parties.  
 
c) European Commission Programmes  
 
The EU also integrates sport as a part of its external relations policies through the Commission 
support of sport-related projects in developing countries by means of a variety of programmes. 
Interesting examples in this regard are: 
 
- Development cooperation programmes focused on young people:  
 
1. Youth Development through Football programme in South Africa,202 ended in March 
2014.  
 
2. EY4Youth Project in the field of culture and sport in Tunisia.203 The project is aimed 
to improve the inclusion of the most vulnerable young people through cultural and 
sporting initiatives, considered as development driving forces.  
 
- As mentioned above, in 2018, the Erasmus+ funding criteria were amended with the 
purpose of making possible the participation of individuals and organizations from third 





culture-sport_en (accessed 23 June 2021).  
202 Youth Development through Football, accessed at http://www.za-ydf.org/pages/home/ (23 June 2021). 
203 AECID and Catalan Development Cooperation Agency sign action protocol for young people in Tunisia, 
accessed at:  
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/SalaDePrensa/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/2020_NOTAS_P/20200629_NOT
A100.aspx (23 June 2021) 
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- Relevant changes affected also the European Week of Sport programme. From 2018, 
participation was extended to permit participation from Western Balkan countries and 
regions (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro), Eastern 
Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgina, Moldova and Ukraine), 
and other Erasmus+ Programme countries (Iceland, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom).  
 
- In 2019 and 2020, the EU calls for proposals on exchanges and mobility in sport have 
supported learning mobility initiatives in the field of sport with the Western Balkans, 
the Eastern Partnership and with countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa.  
 
Through these initiatives, the European Commission has promoted the cultivation of 
relationships with third countries and regions in the field of sport. This tendency should 
continue in the future.  
 
 
d) The Role of the European External Action Service 
 
In its Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, the Council of the EU “raise awareness within Member 
States and in the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
(including EU Delegations) on the potential of sport to contribute to public diplomacy”.204 
Being the diplomatic service par excellence, its importance in the implementation of an EU 
sport diplomacy strategy seems obvious.   
The following examples show that some of the actions carried out by EU Delegations are 
directly linked to sport:205 
 
a) In October 2017, the EU Delegation to Armenia organized the European Sport Festivals 
and Tournaments aiming to promote healthy and active lifestyle.  
b) Also in October 2017, the EU Delegation to the UAE becomes a patron of the Ecole 
Francaise de Football (EFF) 
 
204 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, 14279/16, Brussels, 
23/11/16. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14279-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 
2021). 
205 The information about the examples listed here is available at EEAS website: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en (accessed 23 June 2021). 
65 
 
c) In December 2017, the EU Delegation to Liberia donated sporting materials to the 
Amputee Football Association. 
d) In August 2018, the EU Delegation to the Pacific Islands participated in the launching 
of an initiative aiming to use rugby to prevent violence against girls and women.  
e) In November 2018, the EU Delegation to Philippines organized the first Euro-Filipino 
football festival.  
 
Although important, these actions are not yet systematic in action or conception. A more 
consistent action should include: 
 
a) The incorporation of sport related initiatives in the tasks carried out by the EU Special 
Representatives in troubled regions and countries. As they try to play an active role in 
promoting peace, stability and the rule of law in those areas, they could take advantage 
of the possibilities that sport offers in this regard.  
b) The creation of an EU Office/Unit of Sport for development peace and stability206 to 
coordinate EU action in this field.  
c) The appointment of Delegation officers responsible for sporting relations.  
 
 
C. Purpose Challenges: Time to take sport seriously within the EU External 
Relations domain 
 
Neither coordination nor consistency will accomplish their goals without an overarching EU 
sport diplomacy strategy, which requires political consensus about priorities. As known, in 
practice, EU foreign policy relies on the competences and capabilities of its individual Member 
States. Any joint action within this field depends on their consensus about priorities and 
objectives. This consensus is often difficult to achieve, being these difficulties a direct result 
of the lack of a single voice with regard to international policy. The creation of the figure of 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy through the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and of the EEAS by the Treaty of Lisbon has served only partially to address 
these challenges. These difficulties have often caused problems and frustrated the possibility 
 
206 This was the role played by the above-mentioned UN Office on Sport for Development and Peace. 
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of perceiving the EU as a single actor and may also have consequences in the sport diplomacy 
domain.  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned, there is a growing consensus in considering sport a useful tool in 
the areas of external relations and diplomacy. The EU has joined this consensus and the 
organization is facing now a main challenge: designing a consistent strategy in this domain. 
The above-mentioned Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy acknowledged that sport 
diplomacy “helps to achieve foreign policy goals in a way that is visible and comprehensible 
for the general public”.207 But, what are these goals? 
 
In the context of EU Foreign Policy, Article 3(5) of the Treaty on EU identifies the EU’s 
objectives. According to it, “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall 
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter”.  
 
The pairing formed by sport and diplomacy has proved to be a valuable one in all these areas. 
States, but also international organizations, and non-state actors such as NGOs and sport 
associations have utilised sport as a tool for development and peace, for achieving social 
change or for the promotion of human rights. There are notable parallels between the values of 
sport and the objectives of EU foreign policy, which provide opportunity to preserve peace, 
promote international cooperation, develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.208 As a diplomatic actor, sport can help the EU to 
“engage authoritatively in the core processes of negotiation, representation and 
communication in order to influence third parties”. This is what diplomacy is about.209 
 
207 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, 14279/16, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14279-2016-INIT/en/pdf 23 Nov. 2016 (accessed 8 Apr. 
2020). 
208 Murray warns also about the existence of a sports anti-diplomacy, that is, “the abuse of sport for immoral, 
unethical or intentionally divisive end”: Murray, S. (2018) Sport Diplomacy. Origins, theory and practice, 
Routledge, at 6. 
209 Koops, J. A. and Macaj, G. (2015) Introduction: The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor, in Koops, J.A. 
and Macaj, G. (eds), The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor, 1-10, Palgrave Macmillan, at 2. 
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Furthermore, sport can play a major role in addressing the EU’s need to improve both its image 
among its citizens and worldwide, and its capacity to respond to global crisis.  
 
Once the potential for sport has been identified, it has to be taken into account in EU 
instruments defining external policies, priorities and goals. However, as said, is not mentioned 
in the strategic agenda 2019-2024 recently agreed by the European Council. The organization 
should correct its ways by reflecting on the concrete role sport can play in this regard and 
adopting specific related measures. Sport should help shape EU external relations strategies. 
Two concrete examples will be examined here. 
 
First, the strong connection between sport and the promotion and protection of human rights 
has to be taken into account.210 Regarding EU policy in this field, since the adoption of the  
EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy in 2012,211 two 
EU Action Plans have been adopted covering the periods 2012-2015 and 2015-2019. No 
mention of sport is contained in the documents. This might not be surprising, if we consider 
that the reflection on the role of sport in this field was taking place at the time the EU was 
coming up with them. Nevertheless, sport is not mentioned in the EU Action Plan for Human 
Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 adopted in December 2020 either.212 Being one of the five 
lines of action defined in the plan ‘Protecting and empowering individuals’, it seems clear that 
sport may have an enormous potential and can develop into a powerful tool during the 
implementation of the plan.  
 
Second, sport can also effectively contribute to the achievement of the SDGs adopted in 2015 
as part of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.213 In its 2016 Communication to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, and the European Commission announced steps to be made without  
 
210 Donnelly, P. (2008) Sport and human rights, Sport in Society, 11 (4), 381-394. The EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union has mainly focused on the question of sport, racism and discrimination 
of minorities in Europe. Its work is available at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/tags/sport (accessed 23 June 2021).  
211 Council of the European Union (2012), EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy, 11855/12 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf 
 (accessed 23 June 2021). 
212 It is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020JC0005 (accessed 23 
June 2021).  
213 UN (2018), The Contribution of Sport to the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals: A Toolkit for 
Action, available at https://www.sdgfund.org/sites/default/files/report-sdg_fund_sports_and_sdgs_web_0.pdf 
(accessed 23 June 2021).  
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mentioning the possibilities offered by sport.214 Again, this absence is both regrettable and an 
evidence that the EU’s certainty on the possibilities of sport is far from being fully developed. 
Recently, the Conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on Sport Innovation, adopted in May 2021, make 
explicit the link by affirming that “Sport, in its diverse contexts, such as activities and events, 






Coexistence between ‘old’, ‘new’ and evolving diplomatic actors defines contemporary 
diplomacy, and sport diplomacy can be considered a prime example of this. Both ‘public’ and 
‘private’ actors can utilise sport as a diplomatic tool and equally will be shaped by sports’ role 
in the lives of many citizens and the economies in which they live. The diplomatic troika of 
representation, negotiation and communication is as relevant in sport as it is in any other realm 
of 21st Century life. Public actors are international organizations and states and they seem to 
be fully aware of the possibilities of sport in the diplomatic domain. 
 
Sport diplomacy is a multidimensional policy and diverse EU institutions have shaped until 
now an emerging sport diplomacy policy and have played an active role in boosting EU action 
in this domain. In addition to the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council’s action have been mentioned in this report.  
 
At EU level, in contrast with the political recognition of the prominent role sport can play in 
the external relations agenda, sporting issues are underused in the vast typology of normative 
external relations instruments, both binding and non-binding, and programmes. In like manner, 
the EU’s political dialogue with third countries and regions would benefit from a more 
congruous and structured role of sport. Also, although some of the actions carried out by the 
EEAS are directly linked to sport, they have not yet been systematically conceived. 
 
 
214 COM (2016) 739 final.  
215 Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49705/st08770-en21.pdf (accessed 23 June 2021). 
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Finally, EU sport diplomacy should be oriented to the achievement of certain global purposes 
on the importance of which there is universal consensus: enhancing democracy, creating 
prosperity, building peace, promoting human rights or implementing the 2030 Agenda are 
among them.  
 
Over the years, sport diplomacy has seeped into the mainstream. Now, it is time for the EU to 
become a leading actor in this field. This chapter has highlighted that the notion of 
organizational culture seems an adequate tool in this regard. Only a coordinated, consistent and 










Transnational Actors in Sport Diplomacy: 





“From antiquity to modernity, sport has been used in the international arena to initiate or feed 
exchanges, to project prestige, to serve as factor of influence.” (Laurent Thieule (Sport and 
Citizenship), Strasbourg, Council of Europe, November 2019). 
 
Speeches, publications, and reflections on sport diplomacy tend to start with a justification of 
the topic’s timeliness and relevance, as if they needed to apologise to both sportspeople and 
diplomats for straying from their well-trodden paths. They generally do so by referring to 
Nelson Mandela’s oft-quoted words about the “power” of sport to “change the world”, or by 
recalling the “Olympic Truce” of ancient Greece as evidence for the age-old, inevitable, 
interrelation between sport and politics. 
 
This perceived need for justification reveals that sport diplomacy, as a field of academic 
research, is still a very young sub-discipline, bringing together a variety of different approaches 
and perspectives. The recent attempts to provide a conceptual framework for the field216 attest 
to this view, and simultaneously confirm that as the 21st century unfolds, there is a growing 
awareness on all sides that sport’s relevance in international relations can no longer be ignored. 
 
Sportspeople have become more aware of the political implications of their public statements 
and activities beyond the arena, while diplomats are increasingly interested in sport’s added 
value for their own efforts in public diplomacy. Both draw on academic expertise to help them 
make sense of what their intuition suggests with increasing clarity: sport does play a role in 
 
216 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, and Rofe, J.S. (ed.) (2018), 







how different actors around the globe perceive each other, present themselves, and try to 
influence each other. 
 
When the author of these lines conducted, twenty years ago, numerous interviews with the 
organisers of the 1998 and 2006 World Cup respectively, including political decision-makers 
in France and Germany who had provided their support to these mega-events, not a single 
interlocutor was familiar with the term “soft power”.217 Today, the concept has made it into the 
mainstream vocabulary and has become a cliché of speeches about Europe’s role in the world. 
 
Nation-states (and their ministries of foreign affairs) are, however, no longer the only actors to 
seek to take advantage of sport’s potential in international or intercultural relations. There has 
been a proliferation of sport actors, both on sub-national and supra-national level. In his recent 
theory of sport diplomacy, Murray devotes three chapters to the very diverse typology of “non-
state sporting actors”, ranging from small NGOs to the global governance bodies like FIFA or 
the IOC, and forming what he calls the “international society of sport”.218 Even more recently, 
a consortium of civil society organisations set out to conceptualise what may be referred to as 
“grassroots sport diplomacy”, giving testimony to a new self-perception and self-confidence 
of grassroots actors.219 
 
The global landscape of sport diplomacy is a complicated one, and a quickly evolving one with 
that. It is so far characterised by organic empirical evolution rather than full conceptual clarity. 
There are, however, increasing attempts by different actors to address the field with a strategic 
approach, an observation reflected in the name of the international project to which this report 
contributes.  
 
As a new actor on the world stage of sport diplomacy, which has only just been granted a 
competence in the field of sport by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU adds one more layer to an already 
 
217  Sonntag, A. (2018) Les identités du football européen. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. 
218  Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 135. 
219 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions. Accessed at:  
http://isca-web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-







complex environment. Although some of its foreign policy objectives may resemble those of 
major nation-states engaging in sport diplomacy, it is clearly not a state in the classical sense. 
Its tools, activities, and possibilities are necessarily different. At the same time, it is not the 
first international organisation of intergovernmental and/or supranational nature to venture into 
sport-related diplomatic activities. 
 
 
The European Union’s entry into the field of sport diplomacy  
 
To put it bluntly, there is little doubt that the EU is perceived by traditional sport actors as an 
unexperienced newcomer at best, a kind of ‘legal alien’ in this territory at worst. Sport was 
traditionally considered a preserve of the nation-state, and the international governing bodies 
of sport were composed in principle by national federations, with the constraint of upholding 
the narrative of the ‘apolitical’ nature of sport and entire independence of the national 
governing bodies from political interference. 
 
There are, however, several other international organisations that are already engaged in 
interaction with the global sport community. These are UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the 
Commonwealth, and the Francophonie. Section 2 of this chapter will provide an overview on 
the different approaches of these four organisations, while section 3 will formulate some 
recommendations for potentially meaningful cooperation perspectives (presented in the 
conclusion to this study). 
 
Within the European institutions themselves, awareness of sport’s potential in external policy 
is slowly increasing. Chapter one retrieves how the topic made it onto the European agenda in 
recent years.  
 
The most visible sport-related activity of the EU is the flurry of sport projects mainly conducted 
by civil society actors that have been supported by the Erasmus+ Programme over recent years. 
For long-standing promotors of sport as educational tool in intercultural relations, conflict 







is a logical evolution. After all, the EU’s very reason of being is perfectly aligned on the 
humanistic objectives pursued by most not-for-profit sport actors. 
 
Erasmus+ grants high visibility. According to one of the experts interviewed for this report, it 
remains “the single most appreciated sub-brand of the community, even in the United 
Kingdom”. The EU thus “has done an important step in including sport with culture and 
education, and adding it very explicitly to Erasmus+”. 220 
 
Among the members of the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy set up in 2015, there was 
a strong consensus that sport should not be confined within Erasmus+, but become the object 
of transversal cooperation between different Directorates-General (DGs) of the European 
Commission. Recently, there has been some encouraging evidence in this direction, especially 
in sports-related projects in the Western Balkans outside the Erasmus+ funding, jointly 
supported by the Commission's DG EAC (responsible for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture) 
and DG NEAR (in charge of European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations). 
 
This chapter and its recommendations are grounded on the assumption that awareness of the 
potential benefits of sport diplomacy for the pursuit of EU foreign policy objectives will 
continue to increase among EU institutions. To quote the above-mentioned expert again, “sport 
diplomacy is a concept that has come of age”, acknowledging that both scholars and diplomats 
may have been “blasé about sport being something rather light”. Today, “it would be foolish 
to overlook the feelings of cohesion that sport can generate. Sport can connect citizens, break 
down barriers and serve post-conflict dialogue.”221 In other words: “It needs to be taken 
seriously.”222 One way of taking sport seriously on a European level is making it the object of 

















This chapter is based on a review of key documents relating to activities of sport diplomacy by 
transnational actors. It also integrates findings from research in sport diplomacy, although, 
unsurprisingly and understandably, the field is dominated by analyses centred on the actorness 
of the nation-state or major sports governing bodies (SGBs). The intervention of transnational 
political organisations has not yet been investigated by academic literature. 
 
In addition to the document research, five in-depth expert interviews – both with diplomacy 
scholars and officials from different institutions – were carried out between January and June 
2020. Given the relatively sensitive character of the report’s topic – transnational, institutional 
cooperation in the making – these interviews were conducted in a fully confidential setting.  
 
 
Transnational actors in sport diplomacy 
 
The following section sheds light on the sports-related activities of four different actors of 
transnational dimension,223  whose reason of being and explicit mandate may be considered of 




As one of the best-known intergovernmental organisations of global reach, with the mandate 
“to build peace through international cooperation”, UNESCO may be considered a ‘natural’ 
actor in worldwide sport diplomacy. The full name of UNESCO includes the key adjectives 
“educational, scientific and cultural”. Although all three terms may be perceived to be 
somehow connected to sport, the latter is not explicitly mentioned. In the institution’s 
organisational structure, rather than under “Education” or “Culture”, sport is, somewhat 
revealingly, listed under the “Social and Human Sciences” programme, where the two themes 
 
223 In the context of this report, we use the term “transnational” as an umbrella term, encompassing both 
supranational institutions (such as the European Commission) and more traditional, intergovernmental institutions 







“Anti-doping” as well as “Physical education and sport” figure at the bottom of a list of 
nineteen areas of work. 
 
Without wanting to belittle the attention paid to sport within UNESCO’s very broad range of 
mandates and activities, it is clear that it cannot be considered a priority. To be fair, some sport-
related publications cut across the different work programmes and are flagged on various pages 
of the UNESCO website, such as the 2015 report on the fight against racism and discrimination 
in international football.224 
 
While some date the United Nations’ consideration for sport as educational tool to the 1959 
“Declaration on the Rights of the Child”,225 documentary evidence suggests that it is mainly in 
the 1970s that UNESCO started to view sport as a suitable tool for its purposes. It organised 
its first “International Conference of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical 
Education and Sport in the Education of Youth” in April 1976 in Paris. This conference is 
better known today under the acronym “MINEPS”, one of UNESCO’s principal organs in 
shaping its sport policy. The first MINEPS was instrumental in the development of what 
became two years later the “International Charter of Physical Education and Sport”226 and the 
simultaneous establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and 
Sport, generally referred to as CIGEPS.  
 
The “International Charter” was adopted at UNESCO’s 20th General Conference, as the first 
document to establish, in the first of its twelve articles, sport and physical education as a 
“fundamental right for all”. Between 2013 and 2015, it was revised and updated following a 
large consultation among the member governments and beyond, including sport practitioners, 
experts from academia and activists from NGOs. It was adopted under its new name 
“International Charter of Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport” on 18 November, 
 
224 Sonntag, A. and Ranc, D. (2015) Colour? What Colour? Report on the fight against discrimination and racism 
in football, Paris: UNESCO, accessed at https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000235721. 
225 Beutler, I. (2008) Sport serving development and peace: Achieving the goals of the United Nations through 
sport, Sport in Society, 11(4), 359-369. 
226 UNESCO International Charter of Physical Education and Sport, accessed at 







2015 at the 38th General Conference. According to UNESCO, the Charter has the vocation to 
orient and support policy- and decision-making in sport.  
The Kazan Action Plan 
The most significant recent document that currently inspires UNESCO’s actions in the field of 
sports is the Kazan Action Plan,227 named after the city who hosted the sixth MINEPS 
conference in 2017.  The Kazan Action Plan (KAP) is an important profession of faith in sport’s 
capacity to be an ‘enabler’ of sustainable development and peace and a commitment to go 
beyond declarations on sport policy toward measurable implementation of concrete actions. 
The KAP is based on twenty specific policy areas identified by the so-called “MINEPS Sport 
Policy Follow-up Framework” (pp. 5-15) grouped under three main objectives: 
 
1. Developing a comprehensive vision of inclusive access for all to sport; 
2. Maximizing the contributions of sport to sustainable development and peace; 
3. Protecting the integrity of sport. 
 
The five major actions identified by the KAP are the following 
 
1. Elaborate an advocacy tool presenting evidence-based arguments for 
investments in physical education, physical activity and sport. 
2. Develop common indicators for measuring the contribution of physical 
education, physical activity and sport to prioritized SDGs and targets. 
3. Unify and further develop international standards supporting sports ministers’ 
interventions in the field of sport integrity. 
4. Conduct a feasibility study on the establishment of a Global Observatory for 
women, sport, physical education and physical activity. 
 
227 UNESCO Kazan Action Plan (2017) available at:  
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000252725?posInSet=1&queryId=1e3c907a-5bbd-4459-b507-
c5a3cfeac514 (accessed 17 December 2021); summary graph here:  







5. Develop a clearinghouse for sharing information according to the sport policy 
follow-up framework developed for MINEPS VI. 
 
For each of these actions, developed in detail on pages 17 to 26 of the KAP, “potential key 
partners” are identified. The EU is explicitly listed for actions 1 and 5 (which, of course, does 
not mean that it would not be welcome as partner in the other three actions). 
 
Cooperation with the European Union 
 
Avenues of possible cooperation between UNESCO and the EU were officially agreed upon 
in a Memorandum of Understanding228 signed as early as October 2012, shortly after the 
coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the opening of a UNESCO Liaison Office in 
Brussels.229 In January 2019, the document was completed by an update of a “Financial and 
Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA)” aligned with the current EU Financial 
Regulation. The document, very general in tone by definition, emphasizes the extent to which 
the two organisations share fundamental values and the objectives of the Millennium 
Development Goals (now called “SDGs”). While some areas of enhanced dialogue and 
strengthened cooperation are identified in the third section of the memorandum (education and 
culture, media, science and innovation, human rights, ethics of science and even an “integrated 
maritime policy”), sport is, to little surprise, not explicitly mentioned.  
 
In the meantime, however, the liaison office has included sport in the scope of activities of the 
officer(s) entrusted with cooperation in the field of “culture”. It also noteworthy that the Kazan 
Action Plan recalls that “the responsibility for [its] implementation cannot rest with UNESCO 
of the CIGEPS alone”, but can only be successfully implemented if, in addition to UNESCO 
member states, “other intergovernmental, government and non-government stakeholders share 
this responsibility” (p. 16). This statement may definitely be considered a call for more and 
 
228 Memorandum of Understanding between the UNESCO and the European Union (2012) accessible at: 
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/unesco-eu_mou_8_october_2012.pdf (Last accessed 24 September 2021) 
229 About UNESCO Liaison Office in Brussels, accessed at https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/brussels/about 







close cooperation between transnational actors of different nature and scope, in priority the 
European Union and the Council of Europe. 
 
Beyond such declarations of intentions, cooperation between the EU and UNESCO is likely to 
be project-based. The first significant sports-related joint project is named “Culture and Sports 
for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Reintegration of Afghan Returnees and IDPs 
(Hamdeli)”.230 Its implementation may be considered a genuine step forward but also leaves a 
series of questions open. These will be dealt with below. 
 
The Council of Europe 
 
Created in 1949, the Council of Europe was the first intergovernmental organisation to include 
sport in its realm of activities, implicitly at first, in the European Cultural Convention adopted 
in 1954, more explicitly in a second stage, in 1963, when the “European sport certificate” was 
established, aimed at simultaneously promoting the participation of youth in sporting activity 
and the values of European solidarity. 231 
 
As Gasparini sums it up, “the primary objective of Council of Europe policy in the field of sport 
was not to replace national policies, but to defend certain common principles, and to combat 
certain phenomena deemed contrary to the ‘values of Europe’ (doping, spectator violence, 
discrimination in sport, homophobia).”232 
 
In 1972, the European Sport Charter (updated since, most recently 2021), was adopted as a 
framework for governmental policies allowing citizens to exercise their right to sporting 
activities. In 1977, a specific Committee for the Development of Sport was created, giving 
 
230 Culture and Sports for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Reintegration of Afghan Returnees and IDPs 
(Hamdeli), Accessed at: https://en.unesco.org/eu-partnership/sustainable_reintegration_afghan_returnees (17 
December 2021). 
231 Gasparini, W. (2019) The Council of Europe and sport: origin and circulation of a European sporting model, 
Encyclopédie pour une Histoire Nouvelle de l'Europe, accessed at: 
https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/material-civilization/european-sports-circulations/council-europe-and-
sport-origin-and-circulation-a-european-sporting-model (15 December 2021). 
232 See also the 2004 brochure “50 years of the European Cultural Convention”, accessed at: 







testimony to the increasing relevance of sport in the Council’s activities. In 2007, the 
Committee was replaced by a full-fledged intergovernmental agreement named the Enlarged 
Partial Agreement on Sports (EPAS),233 which today includes 38 signatory states. 
 
For one of the experts interviewed for this chapter, EPAS sees itself as a “facilitator for member 
states, a provider of conceptual support, and a coordinator of national initiatives”.234 This 
perception is very much in line with the official self-definition as “platform for 
intergovernmental sports co-operation between the public authorities of its member states”, 
with the aim to “encourage dialogue between public authorities, sports federations and 
NGOs.”235 
 
The most tangible results of EPAS’s mission are the major conventions in favour of sport’s 
integrity that it has managed to adopt in recent years, namely the Convention on the 
Manipulation of Sports Competition (2014, also known as the Macolin Convention),236 and the 
Convention on Integrated Safety, Security, and Service Approach at Football Matches and 
Other Sports Events (2016).237 They follow in their intent the previous two conventions 
adopted in 1985 and 1989 respectively. The first of them, on Spectator Violence and 
Misbehaviour at Sports Events,238 was prompted by the tragedy at the Heysel stadium in 
1985;239 the second one was the Anti-Doping Convention.240  
 
233 For more information on the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sports (EPAS), see  
https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/epas (accessed 17 December 2021). 
234 Interview with an official, January 2020. 
235  “EPAS: Factsheet” (February 2020), https://rm.coe.int/10-factsheet-en-epas-2019/16809398bc (accessed 17 
December 2021). 
236 Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competition, The Macolin Convention, accessed at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/t-mc. For an analysis of the Convention, see Serby, T. (2015) The Council of 
Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-
fixing?, The International Sports Law Journal, 15, 83–100. 
237 Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches 
and Other Sports Events (3 July 2016), ), accessed at https://rm.coe.int/1680666d0b (17 December 2021). 
238 “European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football 
Matches” (19 August 1985), accessed at https://rm.coe.int/168007a086 (17 December 2021). 
239 Sonntag, A. (2015) 30 years ago – European football’s major lieu de mémoire, FREE Football Research in an 
Enlarged Europe, accessed at   
https://free.ideasoneurope.eu/2015/05/29/30-years-ago-european-footballs-major-lieu-de-memoire-2/ (17 
December 2021). 
240 “Anti-Doping Convention” (16 November 1989) accessed at https://rm.coe.int/168007b0e0, completed by the 
“Additional Protocol to the Anti-Doping Convention” (12 September 2002), accessed at 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800815








EPAS declares itself explicitly open for project-based cooperation with other international 
actors, especially the EU. As the institution’s current factsheet states, “since 2014, EPAS has 
strengthened its operational co-operation capacity by developing joint projects with the 
European Union and the sports movement, for example on the topics of gender equality, child 
protection (in particular the fight against sexual abuse in sport), and on good governance 
standards.”241 
 
While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this declaration, some observers would tend 
to put it into perspective. As was highlighted in one of the expert interviews, the efforts made 
by EPAS are highly commendable, but “sport remains a secondary issue at the Council of 
Europe, including in budgetary terms. Despite a higher awareness of sport’s potential in 
international relations and visible progress over the last five years, they seem to be 
permanently under the burden of proof for their relevance”.242 
 
Beyond these considerations, the Council of Europe is known to have been navigating through 
uncertain budgetary waters in recent years, especially with regard to the part of the budget 
contributed by Russia. The interruption of the Russian contribution between 2017 and 2019 
has forced the Council to establish contingency plans.243 It seems obvious that the ongoing 
debate on Russian membership244 will affect the Council’s sport-related activities in two 
harmful ways. First, in a period of severe budgetary measures, available funds for sports 
projects are highly likely to be reduced (as are human resources in this area). Furthermore, in 
the light of the pending four-year ban of Russia from the Olympics and other major sporting 
 
241 “EPAS: Factsheet” (February 2020), https://rm.coe.int/10-factsheet-en-epas-2019/16809398bc (17 December 
2021). 
242 Interview with an official (external to the CoE), March 2020. 
243 See for instance the Declaration of the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly of June 2019: 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=27992&lang=en. (17 December 2021). 
244 See for instance reports by Deutsche Welle, Russia in the Council of Europe: What does it mean for human 
rights?, 26 June 2019, accessed at https://www.dw.com/en/russia-in-the-council-of-europe-what-does-it-mean-
for-human-rights/a-49368822 (17 December 2021), France24, Russia's undiplomatic return to the Council of 
Europe, 28 June 2019, accessed at: https://www.france24.com/en/20190628-russia-undiplomatic-return-council-
europe-ukraine (17 December 2021) or The New York Times, Council of Europe restores Russia’s voting rights, 
25 June 2019, accessed at:  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/world/europe/council-of-europe-russia-







events,245 the credibility of one of the Council of Europe’s major fields of action may also be 
significantly damaged. 
 
Against this backdrop, it may be expected that EPAS will undergo some changes over the next 





The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organisation of currently 71 nations and territories 
that sees itself as “a family of peoples”, bound by a common heritage in language, culture, law, 
education and democratic traditions.246 The most recent version of its charter, dated 2012, does 
not mention sport explicitly. But one of the most concrete embodiments of the Commonwealth 
today are certainly the Commonwealth Games, launched as early as 1930 under the name 
“British Empire Games” and organised every four years by the Commonwealth Games 
Federation (CGF). Since 2000, this well-known sporting mega-event has been completed by 
the Commonwealth Youth Games of more modest scope. 
 
According to is current strategic plan called “Transformation 2022”,247 the CGF’s vision is to 
“to build peaceful, sustainable and prosperous communities globally by inspiring 
Commonwealth Athletes to drive the impact and ambition of all Commonwealth Citizens 
through Sport”. 
 
As an object of academic scrutiny, the Commonwealth Games have produced a flurry of impact 
studies relating to urban regeneration, tourism, and general issues of ‘legacy’, but relatively 
 
245 The ban was imposed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in December 2019; see BBC, Russia 
banned for four years to include 2020 Olympics and 2022 World Cup, 09 December 2019, accessed at: 
https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/50710598 (17 December 2021). Upon Appeal at the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS), the ban was halved. See Inside the Game, Russian flag banned from Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 
2022 but CAS halves suspension period, 17 December 2020, accessed at  
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1102113/russia-banned-two-years-cas (17 December 2021). 
246 For more information, see the Commonwealth Network, the Commonwealth, at  
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/ (17 December 2021). 
247 Commonwealth Games Fedearation, Strategic Plan, accessed at: https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-







little consideration is given to their role as sport diplomacy tool other than for the respective 
host city or nation. Discussing the Commonwealth Games as nation branding opportunity for 
the host, as Jarvie, Murray and Macdonald do in the case of the Glasgow edition in 2014,248 
which coincided with the Scottish independence referendum campaign,249 does not say much 
about the community spirit within a transnational organisation that this event is meant to 
project.  
 
Beyond the Commonwealth Games, “The Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport (CABOS)” 
was created in 2005 as an independent body providing advice on sport policy issues, 
“particularly as it relates to Sport for Development and Peace (SDP), and protecting the 
integrity of sport”.250 Once per year, CABOS produces a detailed, publicly available statement 
taking a position on the most pressing concerns and issues of the Commonwealth sport 
environment, especially with regard to integrity and alignment of sport activities with the 
SDGs. While its existence can only be viewed in positive terms, it seems to have neither the 






The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) is an intergovernmental institution 
based on a shared language and cultural values. Under the current leadership of Louise 
Mushikiwabo (from Rwanda), the organisation, which counts 54 member-states, 7 associated 
members and 27 so-called “observers”, celebrates its 50 years of existence all over the year 
2020. Its proclaimed aim is to work for the “political, educational, economic and cultural 
cooperation among its member countries, in the service of their populations”.251  
 
248 Jarvie, G. et al (2017) Promoting Scotland, diplomacy and influence through sport, Scottish Affairs, 26(1), 1-
22. 
249 See also Jarvie, G. (2017) Sport, the 2014 Commonwealth Games and the Scottish referendum, in Bairner, A. 
et al (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, 209-221, Routledge. 
250 Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport, accessed https://thecommonwealth.org/commonwealth-advisory-
body-sport (9 February 2020). 









The most visible sports-related tool of the OIF’s global diplomacy are the Francophonie Games 
(Les Jeux de la Francophonie), which bring together, every four years, young people from the 
member countries. The Jeux de la Francophonie are much younger than the Commonwealth 
Games: their first edition took place in Morocco in 1989; the next one will be hosted in 
Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) in 2022. 
 
Like the Commonwealth Games – albeit on an altogether smaller scale – the Jeux de la 
Francophonie provide an opportunity of gathering around sport for both ordinary sport fans 
and high-level actors of politics and business. And they give, of course, an occasion to the host 
country to step up their touristic capacities. Yet, beyond sport, they also explicitly wish to 
promote artistic and cultural exchange as well as sustainable development.  
 
Another diplomatic tool of the Francophonie is the so-called Grand Témoin, a kind of cultural 
ambassador, generally a personality of international reputation, whose mission is basically to 
lobby in favour of the place of the French language within the International Olympic 
Committee. For the forthcoming Tokyo Games, the famous chef Thierry Marx was 
appointed.252 The very existence of the Grand Témoin highlights of course the outstanding 
importance given to the language issue within la Francophonie, a notable difference to the 
Commonwealth’s ambition and self-perception.  
 
Less visible, but more important than the showcase of the Jeux de la Francophonie, is the 
standing Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth and Sports (Conférence des ministres 
de la Jeunesse et des Sports – CONFEJES), created in 1969, i.e. eighteen years before the idea 
of the mega-event was floated. It is revealing that the OIF’s most recent fundamental Charter 
(2005),253 only mentions sport once, in article 2, when referring to the CONFEJES as one of 
its permanent institutions. Scheduled every two years, the CONFEJES is a space of high-level, 
 
252France Olympique International, Thierry Marx – Ep. 1:”Je ne m’inscris pas seulement dans une reflexion 
Franco-Française”, accessed at https://international.franceolympique.com/international/actus/8108-thierry-marx-
--ep.-1---je-ne-minscris-pas-seulement-dans-une-rflexion-franco-franaise--.html (17 December 2021). 
253Charte de la Francophonie, accessed at https://www.francophonie.org/sites/default/files/2019-







ministerial dialogue for the governments of its 43 members.254 Its mission is very explicitly 
focused on “promoting the participation and social integration of young people within society”, 
which positions sports very clearly as a tool rather than an end in itself.  
 
The CONFEJES has no equivalent within the Commonwealth. Its intergovernmental activities 
are richer than its low public name recognition suggests. Its relative financial dependence on 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, however, not a particularly encouraging prospect, 
since, in the words of an expert interviewed for this report, the latter no longer has the means 
to sustain everything that happens in francophone Africa.  
 
On a more general note, the comparison between Commonwealth and Francophonie suggest 
that the latter, while its work is more inward-looking, seems to be, by its very existence, more 
of a diplomatic tool in the (indirect) service of the leading member,255 whose name already 
rings in the name of the organisation itself. And while the Commonwealth, when it comes to 
sport, seems to count on the organisation of its landmark mega-event as resource of prestige 
and worldwide recognition, the OIF is more modest, both in the size of its activities and the 





Beyond the myriad of private non-state actors of transnational reach and ambition, especially 
NGOs of different type and scope, there is only a handful of public organisations that are both 
transnational in nature and engaged in significant activities or programmes that may be 
classified as belonging to the field of sport diplomacy. Four of them have been briefly reviewed 
in this section of the report. The fifth, and most recent player in this field, is the EU.  
 
 
254 la Conférence des Ministres de la Jeunesse et des Sports de la Francophonie (CONFEJES), Les Missions, 
accessed at https://e-confejes.org/cfj2/les-missions-de-la-confejes/ (17 December 2021). 
255 Massart-Piérard, F. (2007) La Francophonie, un nouvel intervenant sur la scène internationale, Revue 
internationale de politique comparée, (14)1, 69-93. Gazeau-Secret, A (2003) Soft power: l'influence par la langue 
et la culture, Revue Internationale et Stratégique, 1, 103-110. Gazeau-Secret, A. (2010) Francophonie et 







Does it make sense for the EU to develop more systematic relations or partnerships with one 
or more of the four players? As has been seen, punctual or more regular cooperation’s are 
already engaged with both the Council of Europe and UNESCO. 
 
The value statements made by any of the four actors referred to in this section demonstrate a 
wide overlap with both the EU’s proclaimed values and the perception of sport’s positive and 
constructive role in projecting and promoting these values.  
 
There is, however, a significant difference between, on the one hand, UNESCO and the Council 
of Europe, and, on the other hand, the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. 
 
The former two have been set up by a community of equals, formulating and defending the 
common interest of their members. They have a fundamentally inclusive purpose, even if in 
the case of the Council of Europe, this is limited by the geographical boundaries of Europe (as 
flexible as these might be at times).  
 
The latter two are, despite their international and even intercontinental dimension, which 
sometimes reaches out beyond the boundaries of the linguistic and cultural community they 
claim to represent, fundamentally based on an exclusive premise. And the historically grown 
dominant position of the former colonial power within the respective community inevitably 
leads both organisations, at least implicitly, to serve as enhancer of national prestige or 
amplifier of national soft power resources.  
 
Against this backdrop, while there is no reason to rule out punctual, jointly organised, sports-
related activities between the EU and the Commonwealth or the Francophonie in certain 
geographical areas, UNESCO and the Council of Europe appear to be more natural partners in 











Relations with UNESCO:  
 
On its website, the UNESCO Liaison Office in Brussels considers UNESCO and the European 
Union “close and natural partners”, pointing to shared values and objectives and reminding 
the reader in passing that “the EU is currently the third largest donor to the Organization”.256 
In the context of the very serious financing and organisational crisis that UNESCO has been 
undergoing since 2011,257 following the decision of the United States to stop paying their 
membership dues (a sudden budget cut of approximately 25 per cent), this reminder of the EU’s 
financial contribution to the functioning of UNESCO is not anecdotal.  
 
It is therefore hardly surprising that one of the experts interviewed for this report sees “growing 
interest in cooperation from both parts” and a significant potential for “synergies”.258 For both 
organisations, cooperation could be a win-win situation, both in general terms and in ear-
marked project funding. While European funding represents a reliable resource, UNESCO’s 
global dimension can extend the EU’s territorial outreach. This is exemplified in the first 
significant sport-related project already briefly mentioned in section 2.1 above: “Culture and 
Sports for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Reintegration of Afghan Returnees and IDPs 
(Hamdeli)”.259 
 
This large project of important societal impact (with a budget of several million €) is financed 
by DG International Partnerships.260 What may look at first sight like an implementation of 
one of the recommendations from the Sport Diplomacy High-Level Group in 2016 – the 
mainstreaming of sports projects in development policies and programmes – turns out to be a 
project where sport is simply considered one tool among others. It is also a project on which 
the European Commission does not communicate through its own channels, but which seems 
 
256 For more information about the UNESCO Liaison Office in Brussels and Representation to the European 
Union, see https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/brussels (17 December 2021). 
257 Hüfner, K. (2017) The Financial Crisis of UNESCO after 2011: Political Reactions and Organizational 
Consequences, Global Policy, 8 (5), 96-101. 
258 Interview with an official, February 2020. 
259 Culture and Sports for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Reintegration of Afghan Returnees and IDPs 
(Hamdeli), accessed at https://en.unesco.org/eu-partnership/sustainable_reintegration_afghan_returnees (17 
December 2021). “IDPs” stands for “Internally Displaced People”. 
260 Formerly DEVCO, the Directorate-General (DG) International Cooperation and Development has become DG 







to be implemented by UNESCO alone. At closer scrutiny, it appears as a random one-off 
project rather than the beginning of a more structured approach. 
 
Moreover, according to another expert interviewed for this report, DG International 
Partnerships would be in a position to conduct sports-related TAIEX261 activities in countries 
concerned by the European Neighbourhood Policy, but seems to persist in considering sport as 
mainly national competence rather than a priority on the European level.262 Clearly, the link 
between sports and value promotion has not yet reached the level of transversality that the 
High-Level Group called for. 
 
In one of the expert interviews, it was suggested that the EU should be both “more sensitive 
and more assertive on the role of sport” in its external policy, ideally showing commitment to 
the objectives of the Kazan Action Plan (KAP) and getting engaged with KAP working groups. 
It was considered that the KAP, rather than be perceived in a “competitive” manner, could serve 
as “a common denominator” or “useful road map”.263  
 
If the current European Commission wishes to give flesh to its claim to develop a “geopolitical” 
dimension and impact,264 it should seek partnerships with organisations that already have 
global outreach and credibility, like UNESCO, and acknowledge sport, across all relevant 
services (EEAS, DG International Partnerships, NEAR, etc.) as an appropriate thematic for 
such partnerships. The EU should step up project-based cooperation with UNESCO, explicitly 
linked to sports through strong reference to the Kazan Action Plan and the Social Development 
Goals. It should do so especially through engagement with the MINEPS and CIGEPS 
instruments. Finally, the EU should include sports-related issues of geopolitical and diplomatic 
 
261 TAIEX stands for “Technical Assistance and Information Exchange”. It is a development instrument aimed at 
aspiring candidate or neighbouring countries. 
262 Interview with an official, March 2020. 
263 Interview with an official, January 2020. 
264 As announced by President Von der Leyen in November 2019. See the analyses by Subotić, S. (2019) A 
“Geopolitical” Commission – What’s in the Name?, CEP Blog, accessed at https://cep.org.rs/en/blogs/a-
geopolitical-commission/ (17 December 2021), Leonard, M. (2019) The makings of a “geopolitical” European 
Commission, ECR.eu, accessed at:  
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_makings_of_a_geopolitical_european_commission (17 December 
2021) or Biscop, S. (2019) A geopolitical European Commission: a powerful strategy?, Egmont Institute, accessed 








nature in its Horizon 2020 research programmes, asking applicants to seek avenues for 
cooperation with UNESCO as partner or associate project partner.  
 
Relations with the Council of Europe: 
 
As one of the experts interviewed for this report put it: the relations between the EU and the 
Council of Europe seem to be characterised by a certain “power struggle”.265 This does not 
mean that individuals on either side are moved by distrust or misgivings. Institutions are 
inevitably zealous guardians of their prerogatives and sharing what is perceived as a tool of 
influence does not come naturally to individual actors. It is no surprise that, according to 
another interviewee, the road to better cooperation is paved with “memorandums that get stuck 
in the details”.266 
 
The first step to overcome these hurdles is a stronger commitment to transparent 
communication and mutual consultation. First, the EU Member States should make sure the 
Commission is systematically invited to meetings working on sport-related conventions 
proposed by the Council of Europe, such as the Anti-Doping Convention, or other major sports-
related documents. While Member States representatives change over time, the Commission 
could provide the necessary continuity in such collaborations. Second, cooperation between 
the EU and the Council of Europe on sports-related issues should be taken to a higher level. 
Once established as a desirable practice leading to mutually beneficial outcomes on the level 
of the general directors, cooperation is more likely to become a habit on all levels of the 
respective institutions. Finally, the EU should pro-actively approach the Council of Europe 
with the suggestion of joint funding activities, for projects or actions on major issues advocated 
by the CoE, which happen to overlap perfectly with values and standards promoted by the 
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Sport Diplomacy beyond the Nation-State 
The national vs. the supranational agenda 
The sport diplomacy literature remains, despite the widening of the concept to include the 
myriad of non-state sporting actors, firmly anchored in the (soft) power logic of the traditional 
nation-state. The vast majority of the case studies of successful sport diplomacy actions that 
are related and analysed by contemporary scholarship make sense on the national level and are 
hardly applicable beyond. 
 
This predominance of the national perspective remains, as Murray observes with lucidity, “one 
of the shortcomings of public sports diplomacy”.267 As a matter of fact, “soft power overtures 
built around sport diplomacy still, no matter how honeyed, or sweetly put, cannot hide the 
realist, hard power character of a nation state.”268 
 
If sport is about sharing, national sport diplomacy initiatives are, at the end of the day, about 
obtaining and preserving one’s own soft power resources. This may well be where a supra-
national actor like the European Union has a competitive edge. Representing, by definition, a 
large number of Member States, and intervening on their behalf, rather than in competition 
with them, significantly reduces the ‘self-interest component’ and enhances credibility in the 
promotion of fundamental normative commitments to specific values. 
 
As one of the diplomacy scholars interviewed for this report observed, EU diplomacy is already 
taking advantage from “not being a state”: “The EU can go places where Member States can’t. 
It is easier for the EU, rather than a single state, to take the ‘human rights blame’. The EU is 
less vulnerable, it does not have the same historical record, its initiatives are untainted by 
individual interest”. According to the expert, Member States recognise this: “This is when the 
European Union brings them an added value.”269 It is obvious that sport seems to fit perfectly 
into this pattern. 
 
267 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 118. 
268 Ibid. 







The emergence of sectoral diplomacy 
This being said, in their need for justification, non-state sporting actors and academics of sport 
diplomacy have a tendency to oversell its potential. Some of them, eager to highlight its 
potential impact, find themselves in what Cooley calls a “rhetorical entrapment”.270 For the 
time being, it is no doubt more reasonable to agree with Beacom and Rofe, who reminds us to 
“be careful not to over-emphasize the role of sport in international diplomacy”, which finds 
itself still “on the margins of international relations.”271 
 
According to several experts, one of the reasons for the gap between the enthusiasm of the 
sport diplomacy promoters in civil society or academia and the hesitation with which it is 
embraced by many professional diplomats may be found in the practice of diplomacy itself, 
shaped by a long tradition that has produced deeply anchored behaviour and perception 
patterns.  
 
Such institutional inertia notwithstanding, the hour of the untapped potential of sport 
diplomacy may come sooner than many think. According to another foreign policy expert, it is 
important for all diplomatic actors to realise that “the future of diplomacy will be characterised 
by specialisation rather than generalisation”.272 In what Murray calls “the digital, plural and 
public twenty-first century”,273 actors will have to identify sectors in which to specialise, and 
for some of them, sport diplomacy is no doubt a very promising sectoral focus. 274 
 
Both UNESCO and the Council of Europe, which this report has identified as ‘natural’ partners 
of the EU in sport diplomacy, are likely to be under similar pressure to identify key sectors on 
which to concentrate their resources. Like all big institutions with a significant history, “they 
 
270 Cooley, L. (2018) The governance of sport in deeply divided societies: actors and institutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, in Rofe J.S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 13-33, 
Manchester University Press. 
271  Beacom, A. and Rofe, S. (2018) Post-match recovery and analysis: concluding thoughts on sport and 
diplomacy, in Rofe S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 243-262, Manchester University Press, 
at 257. 
272  Interview with a foreign policy expert, June 2020. 
273  Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 96. 
274  For the theorisation of “sectoral diplomacy”, see Damro, C., et al (eds.) (2017) The European Union’s Evolving 







are trying to do too much, too widely, and have trouble getting rid of activities or themes”, as 
one expert put it. In the future, “each of their activities will need a unique selling point, which 
is currently not the case”.275 
 
Cooperation with the EU in the field of sport diplomacy would have the potential to enable 
UNESCO and the Council of Europe to sharpen their profile. It would at the same time result 
in mutually beneficial outcomes for each organisation involved. While the geographical 
outreach and diplomatic constraints of these three organisations differ, there is a massive 
overlap both in terms of fundamental values and in the perception of the nature and social role 
of sport. To a neutral observer, this can only appear as a very promising starting point. 
 
Making the best possible use of these opportunities does, however, require a certain change of 
organisational culture in two areas. On the one hand, there needs to be a more widespread 
recognition among diplomats of sport’s potential in foreign policy; and on the other hand, there 
needs to be a clear commitment in the organisations concerned to an attitude of institutional 
complementarity rather than competition. The time is ripe for both. 
 
What is required on the side of sports activists, think-tanks, and academics, is perhaps simply 
a good dose of patience. Institutional inertia is a powerful force, and changing attitudes takes 
time. The High-Level Group submitted its recommendation five years ago, and there have 
already been some modest, but notable advances. It will be important to keep sport diplomacy 
on the agenda. Even a modest momentum is a momentum. 
  
 







Chapter Five  
 






The development of EU sport diplomacy has as one of its core aims the diffusion of the EU’s 
core values beyond its territorial borders. It can do so by employing sport as a way to present 
the EU to the world. However, there is also a possibility, explored in this chapter, to develop a 
sort of ‘Meta sport diplomacy’ that would have as its purpose to influence the quasi-diplomatic 
activities of the Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) themselves in order to harness their private 
power and transnational influence to spread the EU’s values across the globe. These values are 
enshrined in Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU.276 Thus, instead of directing diplomatic attention 
exclusively to states, the EU would also engage its diplomatic resources to shape the 
transnational activities of the SGBs. Such a ‘Meta sport diplomacy’ could find application, for 
example, in the context of the organisation of mega sporting events and in particular with 
regard to their human rights impacts. Indeed, as human rights feature prominently in the EU’s 
proclaimed core values, it would seem coherent to integrate them in any future EU sport 
diplomacy that would be also directed at the SGBs as transnational diplomatic players. In fact, 
as will be discussed at greater length in the second section of this chapter, it would also be in 
line with the expectations expressed by Members of the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union, who have been regularly urging both the European Commission (EC) 
and the SGBs to exercise their diplomatic power and leverage to this end.  
 
 
276 Article 3(5) provides that in its relations with the wider world the EU “shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests” and contribute “to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular 
the rights of the child”. Article 21(1) indicates that the “Union's action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 







This chapter will first discuss the role of the IOC and FIFA as diplomatic actors and map their 
existing commitments to integrate the respect for human rights in the context of their Mega 
Sporting Events. Before reflecting on the need for EU sport diplomacy to adopt also a Meta 
perspective aimed at harnessing and strengthening the diplomatic force of the SGBs in order 
to strengthen the respect for human rights during Mega Sporting Events. 
 
1. Towards a Human Rights Diplomacy of Sports Governing Bodies  
 
In recent years, international SGBs have faced a growing backlash over human rights violations 
related to their Mega Sporting Events. Civil society organisations (CSOs), such as Amnesty 
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), have started to target Mega Sporting 
Events and to criticize the human rights record of the host countries and/or highlight the human 
rights toll extracted by the organisation of the Mega Sporting Events.277 Their demands are 
also directed against the SGBs, which they consider as sufficiently powerful to impose human 
rights conditionality onto the host-countries of their competitions. Thus, they are expecting 
SGBs to become ambassadors for universal values and principles embodied by the 
internationally recognized human rights.  
 
a. The IOC and FIFA as Diplomatic Actors  
 
The study of sport diplomacy is often focused primarily on diplomatic relationships between 
states and their use of sports as another playground for high inter-national politics. Yet, an 
exclusive focus on the states is reductionist and occults the diplomatic practices of the SGBs 
themselves.278 Indeed, they, and in particular the most powerful and better resourced 
organizations amongst them, have used their power and access to political decision makers 
 
277 See for recent example Amnesty’s campaign ‘World Cup of Shame’ dedicated to the rights of migrant workers 
in Qatar, Amnesty International, World Cup of Shame, accessed at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/qatar-world-cup-of-shame/ (17 December 2021), or 
Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Urgently Investigate Migrant Worker Deaths, accessed at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/10/qatar-urgently-investigate-migrant-worker-deaths (17 December 2021). 
278 For a similar argument along this line, see Postlethwaite, V. and Grix, J. (2016) Beyond the Acronyms: Sport 
Diplomacy and the Classification of the International Olympic Committee, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27(2), 295–
313. See as well Rofe, J. S. (2016) Sport and diplomacy: a global diplomacy framework, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 
7, 212-230 and Murray, S. and Pigman, G.A. (2014), Mapping the Relationship between International Sport and 







around the globe to engage in diplomacy. This type of diplomacy has been referred to in the 
literature as “International-sport-as-diplomacy”279 or “pseudo-diplomacy of non-state sporting 
institutions”,280 and new approaches to diplomacy such as “polylateralism” or “multi-
stakeholder diplomacy” have been invoked to capture the actions of FIFA or the IOC under 
diplomatic studies.281 
 
The IOC for example has been recently portrayed as a diplomatic player that is engaging in 
intensive diplomatic relationships with international organisations and states to protect its 
autonomy and its core interests. Thus, Beacom finds that “the IOC is constantly engaged in 
lobbying as a means of pursuing its interests within the international arena”.282 In other words, 
it has become a “diplomatic actor”, which engages in “increasingly sophisticated ways” in 
“diplomatic discourse”.283 The IOC has in particular the capacity to influence the policies of 
certain countries through the bidding process for the Olympic Games. More precisely, as 
Postlethwaite and Grix argued, it acts as a regulatory institution that shapes through its rules 
and administrative practices various local contexts around the world. For them, the IOC’s 
“influence on members and hosts of the Olympic movement is a key dimension to justify it as 
an active diplomatic actor”.284 Hence, “the IOC has constructed a parallel universe of global 
power […] that shadows the political realities of international diplomacy.”285 Similarly, the 
diplomatic power of FIFA in its interaction with national states has also been the subject of 
studies by political scientists and IR scholars.286  
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A comprehensive understanding of the position of international SGBs as diplomatic actors, and 
not only as subject of diplomatic practices, is essential in the elaboration of a strategic approach 
to EU sport diplomacy. One fundamental question in the context of this chapter is whether this 
diplomatic clout of the IOC and FIFA, as well as other less powerful SGBs, can be harnessed 
to turn them into ambassadors for internationally recognised human rights. Thus, as well as 
corporations are being encouraged to use ‘business diplomacy’,287 so could SGBs make use of 
sport diplomacy to ensure that certain international standards are respected in the context of 
their Mega Sporting Events.  
 
b. The IOC and FIFA as Ambassadors for Human Rights around Mega Sporting 
Events 
 
The human rights footprint of Mega Sporting Events has been critically scrutinized for some 
years now. At least since the Berlin Olympics in 1936, it became clear that Mega Sporting 
Events are sometimes being used to prop up authoritarian regimes and provide them with a 
world stage to broadcast their propaganda. Moreover, Mega Sporting Events have also often 
been linked with human rights violations directly connected to their organisation (such as 
disrespect for fundamental labour rights of migrant workers involved in the massive 
infrastructure build-up necessary to host the events). This heightened public sensitivity to 
human rights violations connected to Mega Sporting Events, in particular since the Sochi 
Olympics in Russia in 2014 and in anticipation of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar in 2022, has 
been the trigger for the progressive internalization by FIFA and the IOC of their human rights 
responsibilities.288 To a different extent, both organizations have publicly committed to 
respecting human rights and have integrated human rights requirements in their bidding 
procedures for the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup.  
 
 
287 Saner, R and Lichia Yiu, L. (2014) Business Diplomacy Competence: A Requirement for Implementing the 
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 9, 311-333. 
288 For an overview of the recent developments on FIFA and human rights, see Duval, A. and Heerdt, D. (2020) 







i. FIFA’s Introduction of Human Rights commitments with regard to its 
Mega Sporting Events 
 
FIFA has experienced a lot of criticism after awarding the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It 
triggered its biggest corruption scandal to date, which caused the departure of almost all its 
executives, and has been attacked for the dire working conditions experienced by migrant 
workers toiling on Qatari building sites to prepare the many infrastructures necessitated by the 
expected influx of football fans in 2022. The backlash has been fierce and led to an internal 
reform process that led to the integration of human rights at the heart of FIFA’s constitution: 
in Article 3 of the FIFA statutes.289 This process was framed and guided by a report produced 
by John Ruggie, former U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.290 As 
pointed out by Ruggie, FIFA’s events-related risks are one of the main sources of human rights 
risks connected to its activities.291 However, these risks can be addressed thanks to FIFA’s 
leverage on local authorities and businesses. In other words, FIFA is expected to use its 
diplomatic clout to push towards greater respect for human rights by the actors connected to 
its Mega Sporting Events.  
 
Concretely, FIFA’s human rights turn led, in particular, to the introduction of human rights 
requirements in the bidding process for FIFA competitions.292 FIFA has also created a Human 
Rights Advisory Board composed of independent personalities, and which produces human 
rights reports twice a year. The reports are identifying the human rights issues faced by FIFA 
and offering some recommendation to remedy them. Many of the outstanding human rights 
risks flagged are related to the organisation of Mega Sporting Events.293 Interestingly, FIFA 
already used its diplomatic clout in other contexts, such as to urge the Thai authorities to release 
 
289 Article 3 FIFA Statutes now reads: ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human 
rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.’ 
290 Ruggie, J. (2016), For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Initiative 
Report No. 68. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. 
291 Ibid, at 21-24. 
292 See Kirschner, F. (2019) Breakthrough or much ado about nothing? FIFA’s new bidding process in the light 
of best practice examples of human rights assessments under UNGP Framework, The International Sports Law 
Journal, 19, 133-153. 
293 See for example the focus on Qatar in the ‘Third Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board’, May 
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the Bahraini football player Hakeem AlAraibi or to encourage the Iranian government to allow 
access of women to football stadiums.294 These cases are concrete demonstrations of the 
potential of FIFA’s diplomatic influence when used to alleviate certain human rights violations 
or mitigate specific human rights risks.  
 
ii. IOCs’ Human Rights Commitments with regard to Mega Sporting 
Events 
 
The IOC has not been immune of human rights concerns and controversies either. In the early 
2000s, the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Games was marred with attempts by civil society 
organizations to convince the IOC to pressure China to improve the human rights situation 
there.295 Despite intense lobbying at the time, the IOC remained reluctant to intervene and 
relatively timid in the use of its potential leverage. Six years after, at the Sochi Winter Games, 
the IOC faced again strong scrutiny in light of the human rights record of Russia, be it with 
regard to gay rights, environmental rights or labour rights of workers active on the building 
sites of the Olympics.296 This widespread criticism of the IOC’s unwillingness to remediate 
human rights violations intimately related to the organisation of its flagship event led to 
changes to the Host City Contract, which currently includes a clause providing that “the Host 
City, the Host NOC and the OCOG shall protect and respect human rights and ensure any 
violation of human rights is remedied in a manner consistent with international agreements, 
laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country and in a manner consistent with all 
internationally-recognised human rights standards and principles, including the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, applicable in the Host Country”.297 
 
294 See FIFA, FIFA holds meeting on situation of player Al Araibi and calls for urgent solution, 29 January 2019, 
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Thus, the IOC introduced the language of human rights as part of its contractual framework 
regulating the organisation of the Olympic Games, whether this language will lead to practical 
changes is still an open question.298 The upcoming Beijing Winter Games will be an occasion 
to test these commitments in practice, as China’s human rights record remains a highly 
controversial matter.299 Furthermore, in December 2020, the IOC announced its intention to 
“move forward with its human rights approach”.300 In particular, it announced that it would 
“complete the the development of an IOC human rights strategy and policy commitment” and 
consider amending the Olympic Charter. On the institutional side, the IOC promised to work 
towards “further embedding human rights in the good governance principles” and the creation 
of a Human Rights Advisory Committee. 
 
The IOC and FIFA dispose, through their monopolistic control over their global events, of 
considerable leverage to impose certain conditions on the countries (or cities) hosting their 
Mega Sporting Events. Undoubtedly, they are not in a position to require and obtain a 
fundamental transformation of the societies and governments concerned, but they can attached 
specific human rights conditions to the organisation of their Mega Sporting Events, such as the 
strict respect of the rights of the workers involved in the building of infrastructure linked to 
their events, the protection of freedom of speech on the premises of the event, the respect for 
equal access to the facilities of the competitions, or the provision of adequate compensation to 
those expropriated to construct the venues. The question at the heart of this paper is whether 
the EU should through its sport diplomacy exercise an influence on the SGBs to encourage 
them in that direction. Indeed, it is the premise of this paper that if human rights are at the heart 
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299 See, New York Times, Minky Worden, Human Rights and the 2022 Olympics, 19 January 2015, accessed at: 
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1. Integrating the protection of human rights at mega sporting events in the EU’s 
strategic approach to sport diplomacy 
 
The EU is often portrayed as an economic giant and a diplomatic dwarf. While the European 
integration process has been constructed around economic integration and the constitution of 
an internal market, it has taken some time for the EU to exist alongside its Member States on 
the diplomatic scene. The development of an EU sport diplomacy would seem to fit a broader 
shift toward the affirmation of the EU’s influence on the diplomatic plane. Yet, such a sport 
diplomacy will make sense only if it is aligned with the EU’s own core normative commitments 
with regard to human rights.301 In the past, EU institutions have been keen to highlight the EU’s 
commitment to human rights in the context of Mega Sporting Events. It is time to encode these 
declarations in a structured strategy for an EU sport diplomacy. 
 
a. The European Parliament and Human Rights at Mega Sporting Events:  
 
The EU has, as is well known, a limited competence on sports enshrined in Article 165 TFEU. 
In its White Paper on Sport from 2007, the European Commission failed to consider the human 
rights impact of Mega Sporting Events and focused primarily on the relationship between the 
private regulations of the SGBs and EU law. Yet, the EU institutions have not been entirely 
silent on the link between Mega Sporting Events and human rights. In fact, both the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union have produced soft pronouncements on the 
matter.  
 
The European Parliament (EP) has certainly been the most active EU institution on these issues 
in the past as well as in the present.302 There are numerous resolutions and other non-binding 
acts of the EP referencing the need to account for human rights in the context of Mega Sporting 
 
301 In other words: “Emphasis should be made on the role of sport in the Union's external relations, including the 
promotion of European values.” Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, 
14279/16, accessed at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14279-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 
2021). 
302 For a historical perspective, see Salm, C. (2018) Major sporting events versus human rights: Parliament's 
position on the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina and the 1980 Moscow Olympics, Briefing, European 







Events. Moreover, MEPs have regularly used their power to ask critical questions to the EC 
with regard to alleged human rights violations linked to Mega Sporting Events. In recent years, 
much of the EP’s attention was focused on the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The EP has for 
example issued a Resolution in November 2013 on the situation of migrant workers in Qatar, 
in which it strongly reminded “FIFA that its responsibility goes beyond the development of 
football and the organisation of competitions and calls on it, with the active support of its 
European members, to send a clear and strong message to Qatar to prevent the preparations 
for the 2022 Football World Cup being overshadowed by allegations of forced labour”.303  
 
This amounts to a call for FIFA to engage in diplomatic actions to encourage Qatar to guarantee 
the respect of fundamental labour rights on building sites linked to the 2022 World Cup. The 
EP has also repeatedly voiced its concerns “that some major sports events are being hosted by 
authoritarian states where human rights and fundamental freedoms violations occur” and 
emphasised “the need for awareness-raising campaigns among the general public concerning 
the need to ensure human rights provisions in regard to sports events”.304 Interestingly, it has 
called on “the EU and its Member States to engage with the UNHCR and other multilateral 
forums, as well as with national sports federations, corporate actors and civil society 
organisations to ensure full compliance with human rights in such events, including by being 
one of the determining awarding criteria for major international sports events”.305 In another 
important resolution from 2016, the EP calls expressly “for the development of an EU policy 
 
303 European Parliament, Resolution of 21 November 2013 on Qatar: situation of migrant workers 
(2013/2952(RSP)), 2016/C 436/08, Para. 16 
304 European Parliament, Resolution of 17 December 2015 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2015/2229(INI)) (2017/C 399/19), 
para. 75. See similarly European Parliament, Resolution of 14 December 2016 on the Annual Report on human 
rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter 2015 (2016/2219(INI)) (2018/C 
238/06), para. 97. European Parliament, Resolution of 13 March 2014 on EU priorities for the 25th session of the 
UN Human Rights Council (2014/2612(RSP))(2017/C 378/28) Para. 48. 
305 Ibid. For a similar call, see also European Parliament, Resolution of 12 March 2015 on the EU’s priorities for 
the UN Human Rights Council in 2015 (2015/2572(RSP)) (2016/C 316/21), para. 51. [‘[…]calls for the EU and 
its Member States to actively raise this issue, including at the UNHRC, and to engage with national sports 
federations, corporate actors and civil society organisations on the modalities of their participation in such events, 
including with regard to the first European Games in Baku in 2015 and the FIFA World Cup in Russia in 2018 
and Qatar in 2022;’] and European Parliament, Resolution of 21 January 2016 on the EU’s priorities for the 
UNHRC sessions in 2016 (2015/3035(RSP)) (2018/C 011/10), para. 58 [Is seriously concerned that some major 
sports events are being hosted by authoritarian states where human rights violations occur; calls for the UN and 
the EU Member States to raise this issue and engage with national sports federations, corporate actors and civil 
society organisations on the practicalities of their participation in such events, including with regard to the FIFA 







framework on sport and human rights”.306 In 2017, MEPs recognised that sports should be 
“considered an opportunity, to strengthen dialogue and solidarity with third countries, to 
promote the protection of basic human rights and freedoms worldwide and to support EU 
external policy”.307 In its most recent resolution, the European Parliament urged “public 
authorities, sports federations and organisations to uphold human rights and democratic 
principles in all of their actions, especially when awarding host status for major sporting 
events, as well as in the choice of sponsors” and insisted “that major sporting events should no 
longer be awarded to countries where these fundamental rights and values are repeatedly 
violated”.308  
Based on these statements, it is plain that the EP is willing to support an EU sport diplomacy 
which would be directed at a multiplicity of actors (private and public, national and 
transnational) and would tackle head-on human rights issues connected with Mega Sporting 
Events.  
 
b. The Council of the European Union and Human Rights at Mega Sporting 
Events:  
 
The Council of the European Union has been less active on these questions. Nevertheless, its 
conclusions on ‘Enhancing integrity, transparency and good governance in major sport 
events’309 acknowledged that in the context of “major sport events relevant integrity and 
governance issues are raised such as […]human rights, including children’s rights and 
workers’ rights and gender equality as well as the prevention of all forms of discrimination 
[…]”.310 In this regard, the Council invited the Member States to commit to requesting “from 
all stakeholders involved as partners in major sports event to comply with recognized 
 
306 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 December 2016 on the Annual Report on human rights and democracy 
in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter 2015 (2016/2219(INI)) (2018/C 238/06), para. 97. 
307 European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good 
governance, accessibility and integrity (2016/2143(INI))(2018/C 252/01), para. AJ. 
308 European Parliament (2021), Report on EU sports policy: assessment and possible ways forward 
(2021/2058(INI)), para. 19. 
309 Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council - Enhancing integrity, transparency and good governance in major sport events (31 May 2016) 
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international standards and participate in initiatives such as UN Global Compact, UN Guiding 
principles on Business and Human Rights […]” and of using “transparent and relevant 
principles as the basis for providing public support of major sport events regarding specific 
integrity issues such as human rights, including children’s rights and workers’ rights and 
gender equality”.311 It also urged the “international sport movement” to consider “to comply 
with recognized international standards and participate in initiatives such as the UN Global 
Compact, the UN Guiding principles on Business and Human Rights and ISO 26000 and 
2012”,312 as well as to “develop and publish a catalogue of realistic requirements in the bidding 
phase of major sport events including transparent selection procedures and relevant selection 
criteria for the awarding of major sport events, regarding specific integrity issues such as 
human rights, including children’s rights and workers’ rights and gender equality, as well as 
the prevention of all forms of discrimination […]”.313 Finally, in its recent 2021 Resolution on 
the key features of a European Sport Model, the Council of European Union invited the sport 
movement to respect “fundamental and human rights and in this regard take accountable 
decisions on the hosts for major sporting events both within and outside the European 
Union”.314 While these conclusions are not mandating specific actions, they might be seen as 
outlining the expectations of the Council with regard to human rights in the context of Mega 
Sporting Events. This supports the idea that ensuring the respect for human rights around Mega 
Sporting Events should become one of the core focus areas for a future EU sport diplomacy.  
 
 
c. The European Commission and the European External Action Service and 
Human Rights at Mega Sporting Events 
 
Finally, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has not developed any strong policy 
commitments on human rights and Mega Sporting Events. However, when pushed by MEPs 
through parliamentary questions the then High Representative Ashton replied that the “EU 
 
311 Ibid., para. 17. 
312 Ibid., para. 27. 
313 Ibid., para. 30. 
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considers that at this juncture, the FIFA World Cup could represent an opportunity not to be 
missed for the enhancement of the rights of migrant workers in Qatar, and will continue to 
liaise with local authorities as well as FIFA and other relevant sport stakeholders on the 
implementation of recent commitments in this field”.315 The EC did include a commitment to 
prepare “guiding principles relating to democracy, human rights and labour rights, in 
particular in the context of the awarding procedure of major sport events” in its European 
Union Work Plan for Sport (2014-2017).316 The Guiding Principles in question were completed 
by an expert group in 2016,317 but it remains unclear whether they have triggered any follow-
up action inside or outside the EU. The main contribution of the EEAS to greater respect for 
human rights in the context of Mega Sporting Events came with its financial support for the 
Mega-Sporting Events Platform and the launch of the new Centre for Sport and Human Rights 
in Geneva in June 2018.318 Hence, there is still a lot of room for a systematic approach to 
furthering human rights in the context of Mega Sporting Events through EU sport diplomacy.  
 
Overall, the EU has shown a steady commitment to addressing human rights concerns raised 
by Mega Sporting Events. Yet, to date, this call has not been followed up by strong action on 
the side of the EC or the EEAS. It is in our view essential that a future EU sport diplomacy 
strategy entails a clear and effective commitment to the normative core of the European 
integration project: human rights. In this regard, a set of recommendations are presented in the 
conclusion of this study.  
  
 
315 Answer to Question E-001866/14. 
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For many countries, sport diplomacy is a means of strengthening diplomatic, social and 
political relations with other countries, as well as achieving various foreign policy objectives. 
Through sport, a country or a community can improve and refine its image, brand and influence 
on the international stage. 
 
Despite the obvious notion that the majority of sport diplomacy initiatives are recognized and 
implemented on a national level involving high-profile diplomats and various political figures, 
it is fundamental to think of sport diplomacy beyond the state context. Diplomatic actions may 
be obvious at the elite sport level, with international sports events such as the Olympic Games, 
but what about the people-to-people dialogue, coalitions and cross-border exchanges that 
happen at the grassroots level on a regular base?  
 
This type of sport diplomacy may be less familiar, but it tends to be more inclusive and involves 
a wider range of actors, including those not formally connected to the state. It is evident that in 
a colourful sporting landscape, beside the state apparatus, non-state actors have begun to play 
an increasingly important role in international relations. These non-state actors have attributes 
of modern international relations, and they focus on the security of individuals, their 
safeguarding and empowerment.  
 
For many years, non-state actors have carried out projects covering a range of themes such as 
inclusion of disadvantaged young people, fighting gender inequality, supporting refugees, 
people with disability and more. They have understood that sport can be a particularly vigorous 








This chapter presents an overview of the potential of grassroots sport diplomacy and all the 
informal pathways it can offer for generating diplomacy opportunities and uniting states and 
people via sport and physical activities. The chapter outlines examples of grassroots sport 
diplomacy projects that have increased social cohesion and encouraged reconciliation, both on 
inter-state and intra-state level. Moreover, it will shed light on ‘exploiting’ sport as an element 
of dialogue and collaboration by third countries, particularly in raising awareness of sport’s 
potential in promoting external policies whilst in an accession process. The chapter will 
encompass the results and objectives achieved by the sport non-governmental organization 
TAKT, a partner in the current project.  
 
 
2. What is Grassroots Sport Diplomacy (GSD)? 
 
Since the concept of grassroots sport diplomacy is a new field of interest, it has not received 
much attention in the literature. Pioneers in this field are the International Association of Sport 
and Culture (ISCA) who defined GSD as: “an inductive concept and can be considered as a 
new type of diplomacy, complementary to traditional and formal diplomacy, where individuals 
and civil society play a key role. GSD can be defined as a set of practices, methods and 
activities built on grassroots sport actions developed at a local scale and benefiting from a 
sectorial and cross-sectorial approach. GSD aims to strengthen intercultural relations 
between actors and where civil society and individuals have a strong commitment to carrying 
out sustainable and impacting effects of the initiatives (like exchanges between communities, 
transfer and sharing of good practices, events, network etc)”.319 
 
Furthermore, grassroots sport diplomacy could be defined as a new qualitative, cost efficient 
and impactful approach aiming at: 
 
- Bringing people together, without discrimination, thanks to grassroots sport; 
- Creating or developing a lasting dialogue between communities and fostering cultural 
 
319 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions. Accessed at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/project-result-content/eed6587e-91c1-4ede-a5a5-








- Facilitating share and transfer of information, knowledge and good practices between 
the grassroots sport sector and relevant actors (other grassroots sport organisations, 
states, NGOs, civil society, individuals, etc.); 
- Contributing to societal and individual development in the health, cultural, educational, 
sports or social fields. 
 
The European Commission (DG EAC) established a High-Level Group (HLG) on Grassroots 
Sport, under the political leadership of Commissioner Tibor Navracsics. In its report, the HLG 
defined the concept of grassroots sport as “physical leisure activity, organised and non-
organised, practised regularly at non-professional level for health, educational or social 
purposes.”320  
 
Among the general and specific recommendations delivered by the experts in this group, social 
inclusion and informal learning/skills development are enlisted as potential opportunities that 
should be amplified by the EU.  Namely, the latter recommendation is in line with the Council 
Conclusions of May 2015 on maximising the role of grassroots sport in developing transversal 
skills, especially among young people, that outline the educational potential of grassroots 
sport.321 The report highlights that grassroots sport could contribute by using its social and 
educational potential to promote tolerance, mutual understanding and European values.  
 
According to the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy which was established at the same 
time as its grassroots sport equivalent, sport has the potential to contribute towards: 
 
- Improvement of foreign policy and international relations; 
- Reach external audiences more deeply, positively and effectively; 
- Support external policies; 
 
320 Report to Commissioner Tibor Navracsics, “Grassroots Sport – Shaping Europe”, High Level Group on Sport 
Diplomacy, 29/06/2016, accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/hlg-
grassroots-final_en.pdf (17 December 2021).  
321 Council of the European Union (2015) Council conclusions on maximising the role of grassroots sport in 
developing transversal skills, especially among young people, 2015/C 172/03, accessed at: https://eur-







- Enhance external image and influence; 
- Facilitate changes and/or increase momentum in diplomatic practices and more. 
 
In addition, the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy considered sport diplomacy as a tool 
of ‘soft power’ to be used in three of the five approaches that define ‘public diplomacy’, namely 
advocacy, cultural diplomacy and exchange diplomacy. Sport should be an element of dialogue 
and cooperation with partner countries and third countries as a part of the EU’s diplomacy.322    
 
 
3. Why Grassroots Sport Diplomacy? 
 
Grassroots sport diplomacy is about people-to-people value-based communication, exchanges 
and mobility which have been happening on a regular base outside of the governmental radars.  
More and more not-for-profit organizations are tapping into their potential, experience and 
good communication skills in promoting this concept and labelling their activities as grassroots 
sport diplomacy projects. Their work has always been built upon principles such as inclusion, 
solidarity, human rights and equality and they have successfully used soft power for civic 
engagement and development.  
 
Being fundamentally a bottom-up and peer-oriented approach, and being focused on mutual 
development and benefit, grassroots sport diplomacy is growing both as a concept and practice 
in national and international relations. Diplomacy is no longer perceived through the ‘embassy 
window’ and it is not an exclusive domain of diplomats and government employees.  
 
Grassroots sport diplomacy is becoming widely recognized and remains an open and accessible 
field for many diverse actors, ranging from highly influential international sport federations 
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4. Examples of good practices developed and supported by ISCA 
 
ISCA is a leading sport organization in grassroots sport diplomacy and has been very vocal in 
promoting grassroots sport and physical education as an opportunity for sport diplomacy. They 
have developed a methodology and manuals which sport organizations and sport clubs can use 
if their purpose is to practice grassroots sport diplomacy.323 Discussed below are GSD pilot 
actions which were supported, facilitated, monitored and evaluated by ISCA. All of the actions 
included specific interventions such as policy exchanges, new partnership approaches, and 
event-based collaboration. Each pilot action was an experimentation to enable small scale 
grassroots sport diplomacy activities and their development between two or more international 
stakeholders and they all adhered to one or more of the following principles:  
 
• Transfer or sharing of successful practices through international technical cooperation; 
• Transfer or sharing of successful practices through non-governmental partnerships; 
• International campaigns or events as tools to promote grassroots sport values and 
specific agendas; 
• Multi-sector networks for the exchange of successful practices and/or advocacy. 
 
 
CASE 1: WE WELCOME YOUNG REFUGEES  
 
Implementing agency: Krainem FC, Belgium  
 
Stakeholders: FEDASIL, UEFA Foundation for Children, The Royal Belgian Football 
Association, The European Commission, Municipality of Krainem, King Baudouin 
Foundation, Engie Foundation and Levi Strauss & Co. 
 
Description of the project: This GSD project was implemented under the pillar: Transfer or 
sharing of successful practices through non-governmental partnerships. With its Academy, 
 
323 ISCA, Grassroots Sport Diplomacy Online course, accessible at https://learn.isca.org/courses/grassroots-sport-







based in Brussels, the club deployed all its experience and resources to welcome 20-30 young 
asylum seekers per week, in order to provide them with clothing, food, language courses and 
football practices.  
 
Results: The club identified female refugees in order to start a team since women’s football 
was gaining increasing relevance and although girls are not a majority among refugees, they 
are a sensitive group. The model has already been presented to other amateur football clubs 
and a network of clubs has been established. During the course of this project, this network has 
strengthened its capacities and links.  
 
 
CASE 2: BUILDING RELATIONS BETWEEN HUNGARY AND COLOMBIA THROUGH 
GRASSROOTS SPORT 
 
Implementing agencies: National School, University and Leisure Sport Federation Hungary 
(NSULF) and Colombia. 
 
Stakeholders: Colombian Ministry for External Relations; Hungarian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs; Hungarian Ministry for Human Capacities; Colombian Embassy in Hungary; National 
School, University and Leisure Sport Federation; Hungarian Swimming Federation; Sport 
Department of Budapest Mayor’s Office, Coldeportes Arauca, Budapest Association for 
International Sports and different grassroots sports clubs in Colombia. 
 
Description of the project: This GSD project was implemented under the pillar: Transfer or 
sharing of successful practices through international technical cooperation. As stated in the 
project description, from 11-20 of November 2018, a Colombian delegation composed of 
young female swimmers and a Colombian coach and diplomat visited the Hungarian Capital. 
The initiative was a part of the Colombian Ministry for External Relations’ sport diplomacy 
program and aimed to strengthen intercultural understanding, mutual dialogue and cooperation 









Results: (1) Establishing relations with the Colombian grassroots sport sector; (2) Exchanging 
best practices on how to increase participation in grassroots sports and how to boost levels of 
physical activity; (3) Providing opportunities to disadvantaged young people for personal 
development through engaging in sport-based cross-border mobility; (4) Incentivising high-
level policy dialogue on good practices related to the grassroots sport sector. 
 
Legacy: The project started a dialogue with Colombian organisations that might be potential 
partners for NSULF in the promotion of its good practices, such as the European School Sport 
Day. Profiting from the GSD concept, which has a people-to-people approach, it is possible to 
follow up with this initiative by keeping track of the participants both at personal and at 
institutional level, in order to increase the dialogue between countries and institutions for 
further collaboration. This further demonstrates that grassroots sport actions can contribute to 
public diplomacy further projects in the future. 
 
CASE 3: TRAINING PHYSICAL ACTIVITY LEADERS IN MULTICULTURAL 
ENVIRONMENT  
 
Implementing agency: Fundació Unió Barcelonina d'Activitats Esportives (UBAE) and 
Associació Esportiva Ciutat Vella and Eurofitness Edu training centre, Eurofitness Perill sport 
club. 
 
Project description: The pilot action took place in Barcelona as a part of a grassroots sport 
diplomacy project funded by Erasmus+. To test the concept of GSD, UBAE planned an 
intervention in the Ciutat Vella district, an underserved region of the city that hosts migrant 
families from different nationalities. The overall idea was to train a multicultural group into 
physical activity leaders. The training was free of charge, and conducted in accordance with 
the requirements set for courses to recognised by the sports department of Catalonia, meaning 








Results: The pilot action has allowed for the training of 26 youth leaders from a district of 
Barcelonan on sport activities development and implementation. The trainees received 80 
hours of physical education training distributed in different subjects (first aid, physical activity 
management, educational methods and games). These leaders came from a range of different 
countries (Morocco, Spain, Philippines, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, Guinea Conakry, Syria 
and Pakistan) and they lived together in the same district of Barcelona. The concept of sport 
diplomacy has been introduced to be used as a pathway to integrate members from different 
communities.  
 
Legacy:  The organisers aimed to ensure the sustainability of the project, by extending its 
implementation and sharing the experiences and achievements of the participants, especially 
in the work environment. The project promotes the sharing of their stories of success and 
problems encountered as a guide for future participants and organisations. For future 
implementation, the organising entity is searching for financial resources. Negotiations with 
the municipality have been set up, and thanks to its achievements, the entity received a grant 
from the municipality for the implementation of the course during the next year. 
 
 
CASE 4: WOMEN ON THE FIELD/MULHERES EM CAMPO 
 
Implementing agency: Social Service of Commerce (SESC) Brazil 
 
Project description: This pilot action was an effort to set up an international network focused 
on women’s football between Brazil, as a leading country, and neighbouring countries 
Argentina and Uruguay. The main achieved objectives were (1) To create a network of South 
American institutions that work with women football; (2) To enable the exchange of 
information among partners and best practices, considering their reality and culture and to 
better understand what challenges they face and what solutions they already have; (3) To 
deepen partners understanding on grassroots sport diplomacy; (4) To lead partners to discover 









Results: During the 9 months implementation period, the newly created network was able to 
provide (1) Sports equipment donations between partners; (2) Exchange of good practices in 
communications strategies, share of training methodologies for women; (3) Job opportunities 
for network members; (4) New partners for a new project “Love. Fútbol” with Perifeminas; (5) 
The creation of a calendar of local women's football activities to articulate and integrate more 
people inside and outside the network and (6) Collaborative work to set up the Forum. 
 
 
5. Other examples of grassroots sport diplomacy initiatives  
  
CASE: SPORT DIPLOMACY ACADEMY 
 
Project description: The Sport Diplomacy Academy (SDA) project is the legacy of the first 
Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU 2018 and focusses on the Western Balkans 
(WB). The project involved 4 partners:  EU Applicants – Bulgarian sports development 
association (BSDA) and the Croatian sport umbrella organization – Rijeka sport association, 
ENDAS - Italian grassroots sport organization and 1 WB NGO (BRAVO - Bosnian Youth and 
sport NGO). The project will ensure the educational mobility of coaches and other staff of sport 
organisations (including volunteers) linked to professional and grassroots sport. The 4 modules 
of mobility, held in each one of the partner countries with the same group of participants from 
the project target group will improve their competences, as well as their qualifications, and 
allow them to acquire new skills through learning mobility and spending a period of time in a 
foreign country (in and outside the EU). Learning mobility will be planned as an investment in 
human capital and a contribution to the capacity building of various sport organisations with 
clear focus on building a network of well-trained sport diplomats.324 
 
Main project activities: (1) Prioritizing the EU perspective and connectivity of the WB, 
 
324 Bulgarian Sports Development Association, Sport Diplomacy Academy  







referring to the Sofia Declaration and Sofia Priority Agenda325; (2) Both the EU and the WB 
partners should continue to invest efforts in strengthening the cooperation and good practices 
exchange, focused on democracy, security and fundamental rights. 
 
 
6. Grassroots Sport Diplomacy Good Practices Initiatives on a global stage 
  
The European Commission study on Sport Diplomacy, Identifying Good Practices published 
in 2018326 carried out in the framework of the 2017-2020 EU Work Plan for Sport highlighted 
a specific good practice of how Member States have supported projects that use sport as a tool 
to foster social and economic development within partner countries outside of the EU. The 
study made four recommendations:  
 
- Capacity building workshops be held. 
- Sport for development should be identified as an explicit priority in relevant EU 
funding instruments. 
- Larger scale research should be undertaken on the current state of play and  
- Actions should be developed to support dissemination of and knowledge sharing on 
good practices. 
 
The Study addressed the following themes and highlighted the following examples of good 
practice: 
 
1 Disadvantaged young people: 
1.a Youth Development through Football (2007-2014) – Germany for 10 African 
Countries - Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia. 
 
325 European Council (2018) EU Western Balkan Summit, Sofia Declaration, accessed at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34776/sofia-declaration_en.pdf (17 December 2021). 
326 ECORYS (2017), Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission. 
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1.b Rugby Social (2012-ongoing) – France for Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, 
Madagascar, Cuba. 
1.c Using sport to reduce school dropouts (2016-2019) – France for Burundi. 
 
2 Disability: 




3.a Addressing Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) through football (2014-
2017) – UK for Kenya 




4.a Use of sport to promote health awareness and gender equality (2013-2018) – 
Germany for Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia and Togo, and individual 
measures on a smaller scale in other African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, DR Congo). 
 
5 Refugees: 
5.a East Africa Refugee Programme (2008 - ongoing) – Sweden for Kenya, 
Uganda, Djibouti and South Sudan. 
 
6 Projects linked to major events: 
6.a Leadership and Excellence in Athletics programme (LEAP) (2015-2017) – UK 
for Argentina, Azerbaijan, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Kosovo, Mozambique, St 
Lucia, Senegal and Uganda 








All the above listed examples have used sport and physical activities to promote different 
development goals, either at local or national level.   
 
 
7. Grassroots sport diplomacy projects implemented by non-governmental 
organization TAKT (Together Advancing Common Trust) 
 
NGO TAKT (Together Advancing Common Trust) is a non-governmental organization whose 
work is built on three main strategic pillars: (1) the empowerment of girls and women; (2) 
strong advocacy agenda on advancing gender equality and (3) peacebuilding and social 
cohesion through sport.   
 
TAKT has been involved in the ISCA’s leading project on Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, and 
within the framework of this project they have implemented the initiative Building Bridges 
Through Grassroots Sport Diplomacy between North Macedonia and Kosovo. 
 
 
CASE 1: BUILDING BRIDGES THROUHG GRASSROOTS SPORT DIPLOMACY BETWEEN 
NORTH MACEDONIA AND KOSOVO 
 
Implementing partner: Non-governmental organization AKTI, Kosovo 
 
Project Description: The project action “Building Bridges Through Grassroots Sport 
Diplomacy’’ can be categorised as a GSD transfer or sharing of successful practices through 
non-governmental partnerships, meaning it is an initiative that seeks to share experiences and 
good practices implemented by civil society organizations with a view to promote the practice 
of sport and social development. The target group were girls aged 12-16, from rural areas and 
with different ethnic backgrounds. This particular group was selected because they are the most 
vulnerable and girls from marginalized areas have less opportunity to participate in tailored 
sports programs. The target group was from two selected municipalities, both rural and with 







been empowered to further engage in peer-to peer transfer of knowledge and experience.  
 
Project results: (1) Increased cooperation, peace building and exchange across borders 
between North Macedonia and Kosovo through grassroots sport cooperation in order to build 
upon good practices and the overcoming of migration crisis within the region; (2) Empowered 
young girls in North Macedonia and Kosovo through their mutual engagement in a common 
grassroots sport initiative connecting the region; (3) Raised awareness of sport diplomacy’s 
power to connect people and nations in the region through mutual regional campaign: The 
Power of Grass Root Sport – Building Bridges. 
 
Legacy: TAKT outlined the following recommendations: (1) creating strong, stable and 
community-based partnerships on GSD; (2) importance of solid governing principles and 
guidelines for grassroots sport interventions; (3) transparency and accountability of all relevant 
stakeholders as well as correct communication and solidarity between partner organisations.  
 
 
CASE 2: BUILDING BRIDGES THROUHG GRASSROOTS SPORT DIPLOMACY BETWEEN 
NORTH MACEDONIA AND GREECE 
 
Implementing partner: Greenways Social Cooperative Enterprise, Greece 
 
Project Description: The project “Building Bridges Through Grassroots Sport Diplomacy 
Between North Macedonia and Greece” examines how sport diplomacy can play a role in 
encouraging dialogue and cultural understanding by engaging communities and strengthening 
people-to-people links between the youth of North Macedonia and Greece. By introducing 
grassroots sport-based mobility, this project fosters links between young people of two 
countries and fighting prejudices, thus building tolerance between people of different cultures 
and origins. The soft power of these exchanges opens more doors for people to participate and 
ultimately leads to more inclusion in sport and physical activity, while promoting international 








Main project objectives: (1) Establishing and supporting relations with the Greek grassroots 
sport sector (2) Providing opportunities to young people for personal development through 
engaging in sport-based cross-border mobility (3) To enable the exchange of information 
among partners and best practices, considering their reality and culture and to allow 
participants to better understand what challenges they face and what solutions they already 
have (4) Building stronger links between North Macedonia and Greece and raise awareness on 
the potential of sport as a soft power / public diplomacy tool.   
 
It is important to note that this project will be implemented in the Prespa region and for the 
first time it will enable collaboration on a grassroots level between the sport sector and youth 
from North Macedonia and Greece. This is an important region as the so called Prespa 
Agreement327 was signed there. This Agreement was signed  on 12 June 2018 between Greece 
and the Republic of Macedonia under the United Nations’ auspices, resolving a long-standing 
dispute over the latter’s name. The Agreement was signed beside Lake Prespa from which it 
took its name and was ratified by the Parliaments of both countries on 25 January 2019. The 
Agreement entered into force on 12 February 2019328 when the two countries notified the UN 
of the deal's completion, following the ratification of the NATO accession protocol for North 
Macedonia on 8 of February.329 It replaces the interim accord of 1995 and sees the country's 
constitutional name, then Republic of Macedonia, changed to Republic of North Macedonia 
erga omnes.  
 
This project has the potential to be a great example of grassroots sport diplomacy between 
estranged nations that have experienced conflict and turbulent period. This one-of-a-kind 
 
327 Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of 
a Strategic Partnership between the Parties (Prespa, 17 June 2018), accessed at:  
https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/eidikathemata/agreement.pdf (17 December 2021). 
328 United Nations, Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Prespa Agreement, 13 
February 2019, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-02-13/statement-attributable-the-spokesman-for-the-
secretary-general-prespa-agreement (Last Accessed September 2021). 
329 BBC, Macedonia and Greece: Vote settles 27-year name dispute, 25 January 2019 







project will seek partnership with organizations from both countries, by engaging numerous 
local sports clubs, associations and athletes in cross-border collaborative activities.  
 
8. Grassroots sport diplomacy as part of the accession process  
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the Republic of North 
Macedonia and the EU entered into force in April 2004.330 The passage to the second stage of 
the SAA, which the Commission had proposed in 2009, took place during the reporting period. 
Since 2009, the Commission recommended to the Council to open accession negotiations with 
North Macedonia, a candidate country since 2005.  
In the summary of North Macedonia’s 2019 Report, a total of 33 chapters have been outlined 
relevant to the progress achieved by the Macedonian Government.331 Among the 33 chapters, 
the most challenging ones, such as the rule of law and fundamental rights, the fight against the 
corruption and organized crime, the chapter No 26 Education and Culture, includes sport with 
a short paragraph. Namely, the report reflects on the following “The Law on sports has been 
amended to introduce tax relief measures for companies investing in sports. The governmental 
procedure on the law began in Q1 2019. The strategy on sports still needs to be developed. The 
annual budget for sports increased from 0.3% in 2017 to 1.4% in 2018, increasing young 
people’s participation in sport activities. North Macedonia participated for the first time in the 
European Week of Sports by organising a large number of sport activities in the country. It 
adds that Public spending on education, training, youth and sport remained at 3.8% of GDP 
in 2018.” Evidently, sport has been given very little time and attention within the report.  
 
 
330 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part - Protocol 1 on textile and clothing 
products - Protocol 2 on steel products - Protocol 3 on trade between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and the Community in processed agricultural products - Protocol 4 concerning the definition of the concept of 
"originating products" and methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 5 on mutual administrative assistance 
in customs matters - Final Act. OJ L 84, 20.3.2004 
331 European Commission (2019), Commission Staff Working Document: North Macedonia Report , COM(2019) 
260 final. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-north-







9. Funding opportunities for grassroots sport diplomacy 
This section of the chapter highlights the funding support that North Macedonia has received 
as a candidate member for accession to the EU. Different aspects and topics were addressed. 
Sport and development were once again excluded from the list.  
1. Instrument for Pre-Accession Program (IPA) 
North Macedonia - financial assistance under IPA II 
Indicative funding allocation 2014-2020:  € 608.7 million 
The priority sectors for funding in this period are: democracy and governance; rule of law and 
fundamental rights; environment and climate action; transport; competitiveness and 
innovation; social development; agriculture and rural development; regional and territorial 
cooperation. The latter would greatly resonate with grassroots sport diplomacy as it promotes 
and encourages good neighbourly relations as well as promoting socio-economic development 
in border areas. 
2. Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of North Macedonia 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is represented in the Republic of North 
Macedonia by the Delegation of the European Union. Under Art. 221(2) TFEU "Union 
delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They shall act in close cooperation with Member States' 
diplomatic and consular missions". The Delegations represent the European Union and serve 
the European Union's interests throughout the world.332 As it is mentioned on the website, the 
Delegation of the European Union is a contracting authority for more than 250 past and ongoing 
projects. Sport diplomacy has not yet been listed within these projects and clear potential 
remains for this to occur. 
 
332 European External Action Service (EEAS), About the EU Delegation to the Republic of North Macedonia, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/republic-north-macedonia/1456/about-eu-delegation-republic-north-







For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the Council of Europe programme office 
in Skopje was established in 2012.333 It currently implements projects in the framework of a 
joint cooperation programme with the European Union, Horizontal Facility for the Western 
Balkans and Turkey 2019 - 2022 (Horizontal Facility II), with a focus on justice (prisons and 
police reform; enhancing courts’ compliance with human rights standards to combat ill-
treatment and impunity); economic crimes; promoting anti-discrimination and protecting the 
rights of vulnerable groups (victims of trafficking of human beings for labour exploitation) and 
freedom of expression and freedom of the media. 
 
10.  Conclusion 
Sport diplomacy is a complex landscape and many different actors are performing and 
engaging through their own arrangements and methodologies. Some of them are well- 
structured and some are vague and more unshapen. Nevertheless, they all have the same 
common goal: creating dialogue and connection through sport. Sport diplomacy is targeted to 
help promote social inclusion, peacebuilding or improving gender equality, improving inter-
state and intra-state relations and collaboration are the mutual outcomes for all involved.  
The EU is a new player in the field of sport diplomacy. Within the EU institutions, the 
connection of soft power, sport and diplomacy is becoming natural and a frequent commodity. 
Being a powerful and prominent player means that it can inspire and direct single Member 
States to acknowledge the opportunities and commitments by respective Governments. Setting 
up sport in general and sport diplomacy specifically as a priority and suitable possibility to 
expand one country’s image and international relations will be undoubtedly reflected in 
national policies and strategies. This implies that sport will no longer sit in the margins and 
will be included in the communications, reports, strategies and national policies, alongside 
other pressing topics and sectorial themes. Furthermore, supporting the idea that sport 
diplomacy could be a great potential and possibility to promote and strengthen international 
relations within the accession process of third countries will be a vital signal for Governments 
 
333 North Macedonia, Council of Europe Programme Office in Skopje, https://www.coe.int/en/web/skopje/home 







of candidates’ countries. Following that logic, funding and subsidizing initiatives for grassroots 












Since the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy published its report in 2016, the EU has taken 
its first tentative steps at practicing sport diplomacy. However, these steps have been ad hoc 
and lacking strategic orientation. The arguments for becoming more strategic are now 
compelling:  
 
- The EU and its Member States have an envious sporting heritage. As sport plays such 
an important role in European society, why does it not play a more prominent role in 
the EU’s foreign policy? After all, EU diplomacy is meant to reflect what is best about 
European society. 
 
- The EU has a maturing foreign policy and a Global Strategy. Lessons from Australia 
and the U.S. highlight that sport has a proven track record of reaching wide audiences 
and amplifying diplomatic messages. Sport can help the EU achieve its foreign policy 
goals in a rapidly changing and increasingly unstable international environment. 
 
- The EU has existing expertise and capacity to develop and implement a sport diplomacy 
strategy. Article 165 TFEU equips the EU with the basis to act, the European 
Commission has acquired in-depth knowledge of sport and has built strong relations 
with the sports movement, the European External Action Service (EEAS) is well placed 
to assist with the delivery of such a strategy and the EU possesses a range of financing 
instruments, such as Erasmus+, that can support sport diplomacy initiatives. A sport 
diplomacy strategy can also build on knowledge acquired in the development of EU 
cultural and educational diplomacy.  
 
- The Member States of the EU are increasingly turning to sport to amplify their own 







strategies. EU action can complement national efforts by adding consistency and 
coherence. It can help with their formulation (through the sharing of best practice), and 
it can assist in securing better outcomes and impact (by assisting with implementation, 
providing a wider platform and sharing resources).  
 
- The EU is being left behind by some of its partners and competitors who now routinely 
deploy sport as part of their diplomatic repertoire. Why would the EU not want to use 
all available means to help secure its goals?  
 






1. The Commission, Council and Parliament should adopt and implement a sport 
diplomacy strategy. In doing so, they should take note of best practice, notably the sport 
diplomacy strategies of Australia and the U.S.  
 
2. A value-based networked sport diplomacy model should be considered, with a broad 
network of public and non-state actors involved in mostly people-to-people and 
grassroots engagements. 
 
3. The EU’s sport diplomacy strategy should seek to complement and add value to the 
established and emerging sport diplomacy strategies of the Member States. Member 
States have many valuable pre-existing social, political and economic links with various 
parts of the world, but collectively, there are many shared values, thematic interests and 
geographical priorities, and these should be clearly defined and acted upon in an EU 










EU Institutional Considerations: 
 
4. As sport possesses a pronounced cross-cutting character and can be employed to 
advanced goals in a wide range of fields, including external relations, sport diplomacy 
should be mainstreamed into the work of all EU institutions and services, especially 
those with an external facing remit such as the EEAS, DG International Partnerships 
(INTPA), DG Climate Action (CLIMA), DG European Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), and Commission Service Department, Foreign 
Policy Instruments (FPI). A new specialist body (most likely located within the Sport 
Unit of DG Education, Youth, Culture and Sport (EAC) should play a central role in 
coordinating EU sport diplomacy activities and events and it should support and 
facilitate the training of those who are to be involved in the delivery of the EU’s sport 
diplomacy strategy. 
 
5. The EU should make further use of its experience of Structured Dialogue on Sport to 
ensure participation and cooperation on sport diplomacy issues with key stakeholders.  
 
6. Sport diplomacy should be more systematically integrated into the work of the EEAS 
and a sport diplomacy portfolio should be established within it, with named individuals 
responsible for the co-ordination of sport diplomacy activities. The establishment of an 
EU Sport Diplomacy Platform, or equivalent, should be considered to provide training, 
support and advice to EU Delegations and to co-ordinate their activities. Sport related 
initiatives should be incorporated into the tasks carried out by the EU Special 
Representatives in troubled regions and countries.  
 
 
Sport Diplomacy as an Expression of EU Values: 
 
7. An EU sport diplomacy strategy should reflect the EU’s core values (such as 







development, human rights, environmental protection, security) and geographical 
priorities (such as Western Balkans, Eastern and Southern Neighbours, China etc). The 
messaging should avoid the narrative of the exportation of ‘superior’ European values. 
 
8. Bilateral relations between the EU and sports governing bodies (SGB), such as the 
signature of memoranda of understanding and the provision of financial support, should 
become conditional on the official commitment of the SGB in question to respecting 
human rights and the implementation of a human rights policy and human rights due 
diligence process in line with the UN Guiding Principles. 
 
9. The EU should set up a working group including relevant stakeholders (such as SGBs, 
civil society organisations, labour unions) to exchange best practice on the safeguarding 
of human rights during Mega Sporting Events. Furthermore, the working group could 
also have the responsibility to independently assess the human rights risks of upcoming 
Mega Sporting Events and to advance concrete proposals to tackle them, which would 
then be endorsed by the EU. 
 
 
Relations with International Organisations: 
 
10. The EU should seek partnerships with organisations that already have considerable 
international outreach and credibility, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, 
and seek to complement actions being carried out by these organisations.   
 
11. The EU should step up project-based cooperation with UNESCO, explicitly linked to 
sport through strong reference to the Kazan Action Plan and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. It should do so especially through engagement with the MINEPS 
and CIGEPS instruments. 
 
12. EU Member States should ensure the Commission is systematically invited to meetings 







Anti-Doping Convention, or other major sports-related documents. While Member 
States representatives change over time, the Commission could provide the necessary 
continuity in such collaborations. 
 
13. The EU should pro-actively approach the Council of Europe with the suggestion of 
joint funding activities, for projects or actions on major issues advocated by the CoE, 





14. Athletes and former athletes (envoys) are a valued asset and should be trained and 
deployed in an EU sport diplomacy strategy as they can be effective messengers. 
 
15. Sport related matters should be incorporated into the design and implementation of EU 
external relations strategies, including within the framework of Accession, Association, 
Co-operation and European Neighbourhood agreements. The Commission should 
monitor the implementation of such agreements and liaise with key actors, such as the 
EEAS, to ensure fulfilment of the sport related objectives.  
 
16. The EU should financially support collaborative projects, research activities and 
knowledge dissemination on issues connected to sport diplomacy. This should include, 
inter alia, measuring the impact of sport diplomacy; financing collaborative 
partnerships, and assessing the human rights and environmental impacts of staging 
mega-sporting events. Under Erasmus+, the EU should consider designating Partner 
Countries as Programme Countries, so to ensure the full participation of key third states 
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